CHAPTER XIII.

KRISHNARĀJA WOḌEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*)

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1765—Invasion of Malabar, 1765-1766: Early history of Malabar—Alliance with Ali Raja of Cannanore—Further relations between Haidar and Ali Raja—Haidar sets out on the campaign; his plan of operations; his objective—The Nairs retaliate—Their tactics; Haidar's progress against them—Seeks to negotiate with the Zamorin; settlement of the Kolattiri country; Haidar advances against the Zamorin's kingdom—Invests Calicut; proposes terms to the Zamorin, April 1766; Haidar's precaution; the Zamorin temporizes; the Zamorin confined in his own palace; and burns himself to death; Haidar's exactions from the Zamorin's ministers—The settlement of the Zamorin's country—Haidar advances further south-west; reduction of Cochin and other chiefs; return to Coimbatore—Rebellion of Nair chiefs and its suppression—Territorial limits of Mysore in 1766.

Haidar at the helm of affairs.

THE usurpation of Haidar, thus far noticed, has to be reckoned an epoch-making event in the long reign of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar. Indeed, enough has been said to show how Haidar was as much an usurper of supreme authority in Mysore as his master Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, with this difference that while the latter had sought to maintain his position by recourse to conventional means, the former had come to know that the secret of success was best guaranteed by a direct appeal to arms in times of crisis. The usurpation of master and servant was, in fact, not one of kind but one of degree. If the causes which brought Haidar to the forefront were revolutionary in character, the state of the times (from 1761 onwards) was eminently suited to his furthering the work of the Daḷavāis and the early rulers of Mysore in the true spirit of a virtual Regent or *Sarvādhikāri* of Krishṇarāja.[1] For, as we have

1. *Vide* Ch. XII above, for the evidence on this point. A Persian *Memoir* from Hyderabad (c. 1800) is reminiscent of the above aspect of Haidar's work when it tells us that Haidar, on acquiring the supreme power in

seen,[2] though a Muhammadan by faith, Haidar was every inch a Hindu alike in temperament and training.

Haidar and the idea of a Southern Empire.

There was nothing strange in Haidar following in the footsteps of Nanjarāja and endeavouring to step into the breach and resuscitate the dying Empire of Vijayanagar. Nanjarāja, born in or about 1704, the very year in which Kōdaṇḍa-Rāma, the nephew and successor of Śrī-Ranga VI, died, had seen the chaos that had been wrought in the land by the lack of a central power. The idea of an Empire did not thus originate full-fledged in Haidar's active brain. The seed of Imperialism was latent amongst certain of the States which had formed old Vijayanagar, though the urge towards its realization had been great only with Mysore. The wars of king Chikka-dēva and Daḷavāi Nanjarāja were the natural expression of that spirit of adventure that had taken them beyond their own territorial limits. This was one of those matters in which Haidar was a close and devoted disciple of Nanjarāja. The idea of a new Empire had taken firm hold of Haidar. Two factors governed the situation. The first of these was the opportunity he had in Mysore to develop a centralized power, which he could use for realizing his objective; and the second was his self-confidence, confidence in his own character and capacity for action. The fall of Nanjarāja prepared the ground for Haidar developing a new technique in State-craft, which soon seems to have terrified all people round about him. His dictatorship became rapidly all-embracing in character. It concentrated all power in his hands; and it involved the complete control of every form of activity in the country. It was as nothing that, as we

Seringapatam, "continued his respectful behaviour to the titular prince (the Rāja of Mysore)," "made all conquests in his name," and sent to him "presents on such occasions." [See *Asiatic Annual Register* (1800), pp. 2-7.]

2. *Ibid.*

have seen, he tried to remodel the army; to create a navy; to be friendly to the merchants; and gather in treasure. It was the objective behind all these activities that made those who saw or heard of him, or his zeal, feel that here was a man who was quite unlike what they had seen or heard so far. He could not have been more surprised than they at the fear he had begun to inspire into them and the effective—very effective—bargaining power that he was fast developing in the threat of war that he was continually offering them for the settlement of disputed questions.

His policy of action.

What encouraged Haidar in the policy of expansion—even aggression—he resolved upon, may be briefly touched upon. If we are to judge from the situation in which he found himself, we can picture to ourselves the state of his mind. First of all, there was the chagrin he, with Nanjarāja, felt at the manner in which Mysore had been despoiled of what was due to her under the secret Treaty. The English at Madras had dealt a death-blow to the cession of Trichinopoly by alleging reasons and arguments which showed to him the utter impossibility of diplomacy proving successful where the use of other more telling means was needed. There can be no doubt that the Trichinopoly affair rankled in his heart as much as in that of Nanjarāja or any other Mysorean of the time.[3]

3. It is instructive to note here the causes of the First Mysore War (1767-1769) as set down by Kīrmāṇi—by himself and by another historian quoted by him. According to himself, the operative cause starts with "the violation of the treaty" made with the Chief of Mysore (Nanjarāja) by Muhammad Alī, and Muhammad Alī driving him away from Trichinopoly after such violation, and rebelling against the Nizām of Hyderabad and usurping the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt. Quoting the other historian's view, Kīrmāṇi adds that Muhammad Alī was "apprehensive that the affair of Trichinopoly, where he had so grossly violated his faith, still rankled like a thorn in the breast of the Nawaub (Haidar Alī), and God forbid! lest he should consequently turn his views towards Arkat (Arcot), and with the energy of the Khodadād, seize his country and wealth . . " (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 245-246). See also, on this point, Ch. XVII below.

Lives had been lost and treasure had been poured on this venture and all, it seemed, to no purpose. Was that to go unavenged? To Haidar, revenge seemed a kind of justice—may be, wild justice; still, some kind of justice, which is as the balm to the pained heart. He studied revenge, and so kept his own wounds green. The country's man-power had been drained off by the war. Trade had suffered. Public discontent had to be appeased. It was not enough that Nanjarāja had been humbled and put out of authority. The losses sustained by him had to be made good. The dues to the army had been met but the Sāhukārs had to be paid off. The treasury had been depleted and had to be filled in. A new army had to be organised, if the scheme of reconquest was to succeed. The spirit of depression which had seized the people and which had brought Nanjarāja back to Mysore had to be banished, if the new policy was to get even a sporting chance. Haidar judged of the situation before him as anyone else would have, if he had been in his place. If anything, he realised quickly that he had to do something striking, something impressive, and something even drastic to remove the defeatist spirit which had taken possession of the people. The situation called for a new policy of action, action which would keep the entire nation at work. In the then conditions, it was only military adventure—on popular lines, on lines the populace can understand—that would impress. And what would impress better than the idea of revenge for wrong done or believed to have been done? Such an idea would find a ready appeal in every human breast. Haidar grasped clearly this single fact. His own personal inclination or ambition apart, he instinctively appreciated human psychology and resolved upon a policy which would make the people hold fast to him. It was this policy of action that helped to keep Haidar, despite the faults of his character and his diplomacy, and his

differences of race and religion, at the helm of affairs for over twenty years. It glorified Mysore abroad, wiped out the unhappy memories connected with Nanjarāja's failure at Trichinopoly, and made the name of Mysore one to be feared. A man less capable than Haidar could not have hit on a policy of action which at once transformed a position so destitute of hope into one so full of promise, and granted ordinary diplomatic skill and some political prescience, so sure of success. Two other factors helped Haidar in his active policy of aggression. One was that he was, both by predilection and by upbringing, one on whom religion sat lightly. He befriended generally the Hindus and respected their scruples, their beliefs, and their religious observances. The characterisation that he was "half-a-Hindu" was not inapt in its application to him. This friendliness towards the Hindus in a Hindu state ruled by a Hindu sovereign made him, if not exactly a *persona grata* with the people generally, at least one who was regarded with a feeling akin to goodwill. This initial goodwill proved a great asset to him. It enabled him to gather strength during the beginnings of his career as Regent, and later it helped him to win over the only possible opposition that might have proved an obstacle to his progress as a conqueror.

His immediate aims and objectives.

Haidar's first objective on attaining to the Regency was the unification of the country. Towards this end, he tried to keep well with the Royal House as represented by King Krishṇarāja II and his adoptive mother, the dowager.[4] His initial step was to secure the friendship of his erstwhile master Nanjarāja, whom he deceived

4. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 68. De La Tour refers to the Dowager thus: "There was a lady at Syringpatnam, commonly called the old Dayva because her husband, brother of the King and of Nand Raja, had been regent or Dayva of the Kingdom" (*Ibid*). The reference here to "old Dayva" is probably to Dēvājamma (or Doḍḍamma) of Kaḷale, a relation of the Daḷavāi brothers and dowager queen of Krishṇarāja I and adoptive mother of Krishṇarāja II. De La Tour does not seem to

into the belief that he was still his best friend. He appeased him by making every submission to him. He assigned territory to him and made a promise, both in writing and by oath, that he would never make any attempt on his liberty, property or life, but would always regard him as his father.[5] Nanjarāja, old and gullible, was deceived once again. Then he secured Khaṇḍē Rao and despatched him to Bangalore, where he was exhibited in a cage, in which he was soon reduced to bones.[6] Next, he caused an exact account of the Royal revenues to be made, together with the treasure and the jewels. The Court Banker was examined and the jewellery pledged with him was taken back. A commission was appointed to look into his accounts and for the frauds practised by him—or alleged to have been practised by him—his property was confiscated. But this somewhat harsh judgment was tempered by his sons being appointed in his place as Court Bankers, and himself being allowed a pension to subsist on.[7] Haidar next turned his attention to the subjugation of the Pāḷegārs and certain of the principalities to the north-west. In regard to the first of these, the Pāḷegārs, his policy was not to antagonize those who yielded easily. Towards them, he professed friendliness; and as against those who showed fight, he used force. This policy of force when required

have well understood, or was ill-informed about, her exact relationship. She figures prominently in the local sources, the *Haid. Nām* and the *Annals*, and should have been about 55 years of age in 1761. She was the senior queen of Krishṇarāja I and was married to him on March 17, 1716 (*Annals*, I. 159). Though politically grasping, she is known to have been of a pious and religious disposition. A grant in her name to Brāhmans was made by Krishṇarāja II in August 1761 (see Ch. XV, f. n. 82). She appears to have lived at least till 1767, if De La Tour is to be believed. Some of De La Tour's references to her appear to be from hearsay and seem wholly lacking in foundation

5. *Ibid*, I. 72.

6. *Ibid*, I. 72-73; also Robson, *Hyder Ally*, 23. The latter wrote in 1786 "The cage with the bones is to be seen to this day, in the publ bazzar of Bengalore" (*Ibid*).

7. *Ibid*, I. 73-75.

and friendliness where possible, enabled Haidar at once to keep the country free from insurrections and to raise the levies he required for carrying out the external wars, which he well realized he could not long avoid. The first external wars he engaged in were those by which he sought to secure the natural frontiers of Mysore. Thus, his invasion of the territory of Vīrammāji, the Bednūr Rāṇi, detailed below, was intended to absorb the old Keḷadi chief's territory, which extended towards the west as far as the sea. The kingdom of Kanara, as it was known at the time, had been encroached upon by the Portuguese, who had wrested from it the kingdom of Sunda and the country of Kārvār, with its fortress of Opir, well known for its strength.[8] Haidar tried friendly overtures but, failing in them, attacked them with the superior troops at his command, and annexed all the dismembered parts of the old kingdom of Keḷadi, with the result that he extended at one bound the territorial limit of Mysore in the north-west to very near Goa. Even Goa would have been taken but for the French who were with him failing him in his attempt on the fort of Rāma. On his way back, he met Alī Rāja of Cannanore; and this opened a way for him, as we shall see, to lay the foundation for securing the western coast lower down as far as Travancore.

Giving effect to the policy.

The diplomacy of Nanjarāja, during the Daḷavāi regime, had failed because he could not carry it through in the position he found himself. The English perceived he could not make any further appeal to the sword. The

[8] *Ibid*, I. 92; also Moens' *Memo* in *Dutch Records*, No. 13, p. 151. Moens wrote in 1781: "Meanwhile he (Haidar) was hankering after the very rich kingdom of Canara, which at that time was governed by a queen." As to the Portuguese, he writes: "The Portuguese assisted him on the sly allowing many private soldiers and even officers to enter his service in order to keep this dangerous conqueror their friend. They have however since found that he has respected or spared them on this account no more than any other European nation."

moment to strike had passed and troubles nearer home called him back to his native regions. Haidar, always quick to learn and improve on what he learnt, grasped the central fact in the situation. He saw how Nanjarāja had reduced his own position and that of his country to one of misery and degradation. He realised quite clearly that weakness in armed strength means weakness in diplomacy. Demands—particularly territorial demands—are best pressed home with the backing of a strong army. Whether God is on the side of big battalions or not, there is reason to believe that Haidar was fully convinced that man cannot enforce even his just claims without a strong army to back them. He was thus led to prepare a new army to strengthen his diplomatic power. He addressed himself to this imperious duty—to recast the whole army policy of Mysore—with alacrity. He should have seen, during the course of the fight for Trichinopoly, the deficiencies and shortcomings of the Mysore army and desired to put himself in such a state of defence from attacks from outside as would make Mysore, not indeed immune—that may have been impossible—but secure against the danger of a knock-out blow immediately on the breakout of hostilities. Foremost among the necessities reckoned by him were the introduction of European discipline, ample supplies of guns of the most effective type, and sufficiency of Europeans drawn from every possible source. By assiduous application to duty, Haidar built up quickly a large army, well-disciplined and well-armed, and made it the rampart of his country's independence. At first, at any rate, his military measures were intended to reach a peaceable solution of the problem—who is to rule over the South? The question would no-longer be merely the capture of Trichinopoly. Hence it is he extended his eyes to either end of South India. He made known that a great and strong Mysore would mean a peaceful Southern India.

If the English, the Nizām or the Mahrattas started a war, it would not, he felt sure, be over a minor concern over which they differed but because there existed once more a great and strong power in Mysore in the South of India, which would guard its interests. In such a case, Mysore, he held out, would fight not only for her own existence but also fight passionately for the whole of the South of India. Thus the choice for him lay between the method of reason and the method of force. Nanjarāja had tried to reason but had been worsted again and again. There was thus no alternative left for Haidar but the method of force. So at least he felt; but before using it, he tried the method of peace.

Limitations to his policy of force.

Haidar's external policy was no doubt governed by force. But there was an important qualification to that policy. He did not want to suppress all his neighbours but desired to subordinate them to Mysore. He wanted Mysore to have its full sway over them all, since that was the only way by which the quiet and happiness of the South of India could be secured. Strange as it may seem, he was giving effect to a policy that meant the annihilation of "Moghul" extension in the South in the manner Nizām-ul-mulk intended as the pretended representative of the Mughal Emperor at Delhi, the sovereign head, against whom he himself had revolted. Haidar was, in fact, giving effect to Chikkadēva's and Nanjarāja's policy of one Empire south of the Krishṇa, with Mysore as its centre in place of old Vijayanagar. That was what he aimed at, not merely as the sum of his political philosophy but as a practical scheme of action. He built on the theme that if one Empire is gone, the next one should get ready without delay. In treating of Haidar, one suddenly perceives the daring ingenuity of his solutions to the troubles that confronted him repeatedly.

Haidar's plan of operations.

Haidar's plan of operations was to isolate the English at Madras and encircle them. With this end in view, he fixed the river Krishṇa as his northern boundary. The whole of the west coast from Goa to Travancore was to become his western boundary.[9] This meant the conquest of Bednūr, Mangalore, the whole of Malabar (with the ports of Cannanore, Calicut and Cranganore), Cochin and Travancore. Contiguous with these territories, he aimed at the conquest of Coorg and Coimbatore. Inland, towards the South, he already held the strong fort of Diṇḍigal and he befriended Mahfuz Khān, brother of Muhammad Alī, who had been appointed to the charge of the Madura and Tinnevelly countries.[10] At the same time, he kept close touch with Muḥammad Yūsuf Khān, the rebel Commandant of Madura, in order to use him, if possible, in his own interests.[11] In the country immediately south of the Tungabhadra, including Bellary and Anantpur, and in Mysore itself, he resolved on breaking up the Pāḷegārs who held sway and were found to prove a source of weakness in times of warfare.[12] He further aimed at the subjugation of the Paṭhān Nawābs of Cuddapah and Kurnool, thus seeking to establish a circular cordon along the whole extent of his northern frontier.[13] Nearer home, to the south-east, he was already master of the entire area known as the Bārāmahals, which took him half way up to the confines of Trichinopoly, besides the whole country as far as Vellore. The English had but a strip of country between Vellore and Madras, including Arcot and the country as far as Trichinopoly to the south, nominally in Muhammad Alī's possession. Tanjore was an uncertain factor. In between Diṇḍigal

9. See Chs. below.
10. See under *Madura and Tinnevelly* below.
11. See under *Yusuf Khān* below.
12. See Chs. below.
13. See Chs. below.

and Madras lay Trichinopoly, the disputed possession. The French, however, though disabled for the moment, were active in his interests and soon expected to get back Pondicherry, their capital, and they would thus be within striking distance of both Madras and Trichinopoly.[14] The country from near Masulipatam to the northward was in the hands of the Nizām, whom Haidar determined on turning into an ally of his own.[15] He desired first to digest the west coast kingdoms from north to south, settling accounts with the Portuguese and the Dutch in this region incidentally; then, turn first on the English; next, on the Mahrattas; and finally on the Nizām. If the English were done with, he felt sure he could deal with the Nizām easily. The sea-roads he desired to cut by developing a navy. For this he laid out dockyards and naval arsenals for the construction of ships of war at Honāvar, Mangalore, Calicut and other places.

Political situation in India in 1761.

The year 1761 was an eventful one in the history of India. It saw the translation of Haidar to the supreme position of *Sarvādhikāri* in Mysore, a departure from tradition as striking as it was full of portent. It marked the disappearance in the south of the final remnants of Vijayanagar rule by the death of Śrī-Ranga VII, the last of that famous dynasty known to the inscriptions.[16] In the north, the Mahrattas, who had reached the pinnacle f their power in India, were attacked by Ahmad Shah Ābdāli, the Afghan, and sustained a defeat which may

14. Pondicherry surrendered to the English on the evening of the 15th January 1761. It was restored to the French by the Peace of Paris in 1763, though with a territory less extensive. Pondicherry is by road just 102 miles South of Madras *via* Tindivanam and Chingleput; and about 123 miles N. E. of Trichinopoly *via* Volcondapuram, Vriddhāchalam and Cuddalore.

15. See Ch. XVII below.

16. Śrī-Ranga VII probably bore an attenuated rule up to about 1761, as we have no inscriptional or other records referring to him beyond 1759. Tentatively he has been assigned to 1717-1759. But probably he lived a year or two more (See *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 2416-2418).

fairly be described as closing the period during which they had tried, under the leadership of the Pēshwas at Poona, to establish imperial rule in India.[17] The Anglo-French War in South India, the counterpart of the Seven Years' War in Europe, ended, in that year, with the fall of Pondicherry and the destruction of its fortifications by the English. The French were left without a home in India, and, dispossessed of all their possessions, were compelled, if they were at all to remain in it, to seek service under independent Indian rulers, awaiting a turn of events in their favour.[18] This great French reverse, however, proved of infinite advantage to Haidar, who took over the whole of their forces into his services, an accession welcome not only as adding to his military strength but also as a means to better the discipline of his own forces, present and future. The year 1761 also marks definitely the break-up of the Mughal Empire and the decline of its authority wherever it had held sway. Ahmad Shah's invasion of India in that year did even more damage to the Mughals than even to the Mahrattas. Whereas the Mahrattas recovered later what they had lost, the Mughal power was completely broken. In the words of Elphinstone, "the history of the Moghul Empire here closes of itself."[19] Its territory was broken into

17. See Elphinstone, *History of India*, 752-753.

18. Pondicherry surrendered to Coote on 15th January 1761, the French officers and soldiers becoming prisoners of war. (See f. n. 14 above). Refugees in neutral settlements and those who had escaped into the interior and sought service with Indian rulers were the only French that remained to represent their nation's interests in this country. The Madras Council, in a letter dated the 26th March 1764, estimated the total number of these at 1,500 (*I. O. Records, Madras Letters Received*, I. A.). In the Court's letter dated 9th December 1762, the number is set down as 500. Some took service in Mysore, some in Tanjore and some under Yūsuf Khān, the rebel Commandant of Madura. One M. de Maudave, who had served under Lally, became representative of France in India, from 4th April 1762, when he arrived at Negapatam from Mauritius. He was commissioned by the French Council at Mauritius to resuscitate the French party in India among the Indian States. All Frenchmen in India were to obey him (see M. de Maudave's *Relation* in S. C. Hill, *Yusuf Khan*, 246).

19. *History of India*, 753.

separate states; its capital was deserted and its Emperor became an exile.[20] Among the foreign traders settled in India, the English had triumphed over the French, and from 1761 they began to shed their trading character and assume more and more the position of territorial rulers, first as agents and then as principals.[21] The Mahrattas, worsted in the north, found it impossible to regain their power either for combination or for action. The Mahratta confederacy was broken, with the result that Haidar found that he had either to fight alone the English or yield the place to them, thus making room for foreign ascendancy.

Territorial expansion: acquisition of Hoskōṭe and Sīra, 1761.

In prosecuting his aims and objectives, Haidar proceeded from point to point, the nearer or easier objective first and the farther or more difficult one next. Thus, he first subdued the local chiefs round about Bangalore and Kōlār, thus clearing the immediate neighbourhood both of Mahratta allies and subordinates or possible hostile chiefs. Then, he turned his attention to chiefs farther away and reputed stronger.[22] Among

20. Ahmad Shah Ābdāli recognised Alī Gōhar, the eldest son of Alamgīr II, as Emperor, under the title of Shah Ālam II. Najīb-ud-daula, however, remained the imperial deputy at Delhi until his death in 1770. Shah Ālam returned to his capital, by the aid of the Mahrattas, in December 1771. But the Delhi of 1771 was a very different place from the Delhi of Aurangzīb and his forbears.

21. The English deposed, in October 1760, Mīr Jāfar in Bengal and set up Mīr Kāsim in his place. In the South, they stood by Muhammad Alī throughout his struggle with his competitors.

22. *Haid. Nām.* (1784), ff. 24-25. For an account of some of Haidar's early campaigns (1761-1766) from the military and strategic points of view, see *Memoirs of Hyder Ally* by Eloy Joze Correa Peixoto (1770), pp. 27-82. This work, though perhaps the earliest available contemporary authority for the period, only occasionally dates the campaigns described, and merely records the author's impressions of them without a correct appreciation of their background. Among other authorities on the subject, see also and compare De La Tour, *Ayder Ali* (1784), I. 75-114; Robson, *Hyder Ally* (1786), 23-37; Kīrmāṇi, *Neshauni-Hyduri* (c. 1800), 105-187; Charles Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan*, 15-17, etc. In these sources, there is generally a mixing up of the details of events, which are not satisfactorily dated. De La Tour, in

the first places to be taken were Sīra and Hoskōṭe, in the possession of the Mahrattas. The events that led to these conquests will necessitate a little diversion into Hyderabad affairs.

Asaf Jah and his sons and grandsons, 1748–1761.

During the twelve years that followed the death in 1748 of Kamar-ud-dīn, surnamed Asaf Jah, the Subādār of the Deccan, affairs in Hyderabad were in a constant state of flux.[23] The domestic rivalry among his sons and grandsons added to the contests for supremacy in the south between the English and the French, who had been established for some time on the East Coast, and kept Deccan in continued turmoil.

Their internecine quarrels.

Asaf Jah left four sons. The eldest of these was Ghāzi-ud-dīn, who held high office at the court of Delhi. The second was Nāsir Jang, whose claims were disputed by Muzaffar Jang, his nephew, who was supported by Dupleix, the French Governor of Pondicherry. But he had the misfortune to fall into his uncle's hands and was imprisoned by him. Nāsir Jang, however, was himself murdered treacherously by Paṭhān rebels in 1750. Muzaffar Jang was, after this, set at liberty, and he succeeded his uncle with the support of the French. To mark his appreciation of

particular, is aware of his own limitations when he says: "The true reason why the former actions of this celebrated conqueror have not been given in a more ample manner in the present work, is, that the Author, not having joined the army of the Nabob before the time of the war on the coast of Malabar, did not think it necessary to speak largely concerning military operations he could only know from the communications of others." (*Ibid*, II. 1-2). De La Tour makes Basālat Jang's campaign, which occurred in 1761, come after the conquest of Savaṇūr by Haidar, which occurred in 1763, after the conquest of Bednūr. In fact, he represents Basālat Jang as sending an "embassy" to Haidar as the result of the latter's victory over the Savaṇūr Nawāb. See De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 76. Compare also Wilks (*Mysoor*, I. 487-534), who cites no authorities for his statements. For a detailed critical notice of the sources of Mysore History for the usurpation period (1761-1799), *vide* Appendix IV.

23. Asaf Jah was appointed Nizām-ul-mulk and Subādār of the Deccan in 1713. He later became independent and died in 1748. See *ante* P. 363.

French aid, he received a body of French troops, commanded by General Bussy, into his service, and assigned large territories near Pondicherry, the district of Karikal, and the town and district of Masulipatam.

Salābat Jang's succession, 1751.

He was, however, soon killed, in 1751, in a personal encounter with the Nawāb of Kurnool. His only son being a minor, Salābat Jang, the third son of Asaf Jah, succeeded, again under French auspices. He confirmed, in 1753, many of the privileges enjoyed by the French, and assigned several districts in the *Northern Circars* for the pay and equipment of the French auxiliaries in his service. Salābat Jang was served as Minister by one Rāja Raghunāth Dās. He being murdered in 1752, was succeeded by Sayid Lāshkar Khān, who, in his turn, was followed, in 1755, by Shāh Nawāz Khān, who, being treacherously murdered in 1758, was succeeded by Basālat Jang, Salābat Jang's own brother, who was then Governor of Burhanpur. He was, however, supplanted, in 1760, by Nizām Alī Khān, his younger brother, who became all powerful at Hyderabad thereafter. In his hands, Salābat Jang became before long a mere puppet, and later, in 1761, was first imprisoned and two years later murdered by him. In the year 1760, Nizām Alī was engaged in a defensive and unsuccessful campaign against Bālāji Rao, the Pēshwa, between the rivers Krishṇa and Gōdāvari. Basālat Jang, who, since 1759, had nursed a feeling of ill-will against his brother Nizām Alī, and had unfolded in his negotiations with Mons. Bussy his views of independent sovereignty in the south and his desire, if he could effect that object without compromising his independence, of obtaining the aid of the French to

Basālat Jang, his brother and Minister, 1758.

His displacement by Nizām Alī, 1760.

Basālat Jang's activities.

oppose the better fortunes of his brother Nizām Alī, saw his opportunity come. But as he could hardly move in any direction beyond the limits of his *jahgīr* of Adoni, without coming into contact with some Mahratta territory, dependency, or army and he found it expedient to maintain amicable relations with the actual opponents of his rival, he passed the early part of that year at his own capital in inaction. The distraction that called away the Mahrattas northwards and which subsequently ended in the famous battle of Pāṇipat on 7th January 1761, gave him an opportunity to move out on a venture of his own.[24]

His invasion of Sīra province, 1761.

In August 1760, he began to draw within the circle of his own possessions the most convenient and accessible fragments of the shattered states around him. The success that attended this first independent effort of his proved encouraging. Although checked now and again, he had greatly enlarged his limits and about the month of October 1761,[25] he had planned a campaign which included the reduction of Sīra, then in the possessionof the Mahrattas, but, as we have seen, formerly the capitale of the Nawāb, and as such held to be dependent on th Subādār of the Deccan. The plan of his projected campaign appears to have been to march straight from Adoni to Sīra and take it and from there proceed to Hoskōṭe, the other strong outpost of the Mahrattas, and drive them out of the Karnāṭak-Bālaghāt, and establish himself in their place. He seems to have marched *via* Gooty-Pāmaḍi-Penukoṇḍa-Hoskōṭe-Doḍbaḷḷāpur.[26]

24. The statement of Robson (*o. c.*, 24) that Basālat Jang was "dispatched" by his brother Salābat Jang with an army to recover Sīra from the Mahrattas is without foundation.—It was essentially an attempt of his own to establish himself in the Karnāṭak-Bālaghāt.

25. This is the date given in the *Haid. Nām.*, ff-24-25: *Vishu-Āśvija.* Robson gives no date but correctly places the event before the conquest of Bednūr. Wilks sets it down to June 1761, *o. c.*, I. 490. Kīrmāṇi antedates the events connected with Basālat Jang's campaign and sets them down to 1757 (A. H. 1171).

26. There is some doubt whether this was the route followed by Basālat

His siege of Hoskōṭe.

Arrived at Hoskōṭe with a large force, he seems to have moved to Sīra, the capital of the province, and reconnoitred the citadel there, but thought it most prudent to leave it alone. His coffers were empty and the long drawn siege that the place promised did not prove attractive to him. He, therefore, evidently turned his back on the place and retired to Hoskōṭe and laid siege to it.[27] It was his arrival there that called Haidar to Bangalore, immediately after his success over Khaṇḍē Rao at Seringapatam.

Its defence by Mukund Śrīpati, the Mahratta killedār.

On his arrival at Bangalore, Haidar found Basālat Jang engaged in his siege of Hoskōṭe, but unable to make any headway against it. Though the works were rude and

Jang. Wilks' narrative (l.c.) would suggest that he proceeded to Sīra first. If so, his route would be from Adoni to Sīra *via* Bellary and Rāyadurg and after taking Sīra pass on *via* Maddagiri and Chikballāpur and then to Hoskōṭe. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 24-25), the earliest authority, makes Hoskōṭe the first objective. Robson confirms by his direct statement that Hoskōṭe "being the first place on his route", was "immediately invested" by him. Robson's account (*o.c.*, 24) would suggest that he came by the other and more direct route from Adoni, which is by way of Gooty, Pāmaḍi, Rāmdurg, Dharmāvaram, Nāgasamudram, Venkaṭagiri-pāḷayam, Penukoṇḍa, Hindupur, Kōḍikoṇḍa, Chikballāpur, Nandīdurg, Dēvanhalli, Hoskōṭe, Doḍballāpur, Tumkūr and Sīra. Robson's version seems to be confirmed by Kīrmāṇi (*o.c.*, 106-111), who makes Hoskōṭe Basālat Jang's first objective, he and Haidar marching on, separately, to Sīra, after the capture of Hoskōṭe. Robson's account renders unnecessary a double visit to Sīra, necessitated by Wilks' version. The *Haid. Nām.* version, which is the earliest and is adopted here, may be reconciled with Wilks' version by understanding it to mean that Basālat Jang came not by the Adoni-Bellary-Rāyadurg-Sīra route but by the Adoni-Gooty-Hoskōṭe route but after proceeding further to Sīra and reconnoitring the place, and finding it difficult to take without a siege, marched back to Hoskōṭe and laid siege to it first.

27. See note 25 above. Wilks says that finding a siege of Sīra unprofitable, from the immediate view of quickly filling his "military chest," Basālat Jang "passed it" and "moved farther south, over an undulating country, alternately strong and open, the plainer parts having been fortified against sudden incursion by walls and towers by kneaded clay, which surrounded every village." A little later, Wilks makes us infer, Basālat Jang moved to Hoskōṭe, where Haidar found him "engaged in the siege" (l.c.). These details suggest, as stated above, that Basālat Jang came to Sīra by a route other than the one to be inferred from the *Haid. Nām.* and Robson. Wilks, as usual, does not quote his authority.

consisted mainly of village bulwarks, the fort possessed the great advantage, bestowed on it by nature, of being unassailable on one face. What was worse for Basālat Jang, it was defended by a garrison which defied and derided his attempts to subdue them. Though garrisoned only by 700 regulars with country arms, the garrison defended itself for two months, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Basālat Jang.[28] Mukund Śrīpatī,[29] the Mahratta officer, who commanded it, was a brave man. He had strengthened the works with care and stood the siege well. So gallantly indeed did he defend it, that Basālat Jang was put to the necessity of calling in the aid of Haidar.[30] His mortification at being thus foiled in his attempt was extreme, but he had no funds and he had to look as brave as he could.[31] This was the opportune moment for Haidar. He had not only arrived at Bangalore in time but had also been watchful of what was happening around him. He at once set to work. Hoskōṭe being only 18 miles to the north-east of Bangalore, the first communications were rapidly opened.[32] Basālat's emissary had hardly reached Haidar's camp, when Haidar despatched Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān as the Mysore ambassador to Basālat Jang. The talks ended in the conclusion of a treaty, Haidar all the while keeping himself in the background.[33] The terms were that

Basālat Jang's Treaty with Haidar for the conquest of Sīra province.

The terms of the Treaty.

28. Robson, *o.c.*, 24. According to Kīrmāṇi, he was assisted in the siege by Murāri Rao of Gooty and the Nawāb of Cuddapah, from whom Hoskōṭe had been taken in 1757 by Pēshwa Bālāji Rao. See Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 106; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 490-491.
29. Kīrmāṇi styles him "Mokhund Sriput", l.c.
30. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 106-107.
31. Wilks, l.c.
32. *Ibid*; Kīrmāṇi, l.c.
33. Kīrmāṇi (*o.c.*, 107) states that Haidar declined a personal interview with Basālat until he had known what service was expected of him although he had executed the same. Though Haidar could afford some times to be very humble and assume an air of obedience which woul d

Haidar was to actively help Basālat with his large army and a sufficiency of artillery in the conquest of Hoskōṭe and Sīra, in fact, in retaking the lost Mughal province of Sīra; that they were both to carry on the sieges of the two places, till they were taken; that as soon as each place should surrender, each army should take possession on its respective side of attack; that all the artillery, ammunition, and other things taken possession of should be the share of Basālat Jang, who should either take it in kind or receive their value from Haidar; that the places should be taken possession by Haidar; and that Basālat was to invest Haidar with the *Subāh* of Sīra in return for a *nazar* of Rs. 3 lakhs.[34] This meant, so far as Haidar was concerned, the extermination of the Mughal from Mysore, a much desired end, and for Basālat, a sum of money which he badly required. Basālat could do little with a territory he could not keep as against Haidar. So, he determined to make him his pretended vassal, which he could not well avoid. Incidentally he may, if Haidar sided him, keep his brothers, Salābat and Nizām Alī, out of this area. The treaty was signed and the money was paid,[35] and the *sanad* for investing him with the title of "Nawāb" was duly executed by Basālat Jang and handed to Haidar. These documents designated Haidar as *Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr*, a name which he from about

Significance of the Treaty.

at the same time serve his own ends, this statement is probably a refinement of Kirmāṇi. Both Robson and Wilks discountenance it.

34. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 491; Robson says Rs. 5 lakhs, *o.c.*, 24-25. According to Robson, Basālat desired the help of Haidar only for the "reduction of the capital" *i.e.*, Sīra, he himself "engaging to compleat the rest with his own force." (The name of "Sīra" is given as "Sirpi" by Robson wherever it occurs in his work). De La Tour gives the conditions of the Treaty entered into and confuses it as applying to Sīra only, which Basālat could not reduce by himself. But the Treaty is a general one and applies both to Sīra and Hoskōṭe, both of which Basālat found it difficult to take—De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 78-79.

35. Wilks, *o. c.*, I, 491-492; Robson, *o. c.*, 24-25.

this time assumed, though the latter title had been bestowed on him earlier than this by his own sovereign [36]

Wilks' criticism of the terms of the Treaty.

The Treaty, which confirmed these titles, if it did not grant them actually, has been half humorously criticised by the military historian of Mysore. "The distress of this Chief (Basālat Jang) and the whole

36. The title "Bahadūr" was bestowed on him by King Krishṇarāja II in 1758 (see *Ante* P. 225). According to Wilks and Robson, the *sanad* was granted and the treaty was executed and delivered *before* Haidar began to give his aid in the taking of Hoskōṭe. According to the *Haid-Nām*. (ff. 24-25), the *sanad* conferring the title was given *after* he had given his help and taken Hoskōṭe, in recognition of the skill he displayed in taking this fort. According to this source, the title bestowed on him on this occasion was "Haidar Jang." (The text runs: *Basālat Jangaru santōshapaṭṭu Haidar Jangaru endu Nawābarige kitābu koṭṭaru*, etc.) This would suggest that he had already had the titles of *Nawāb* and *Khān Bahadūr* and that the *Sanad* and *Treaty* only recited these titles in them. Kīrmāṇi (*o. c.*, 112-113) suggests that the title was given to Haidar by Basālat Jang "some three or four days after" *the taking of Sīra* and that the title was conferred on him in person by Basālat Jang. This chronicler says that Basālat Jang sent for Haidar, on the day appointed for his march back to Adoni, and he "saluted him with the title of Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr Chuckmak Jung," "Chuckmak" meaning in Turkish the flint and steel of the musket. Kīrmāṇi adds the remark that he is not anxious to conceal the fact that at the time Basālat conferred on Haidar the titles mentioned, he did not wish to displease him by rejecting them and so remained silent. But after Basālat departed, "he rejected the title of *Jang* and styled himself *Khān Bahadūr*" (*o. c.*, 113). Wilks records a modified version of this story as an incident that took place during the negotiations that followed anterior to the conclusion of the treaty that preceded the capture of Hoskōṭe and Sīra. His version is thus characteristically told: "In the course of the negotiation, Basalut Jung proposed . . . to honour Hydur with a title of the order distinguished by its terminating Persian word '*Jung*' (war). Among the lowest vulgar this word is pronounced as *Zung*, which also signifies the tinkling circular kind of bell, commonly strung round the necks of camels and oxen; and Hyder, among other remains of the society of his youth, retained this faulty pronunciation. When Fuzzul Oolla Khan came with this proposition, Hyder laughed in his face, and repeating four or five times the word *Zung*, 'Let me have nothing to do with your ornaments of a beast of burden,' said he, 'but if the great man insists on giving such a decoration, you may take it to yourself.' Fuzzul Oolla, who loved a title, and was not fastidious in scrutinizing authorities, took Hyder at his word; and returning to Ooscota did receive the title of *Hybut Jung* (terror of war), which he ever afterwards retained." (Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 492). Cf. Peixoto, *Memoirs*, l.c.

character of the negotiation may be inferred from the fact," he says,[37] "that for a *nezer* of three lakhs of rupees, he agreed to invest Hyder with the office of Nabob of Sera, an office, a country, and a capital, which were yet to be conquered! The alleged rights which Hyder acquired from this instrument of investiture have been gravely discussed and defended.[38] The right of the grantor seems to have been inferred from the act of granting, for no other source of right can be readily discovered, the right of the sword, to which most political claims may be ultimately traced, was absolutely wanting in this case; and the decision of this arbiter, pronounced three years afterwards by Nizam Ali, *de facto* Soubadar, or ruler of the Deckan, shewed his sense of the authority of Basalut Jung, by restricting him by force of arms to the single district of Adwanee (Adoni)." As to this suggestion, it may be stated that at the time of his expedition to Mysore, Basālat Jang had elected to take his chance against his brother Salābat Jang. Haidar—or rather Mysore—acquired rights over the conquered area just because they were conquered and not by virtue of the alleged grant by Basālat Jang any more than they were when Nizām Alī was later bought off by Haidar just as his brother had been on the previous occasion. The fact of possession was more important to Haidar than the grant, though the alleged grant made possession more secure in the sense that it helped towards a formal settlement, and, what is more, made other claims against Mysore less moral, if not less legal also. If Haidar had dreamt that he had any rights under this alleged grant for Mysore, he knew quite well he would have to defend them with his sword. He knew full well that Basālat Jang had neither the right to make the grant, nor

Haidar's act justified.

37. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 491.
38. By whom, Wilks does not mention.

acquired the right to make it, nor could back up the assertion of such a right by an effective appeal to the sword. But he was prudent enough not to think beyond the immediate present. He had just got out of the ordeal with Khaṇḍē Rao and there was no need to court trouble from Basālat Jang or his brothers. Each was to be dealt with in his turn, if it came to that.[39] Basālat Jang, happy with his money, pretended to show his appreciation of Haidar's solicitude by investing him with a title of honour, evidently to exact an additional sum from him. But Haidar artfully refused himself the gratification of a high sounding tittle and with it the further cash gift that was expected of him.[40] Immediately the treaty and the *sanads* were duly made out, Haidar, in October 1761, joined his forces to those of Basālat Jang before Hoskōṭe and prosecuted its seige with vigour. He first reconnoitred the fort and the nature of the ground. He then attacked the fort and took it at the first assault. Having raised his batteries there with the aid of his French officers, he gave orders to his artillery to fire at the walls of the fort. They soon drilled them so full of holes as a bird's cage. Basālat Jang, against whose camp Haidar directed a few shots, got so upset that he, it is said, immediately changed his ground of encampment to another, beyond the local tank, northward of the fort.[41] The firing on the fort continued for another two or three days, and the walls battered. Haidar, appreciating the gallantry of the defenders, proposed honourable terms of surrender. He said that if they surrendered immediately, they might, without molestation from any one, proceed with their property where they liked; if not, he would

39. As a matter of fact, when, in 1767, Nizām Alī had to be appeased in his turn, Haidar was equally ready to buy him up for the moment and turn against him immediately thereafter, see Chapters below.

40. Wilks (l. c.) says that Basālat expected an enhanced payment for giving the title.

41. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 107-108.

Capitulation of Mukund Śrīpati.

storm the fort, and that in that case, the garrison with their wives and children would be put to the sword. The Killedār, Mukund Śrīpati, at last yielded, though not without protestations, and marched out with his men and property, Haidar providing him with the necessary transportation for his baggage as far as Poona. Haidar at once placed a garrison of his own in the fort and next day called upon Basālat Jang to send his own garrison, so that he might withdraw his.[42] But the prudent Basālat Jang, though thus declared "the reputed captor of a mud fort," declined the honour, either through lack of convenience or policy, and left the fort with its dependencies to the charge of Haidar, and marched towards Sīra.

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42. Robson's account (*o. c.*, 25) is very brief. "The treaty signed, and the money paid," he says, "Hyder marched with his army and joined the party lent him by Basalat Jung, attacked Ouscottah afresh, and in a few days carried the place by composition, which he garrisoned with his own people, and immediately marched to the reduction of Sirpi (Sira)." Wilks is equally short (l. c.). "On receiving these honours (the honours conferred on him), he (Haidar) in October (1761) united his army to that before Ooscota (Hoskōṭe) and in a few days gave to the great Basalat Jang the honor of being the reputed captor of a mud fort." De La Tour fails to note the capture of Hoskōṭe. The *Haid Nām.* is pointed to a degree. On his aid being sought by Basālat Jang, Haidar, it says, proceeded thither and loading up the cannons, battered the fort and reduced it on *cowle* (or agreement). The Kannaḍa original puts it tersely thus: *mōrchi kaṭṭi tōpugaḷa peṭṭininda hoḍaḍu ājiju māḍi kavalinindā iḷisalāgi.* The account given in the text above is based on Kīrmāṇi (*o. c.*, 107-109), which is confirmed by all the other sources as indicated above. Kīrmāṇi fails to note, however, the help received from French artillery officers. Robson, *Haid. Nām.* and Kīrmāṇi agree that the fort was surrendered as the result of a mutual agreement. But none of these mention the fact that the French artillery officers in Haidar's service were useful to him in this connection. As Col. Miles, the translator of Kīrmāṇi's work, puts it, "Basalat Jung knew well to whom Hydur owed his fame, although he (Hydur) himself had not the candour to acknowledge it" (*o. c.*, 112, f. *n.*, *t.*). De La Tour makes it plain that one condition of the Treaty between Haidar and Basālat was that Haidar should help him with his camp army and numerous artillery.

Siege of Sīra.

Haidar followed Basālat Jang two or three days later and joined him with his well-disciplined army and a grand train of artillery served by Europeans, though he kept aloof from him.[43] Arrived at Sīra, Haidar encamped near the Īḍgah, to the north-west of the fort, while Basālat Jang and his troops took up their position on a tank, to the east of the fort, which they surrendered.[44] Batteries were next thrown up, and approaches dug and carried, a sharp fire, with explosion of mines, being kept up continuously. The town was soon taken by Haidar, though only by degrees, the defence being more than equal to the attack on it. Batteries were soon erected, again with the aid of French officers; and the heavy cannon mounted on them did their work, with the result that the walls of the fort were completely knocked down. By successful undermining, two of the bastions were also blown up together with the curtain. This induced the besieged to consider their position seriously. Despite all this, neither Lakshman-Hari, the Mahratta Governor of Sīra, nor Triambak-Krishṇa, the Killedār, showed any sign of yielding.[45] Though they knew that no relief was

Triambak-Krishṇa's stout resistance.

43. Kīrmāṇi says that Haidar passed on and took his post with Basālat Jang's advanced guard. "Still, however," he adds, "no visit or meeting had passed between them, nor had they ever spoken to each other except through a medium"—Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 109. As to the grand train of artillery brought up by Haidar—see De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 79.

44. The account which follows is based partly on the *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 24-25) and partly on Kīrmāṇi (*o. c.*, 109-111) and De La Tour (l. c.), Robson includes no description of the warfare, while Wilks dismisses equally summarily, stating that the place "made but a feeble resistance." (I. 493). The text above shows the stout resistance offered. The siege lasted for "a month," according to both Robson and Kīrmāṇi. De La Tour says that the blowing up of the bastions and the curtain "forced the besiegers to surrender at discretion." This seems a clear exaggeration on his part as also the statement that this surrender "increased the terror his (Haidar's) arms had spread over the extensive Empire of India." (l. c.).

45. The *Haid. Nām.* (l. c.) mentions the name of Lakshman-Hari. Kīrmāṇi (*o. c*, 110) says that "Trimuk Kishen" (Triambak-Krishṇa) was

possible, the Mahratta power being temporarily on the decline, they both held out for a month,[46] during which they offered a stout resistance. The walls were being nearly levelled with the ground and an assault seemed imminent. Both parties were evidently ready for a composition, and Triambak-Krishṇa, mainly to save the garrison's lives, marched out with the honours of war. Haidar immediately placed in the fort a garrison of Mysore troops. He seized at the same time the depot of provisions and military stores, which the Mahrattas had gathered here for the conquest of the whole of the Karnāṭak, and secretly buried underground all the heavy artillery and such stores as he desired to reserve for himself. He then sent a congratulatory message to Basālat Jang, announcing the fall of the place. Basālat arrived the next day, only to find a few pieces of damaged artillery and some useless stores in place of the large magazine of military stores, guns, etc., of which he had heard so much from his spies! Haidar having met him, for the first time since his arrival in Mysore, and talked to him "with fool-deceiving words," presented him with the keys of the fort, and showed him, one by one, the articles he had allowed to remain! Basālat selected three guns from among these, these having belonged to the body-guard of the murdered Nawāb Nāsir Jang, and sent them to his camp.[47] He then handed back the keys to Haidar and with it the fort and Suba of Sīra to

He marches out with the honours of war.

Haidar seizes the military stores.

Basālat Jang hands over possession of Sīra province to Mysore.

His departure to Adoni.

the "Chief of the Souba" and describes him also as "Killadar." This is possibly an error, Lakshman being evidently the Chief of the Suba (*i.e.*, Governor), while Triambak-Krishṇa appears to have been the Killedār or the military officer in charge of the fort.

46. There can be no doubt that the siege lasted for a month. Both Robson and Kīrmāṇi mention its duration as a month. (Robson, *o. c.*, 25; Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 110). See f. n. 22 above.

47. According to Kīrmāṇi, of these three guns, when Basālat Jang finally

Mysore,[48] and departed back to Adoni by way of Rāyadurg. Indeed, his presence was needed urgently there to defend his province against his brother's impending invasion. While Basālat Jang was engaging himself in Sīra, Nizām Alī, his brother and general of Salābat Jang, had imprisoned the latter (18th July 1761) and openly assumed the office of Subādār of Deccan and prepared himself to punish Basālat Jang for the encroachments he had committed. Haidar stayed on for ten or fifteen days for the settlement, and after appointing one Mīr Ismail Hussain as Governor, with instructions to repair the fort, he passed on to his next adventure.[49]

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departed from Sīra, he "left two on a river to the northward of the fort." (Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 112). The third one, however, which belonged to the bodyguard of his father Asaf Jah, "he, with a thousand difficulties, contrived to carry with him." (*Ibid*, 112-113).

48. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 111. Col. Miles, the translator of Kīrmāṇi's work, notes the fact that "the author of another life of Hydur states that Hydur bullied Basalat Jung into the surrender of the fort and the stores." He does not, however, mention the name of the author or his work. But the statement may be taken to represent the actual truth, as Basālat was not in a position to protest against any of the doings of Haidar. But Haidar usually managed such things with such consummate skill that the deceived never realized he was at every stage yielding to his enemy, who, for the time being, pretended to be his best friend.

49. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 113. The *Haid. Nām.* (l. c.) says that the amount of Rs. 3 lakhs agreed to be paid was given at the time of the departure of Basālat Jang and that he gave a *sanad* then to Haidar for both Sīra and Hoskōṭe, indicating the transfer of their possession to him. De La Tour adds the interesting detail that Basālat preferred "receiving money for his share," and that for this reason Haidar called him ever after as "the merchant" who preferred money to territory (l. c.). De La Tour also states that it was "now that the Emperor (at Delhi)" sent to Haidar "an embassy with all the highest honours annexed to the title, and marks of the dignity of Suba, such as the rich round palankeen, and *Mahee Muratib*, the fish's head, set with precious stones, etc." (*o. c.*, I. 80). This conferment of a Prince's dignity on Haidar by the Emperor of Delhi is not confirmed by any other authority. Kīrmāṇi confirms the *Haid. Nām.* by saying that Basālat not only presented Haidar with the *sanad* for the entire revenue of Sīra with the tributes due from the Pāḷegārs, but also the district of Gurramkoṇḍa, with its forts and dependencies, and that Haidar, in return, gave Basālat "a large sum of money, horses and elephants" (*o. c.*, 112).

Annexation of Doḍbaḷḷāpur, 1761-1762.

The acqusition of Sīra and Hoskōṭe soon paved the way for a series of operations in central and northern Karnāṭak, which was fast slipping out of the hands of the Mahrattas or torn asunder by internal feuds and dissensions among local chiefs. Doḍbaḷḷāpur, the *jahgīr* of Abbās Kuḷi Khān, was the first to be absorbed. Abbās, the son of Abdul Russool, the first *jahgīrdār*, had illtreated Haidar and his brother soon after the death of his father and dreaded the name of Haidar.[50] Basālat Jang, in his negotiations with Haidar, had tried to exclude Abbās' *jahgīr* from the province of Sīra as ceded to Mysore. But Haidar would not agree to such exclusion. He had threatened even to break off all negotiations if Basālat showed any tendency not to agree. The story is told that Haidar broadly answered that his honours would be worthless if they excluded a full and a deep revenge; that he accepted and paid for the *sanads* as a mutual accommodation, not from any diffidence of being able to achieve his own objects without them; and that another syllable indicating the exclusion of Doḍbaḷḷāpur would terminate the negotiation.[51] Basālat saw the impossibility of the situation and gave up the show in favour of Abbās as a vain and inconvenient one. Shortly after the capture of Sīra and its delivery over to Mysore, Haidar prepared to bring under control several of the adjoining places.[52]

50. See *Ante* P. 265, where the story of Abbas' cruelty towards Haidar and his brother will be found referred to. See also Appendix III. Wilks mentions Abbas' father's name as "Abdul Russool" (I. 268), while Kīrmāṇi calls him "Durga Kuli Khan" (*o. c.*, 109).

51. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 493.

52. See *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25. Kīrmāṇi (*o. c.*, 109) antedates the event and makes it come *before* the conquest of Sīra; in fact, he puts it in between the taking of Hoskōṭe and the capture of Sīra. He says that "two or three days" after Haidar had made his arrangements for the safety of Hoskōṭe, he marched towards Doḍbaḷḷāpur and encamped there. Wilks (*o. c.*, I. 492) says Doḍbaḷḷāpur "next engaged" the attention of Haidar—"next" after the taking of Hoskōṭe and before investing Sīra. According to him, Basālat Jang and Haidar "moved to Sera" from Doḍbaḷḷāpur after its fall (*o. c.*, I. 493). This would make the taking of Doḍbaḷḷāpur fall about October 1761. Robson and De La Tour do not mention this event in their works.

Doḍbaḷḷāpur was assigned the place of honour in this series. When, about November 1761, while Haidar was yet in Sīra, Abbās heard of this project, fearing of retribution, he fled precipitately with his wife and children and a few indispensable baggage to Arcot.[53] Haidar, quickly garrisoning the fort, found the object of his vengeance had escaped. He then showed himself in a manner quite unlike himself. He showed that he sometimes could act like a man blessed with the most amiable qualities that a human being could be associated with. Tradition says that he presented himself at the gate of the dowager, the widow of his father's lord, and the mother of the fugitive. In a message full of gentleness and delicacy, he exhibited a remembrance of kindnesses conferred in the days of his infancy, and assured her of his gratitude and respect. Though he appropriated, withous hesitation, everything that for political purposes might be considered public property, he kept up entirely to the assurances he had extended to the dowager, and continued through life to treat the unoffending branches of her family with distinction and generosity.[54] The dowager, in particular, was allowed a special pension to enable her to maintain herself independently and well during the rest of her life.[55]

Reduction of Chikbaḷḷāpur, November 1761-March 1762.

Haidar next turned his attention to Chikbaḷḷāpur, 14 miles to the east of Doḍbāḷḷāpur. Its chief was related to the Pāḷegār of Dēvanhaḷḷi, who had, since 1749, retired to that place and conspired to take it

53. Wilks says that Abbās "fled with the utmost precipitation to Madras, a distance of 220 miles, leaving his family to their fate" (*o. c.*, I. 493). He adds the note that such was Abbās' terror, that when Haidar in 1769 "presented himself at the gates of Madras, he (Abbās) embarked in a crazy vessel, and did not venture to land until Hyder's army had re-ascended the passes of the mountains." (*o. c.*, I. 493, f. n.).

54. Wilks, l. c.

55. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25.

back.[56] Haidar considered the reduction of that place, accordingly, a necessity, more especially as such reduction was, besides, required to secure the safety of the Mysore frontier on this side. Chikkappa Gauḍa, the Pāḷegār, offered one of the stoutest defences known to Pāḷegār annals in Mysore. Chikkappa had become Pāḷegār about 1758, in succession to Baiche Gauḍa, his nephew, who had been deposed after having been in power for only nine months.[57] His family was an old one, tracing its origins to the fifteenth century and had built up a reputation for itself in and around Chikbaḷḷāpur by annexing or purchasing various adjoining places. Chikkappa had also the advantage of treasure which had been amassed during many years, Aṇṇi Gauḍa, one of his predecessors, having left a fortune estimated at twelve lakhs of pagodas.[58] Chikkappa had a well equipped army; knew the use of fire-arms and had cultivated the friendship of the Mahrattas, with whom he kept general intercourse.[59] Haidar accordingly found in him a hardy and resourceful man to deal with. Haidar advanced against Chikbaḷḷāpur with a large

The Pāḷegārs of Chikbaḷḷāpur.

Chikkappa, the Pāḷegār, and his valiant defence.

56. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 495. Robson notes the further fact that he had not only proved himself intractable but also "in the course of two or three months," the Pāḷegār of Chikbaḷḷāpur "had destroyed upwards of one thousand of his (Haidar's) troops"—*o. c.*, 25. The name of the Pāḷegār is not mentioned by any of the sources, including Wilks, Robson and Kirmāṇi. We know from other sources his name was Chikkappa Gauḍa, who was the younger brother of Venkaṭanārāyaṇa Gauḍa, who had been in power for 35 years. Venkaṭanārāyaṇa Gauḍa had been succeeded by his son Baiche Gauḍa. The latter was in power for 9 months, after which he was deposed and his uncle Chikkappa Gauḍa took over the Pāḷegārship. The latter was the Pāḷegār who resisted Haidar and eventually lost his life in prison. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 305-308, for the history of the Chikbaḷḷāpur Pāḷayam.

57. See *Mys. Gaz.*, l. c., for details of the family history.

58. *Ibid*, V. 307.

59. It is said that when Haidar, with the aid of his French artillery officers, tried to carry the fort of Chikbaḷḷāpur by storm and mining, Chikkappa counter-mined in such a way that Haidar's attempt proved unsuccessful (*Ibid*).

army[60], consisting of 8,000 horse, 10,000 regular infantry and 12,000 irregular foot, with abundance of stores and artillery. When he approached the town, it was open to Chikkappa to retire to the impregnable rock-fortress of Nandidurg, only 3 miles off his place. But the brave and patriotic man that he was, he thought proper to await the attack in the rather open town of Chikbaḷḷāpur, which was provided with a weak citadel, so placed that an assailant must previously possess himself of the town. He had nothing to help him in the matter of the defence of his place; nothing to protract its defence and all to accelerate its fall. But he was determined to establish the truth of the doctrine that all places are impregnable, so long as the moral energies of the defenders can be upheld.[61] He contested every inch of the ground in this open town; every successive house became a fortress; and at the expiration of two months, Haidar could scarcely yet be said to have commenced the siege of the citadel.[62] Disappointed, Haidar tried every means in his power to induce the Pāḷegār to submit, but he prepared to defend himself the more bravely.[63] He kept the spirit of the defenders at its stretch by mentioning to them the relief he expected from Murārī Rao Ghōrpaḍe of Gooty, who, he said, was now approaching

Haidar's discomfiture and attempt at composition.

60. Kīrmāṇi says that Haidar moved with his "whole force" (*o. c.* 114), whereas Wilks says his army was "superior" in numbers to that of the Pāḷegār (*o. c.*, I. 497).

61. Cf. Wilks, who writes thus of the defence set up by this Pāḷegār:—"Regular science, in its legitimate application to the defence of places, is calculated to protract resistance, but in its practical effects it seems more frequently to have excused or accelerated their fall. This Poligar verified the better doctrine that all places are impregnable, so long as the moral energies of its defenders can be upheld."—*o. c.*, I. 496.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 115, where he records that Haidar "took great pains to induce him to obey his orders" and that he "rejected all his advances and prepared to defend himself."

the place.[64] The town was well furnished with the means of subsistence though not of defence. Its defenders too fought valiantly for their dearest rights, independence and property. The efforts of the invader were not inadequate to the difficulties he encountered and the value of the prize. Chikbaḷḷāpur was likened to "the garden of Eden" at the time and reckoned valuable from a strategic point of view as well. Haidar prepared himself to meet the new emergency that threatened him.

Murāri Rao's advance.

Murāri Rao, with his whole army of 12,000 horse and foot, advanced rapidly to Guḍibaṇḍa, some 25 miles off to the north-east of Chikbaḷḷāpur,[65] and there stationed himself and despatched some 7,000 men under the command of one Timmappa, son of Bhānōji-Pant of Maḍakśira, to attack Haidar and his forces. They, however, foolishly engaged themselves a few foraging parties and retired. When he heard of this, Haidar was much irritated but quickly resolved upon a settlement with the Mahratta first. His superior numbers enabled him to leave a strong corps for maintaining his ground in the town, and, by an unexpected movement of the remainder of his

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64. All the sources agree in noting the help given by Murāri Rao to Chikkappa Gauḍa. See Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 497-498; Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 115 *et seq.*; Robson, *o. c.*, 26, to whose accounts the version in the text owes much. An attempt has been made to reconcile their statements in reconstructing the story. Kīrmāṇi's account is the most informative on this affair, though it requires careful checking. The *Haid. Nām.* gives only the main items, see ff. 25-25-A. See also on this head *Fort St. George Records—Mily. Count. Corres.*, X. 195-197. De La Tour and Stewart are silent on this topic. The date given by the *Haid. Nām.*, March 1762, seems correct. Kīrmāṇi, as usual, antedates the event, placing it down to 1758 (A. H. 1172). Robson sets it down subsequent to 1763.

65. Guḍibaṇḍa: headquarters of a sub-taluk of the same name in the present Bāgēpalli taluk, Kōlār district. It is situated on the Nandidurg range of hills; now a municipality. For an account of the place, see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 319-320. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 25-25-A) furnishes the detail that the detachment sent by Murāri Rao was under the command of Timmappa.

army against Murāri Rao, followed him and tracked his route, and on a plain to the west of Nandidurg, he fell in with his troops and at the first charge inflicted a signal defeat on them, putting most of them to the sword. The few who escaped with their lives, left their horses and arms behind them. It is said nearly two thousand horses[66] were taken by Haidar on this occasion. The Pāḷegār was now left to his own resources. Haidar, returning flushed with his victory over the relieving Mahratta, fixed his attention solely on the reduction of the place. Its complete investment followed. At a suitable moment, Haidar's troops attacked and took the Pettah at long last, and raising batteries there, employed themselves in firing at the walls of the fort and exploding mines.[67] Meanwhile, Murāri Rao was not inactive. He kept ravaging the adjoining areas, though he did not attack directly Haidar's forces and thus attempt to relieve the besieged. Haidar took no notice of his acts for the time being and rivetted his attention solely on the reduction of the Fort. The Pāḷegār met Haidar's mining of the walls by counter-mining, which he did from his knowledge, and thus rendered unsuccessful Haidar's attacks against him. But further exertions followed on Haidar's part, and after a short time, the walls of the fort, which were of earth, were completely battered down and breached on one side. Haidar now gave the order for the assault, without calculating in the

His defeat and retreat.

Pettah and Fort besieged.

Two successive assaults beaten off.

66. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 115.

67. *Ibid*, 116. The term "exploding the mines" is explained by Col. Miles, the translator of Kīrmāṇi, as meaning "perhaps throwing shells into the town." It is possible, however, that Haidar's artillery men "mined" the walls of the fort and the Pāḷegār "countermined" and neutralized the effects of "mining." See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 307. A "mine", in the sense used here, appears to indicate an underground passage in which gunpowder or other explosives can be lodged for destructive purposes.

least the spirit of the defenders. Notwithstanding the state of the walls and other disadvantages under which they were suffering, the besieged fought so bravely in the breach that they beat off the storming party and put them to flight. The next day another storming party tried their luck but with no better result.[68] Haidar had recourse to his ingenuity now. With great labour, he put up a new battery in front of the gate of the fort, and ordered the gate to be battered. In the next one or two days, his experienced gunners beat down the two walls which masked the gate. As soon as the Pāḷegār and his forces saw that the defences of the gate had been beaten down, they began to reflect on the probable result. The spirit of the defenders, which had so far been maintained at a high level, seemed for the first time to give way. It dawned on them for the first time that their attitude had not only been of defence, but also defiance. But it would be wrong to say they were downhearted or had yielded to despondency. Their leader, the Pāḷegār, saw that it would not do to waste either his opportunity or the valuable lives of his men. What boots it at one gate to make defence, and at another to let in the foe? That was the thought uppermost in his mind. Three months had elapsed and Haidar too was tired of an operation that seemed never to end in a victory.[69] He was intent on composition. Negotiations ensued, both sides being ready for it. Bankers and neighbouring Pāḷegārs did the

Haidar's ingenuity at work.

Haidar's fresh attempt at composition: terms agreed to.

68. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 116-117.

69. Wilks says that Haidar was so stoutly resisted that he could not be said to have begun *the siege of the citadel* even after the lapse of two months from the time he initiated the attack on the Pettah—*o.c.*, I. 496-497. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) says that the siege occupied three months. This seems correct, reckoning from the date of arrival of Haidar before Chikballāpur and its final capture.

rest.[70] A ransom of rupees nine lakhs was agreed to and Haidar consented to raise the siege and leave the place.[71] He clearly saw that so large a sum could not be paid without time being allowed for its realization. He was also anxious to vacate a town which was reeking with the evil smells of a close conflict. It was mutually agreed that Haidar should leave the town with his troops and artillery by way of Dēvanhaḷḷi and Bangalore to Seringapatam, the amount fixed being paid in three instalments, the first at Dēvanhaḷḷi, the second at Bangalore and the third at the capital.[72] The siege was accordingly raised and Haidar marched out of the town and encamped on the plain near Dēvanhaḷḷi, preparatory to moving forward agreeably to the settled plan. Haidar, however, took the precaution of posting in the batteries and suburbs a thousand matchlock men, under the command of two of his Afghan officers, Juhankhān Khōkur and Hussain Khān Lōḍi, with seven or eight boxes of ammunition in their charge, ostensibly to secure the payment of the ransom but really to await eventualities.[73]

Haidar's withdrawal to Dēvanhaḷḷi.

Murāri Rao, hearing of this accommodation, immediately made—either on his own initiative or as the result of previous arrangement—a forced march during the night, arrived in the rear of the fort, and apprized

Chikkappa's fresh confabulation with Murāri Rao.

70. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 117. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) mentions the name of Chikkappa, Pāḷegār of Koraṭagere in this connection.

71. So Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 498; Kīrmāṇi says Rs. 7 lakhs, *o.c.*, 117. The family history of the Pāḷegār says that Haidar demanded 500,000 Pagodas (equal to Rs. 17,50,000) and a golden head of Kaṇṭhīrava, the Daḷavāi, who had fallen in an attempt to take Chikbaḷḷāpur. See *Mys. Gaz*, V. 807. Robson says that the amount agreed to was 5 lakhs of Pagodas (*o.c.*, 26).

72. The family history says that part of the sum was paid on the spot (*Mys. Gaz.*, l.c.). Robson says that Haidar received Rs. 1½ lakhs in hand (l.c.).

73. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 118.

the Pāḷegār of his arrival. The two drew together and decided upon further resistance to Haidar. It was agreed that the Pāḷegār and his family should at once ascend Nandidurg while Murāri Rao, in return for rupees five lakhs—which had been collected to pay up Haidar's instalments—should occupy the fort at Chikbaḷḷāpur and with fresh troops drafted in from Hyderabad and Poona, give Haidar the punishment of his life.

Murāri Rao's occupation of Chikbaḷḷāpur fort.

This agreement was sooner put in action than signed. A body of Murāri Rao's forces soon threw themselves into the fort, while the Pāḷegār and his family went up the invincible fort of Nandidurg, not far away from the town,[74] holding Chikkappa Gauḍa of Koraṭagere a close prisoner.[75] The project of the Pāḷegār was to leave Haidar to waste himself afresh in a contest with new troops drafted for the purpose; and when the garrison should begin to show signs of weariness, to descend once more with his select followers and by a vigorous effort compel Haidar to raise the siege.[76]

Haidar's detachment attacked.

Murāri Rao, after garrisoning the ruined fort with 2,000 foot and providing it with sufficient ammunition, left it with suitable instructions to defend it to the last man.[77] On the following morning, the garrison manned the walls, beat their drums, and sounded their trumpets in the true Mahratta style, and then assembled suddenly in large numbers at the gate. Perceiving these movements and apprehending treachery, Haidar's detachment manned their batteries and were standing ready for

74. *Ibid*, 118-119; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 499; Robson, *o. c.*, 26. Robson says that Murāri sent 500 of his troops to occupy the fort (see note 77 below).

75. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

76. Wilks, l.c.

77. The strength of the troops left by Murāri Rao as mentioned by Kīrmāṇi differs from that mentioned by Robson. Robson's seems an underestimate. See note 74 above.

action, when all at once, 1,500 of the Mahrattas left the fort and advanced against them. Haidar's men, being few and scattered about, left the battery and assembled in the Pettah, and, making one gate strong, held fast to it. The troops from the fort now formed a circle round them and showered a brisk fire of musketry and rockets. Haidar's infantry, resolved on selling their lives dearly, strengthened a large building near the gate and defended it gallantly, while Jahān Khān Khōkur, the Afghan officer, with a few brave fellows, made an attack on the Mahratta forces and with the sword and spear killed a great many of them. The prisoners taken told the rest of the tale. They were duly despatched the next night to Haidar, with a full narration of what had occurred since he raised the siege and left the place.[78]

Haidar's forced march on Chikballāpur.

Haidar's rage knew no bounds when he found himself a dupe at the hands of the Pāḷegār. He became, it is said, "as furious as an enraged lion," and he returned with renewed vigour to the attack. With his troops and artillery, he made a forced march back from Dēvanhaḷḷi. Arrived at the fort, he saw the Mahratta cavalry stationed round it and attacked them. He inflicted such a crushing defeat on them that they fled in different directions, unable to stand the onslaught of the light cavalry. The chastisement was so severe that they never looked behind them until they reached Guḍibaṇḍa, their temporary headquarters. Perceiving this, Jahān Khān Khōkur and Hussain Khān Lōḍi immediately hoisted the Mysore standard on the gate. Seeing this, Haidar advanced rapidly and occupied the Pettah. He then began working the batteries he had before raised, and ordered his infantry and artillery to give the fort a

His chastisement of Mahratta forces.

78. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 119-120.

shower of shot. The spiritless defence of the mercenary garrison did not long protract the fate of the place. In about ten days, it was carried by assault.[79] (March 1762).[80] To inspire terror in the neighbourhood, he put to death some of the garrison, while, for an example, some among the Mahratta garrison had their noses and ears cut off and were turned out bleeding to join their comrades with Murāri Rao.[81] He then appointed Mīr Alī Razā Khān to command the fort and attend to its future defence.[82]

He takes Chikbaḷlāpur fort.

Haidar next turned his attention to the Pāḷegār on Nandidurg and to Murāri Rao himself. He made no immediate attempt on Nandidurg, except to ask Mīr Alī Razā Khān to have an eye on it and leaving a light corps under Ibrāhim Sāhib, his maternal uncle, who had his headquarters at Bangalore,[83] with orders to destroy the surrounding country, and in communication with the garrisons of Dēvanhaḷḷi and Chikbaḷḷāpur, to cut off all supplies to it. With the double object of furthering this project, and retaliating on Murāri Rao, he determined on extending his conquest over a large area of country to the north of Chikbaḷḷāpur and to the east of the old Mysore frontier. With this view, he marched off with a sufficient

Chikkappa besieged at Nandidurg.

Haidar's pursuit of the Mahrattas.

79. Wilks says ten days, *o.c.*, I. 500; so also Robson, l.c.; but Kīrmāṇi says "two days," *o.c.*, 121.

80 *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25-25A.

81. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 121; the family history confirms this statement, *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 308; also Robson, *o.c.*, 26-27.

82. So says Kīrmāṇi, l.c. Wilks, however, states that Badr-u-zamān Khān was appointed to look after the future defence of the place. Kīrmāṇi is probably correct here. While Badr-u-zamān Khān was appointed later as the Faujdār of Chikbaḷḷāpur, it was Mīr Alī Razā Khān who was nominated to complete the capture of the place after Haidar left it on delivering the assault. He also reduced Nandidurg later, as will be seen from the text above.

83. Wilks, l.c.

force towards Guḍibaṇḍa, the temporary headquarters of Murāri Rao. Hearing this, Murāri Rao, unequal to the occasion, retired towards his own territory and halted at Kōḍikoṇḍa.[84] Haidar, reducing Guḍibaṇḍa at the end of a siege of but forty-eight hours or so, and leaving a detachment there, marched on to Kōḍikoṇḍa in search of Murāri Rao. Here Murāri Rao took his post with all his troops, infantry, cavalry and artillery.

Capture of Guḍibaṇḍa.

Fight at Kōḍikoṇḍa: Murāri Rao's retreat to Gooty.

Haidar, taking in the situation at a glance, placed his regular and irregular infantry and artillery in ambush, in the dry bed of a river close by, ordered off all his light horse to the front, with instructions to attack immediately the enemy's troops. When Murāri Rao's cavalry attempted to charge them in a compact body, Haidar's horse, before the enemy could come near, turned their backs and fled at speed. Murāri Rao's horse, who were misled by this evolution, were rendered bold by it and followed them. While they were in pursuit, however, the troops in ambush rose up, all at once, and received them with such a volley of cannon and musketry, that they suffered incalculable loss in their ranks. Murāri Rao's troops were scattered like "grain shaken out of a slit bag, and they did not drink water until they arrived at the walls of Gooty." Murāri Rao followed them, thus accepting

84. Kīrmāṇi spells this place as "Gurikonda." The contemporary work *Haid. Nām.* correctly mentions it as Kōḍikoṇḍa, an extant town in Anantpur district. The family history of the Chikbaḷḷāpur Pāḷegārs refers to it as Kōtikoṇḍa among the places taken by Haidar. The other places, besides Nandidurg, were Kalavaraḍurg, Itikaldurg, Kōtikoṇḍa and Guḍibaṇḍa. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 308. Kīrmāṇi mentions the conquests in this order: Guḍibaṇḍa, Gurikoṇḍa, Penukoṇḍa and Maḍakśira (*o.c.*, 121-123); while the *Haid. Nām* (l.c.) adopts the following order: Maḍakśira, Penukoṇḍa and Kōḍikoṇḍa. Robson mentions only Penukoṇḍa but adds that Haidar made a conquest of such parts of Murāri Rao's country as lay most convenient to his new acquisitions of Sirpi (Sira), nearly to the value of three lacks (lakhs) of pagodas yearly."—*o.c.*, 27.

the decisive character of the defeat he had sustained in the war.[85]

Haidar's advance northward into Murāri Rao's territories.

Capture of Kōḍikoṇḍa.

Reduction of Penukoṇḍa.

Haidar, however, advanced further northward. After a siege of seven days, he took Kōḍikoṇḍa, the erstwhile retreat of Murāri Rao. From that place, he marched towards Penukoṇḍa, the ancient capital of the Vijayanagar kingdom, where Murāri had placed a garrison. After first fortifying the passes near about, he delivered successive assaults on the hill fort of Penukoṇḍa and took it after a hard fight lasting over a month. He then proceeded to attack Maḍakśira, an equally strong hill fort. Its commandant, a brave man, gave Haidar a warm reception here and by the continual fire he kept up from his guns and musketry, he killed a great many of his troops. The fort was accordingly invested immediately. Under the cover of the rocks, the assault was delivered, Haidar taking his position on a hill to the northward of the fort, but next adjoining to that on which it stood. Mounting some large guns on that hill, he sent to the killedār word suggesting a composition. The proud commandant rejecting the terms of surrender, Haidar gave orders to his artillery men to fire at a particular part of the rocks which rose above the middle of the hill, and beneath which stood the houses and buildings of the fort, full of inhabitants. As these rocks were knocked to pieces by the cannon balls, the fragments killed a number of the besieged, and scattered the rest so effectu-

Capture of Maḍakśira.

85. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 120-122; Wilks, l.c., *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25A; also *Fort St. George Records, Mily. Count. Corres.*, l.c., *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXXVII, *Letter* No. 7, very briefly touching on this campaign. De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 81) and Robson (l.c.) hardly refer to it. Stewart is silent on it. Kīrmāṇi antedates the event and sets it down to 1758 (A. H. 1172). Wilks adopts the following order of conquests: Kōḍikoṇḍa, Penukoṇḍa and Maḍakśira (l.c.)

ally that the garrison of the fort got unnerved and lost the power of defence. Alarmed at this state of affairs, the commandant surrendered on the condition that he and his garrison were to march out with their lives and property.[86]

Capture of Nandidurg and capitulation of Chikkappa.

The position at Nandidurg had developed as expected. The Pāḷegār Chikkappa and his family had been reduced to such extremities that they were without resources to continue the defence. They had not even the necessaries of life to sustain them. Mīr Alī Razā Khān had exerted great skill in stopping all supplies, and, as for help, the flight of Murāri Rao had ended all possible chance of it. Chikkappa thus forced to surrender, he and his family, including his nephew Baiche Gauḍa, were sent under Haidar's orders to Bangalore, where they were kept close prisoners.[87] Here Chikkappa died, some say leaving no issue, while others state that he left a number of sons, of whom two were made Mussalmans, according to the directions issued by Haidar.[88] Later, a report being

86. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 122-123; Wilks (l.c.) barely mentions the names of the places taken, without attempting any description of the fighting connected with them.

87. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 123-124; *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 308.

88. The family account says he died "without issue" (*Mys. Gaz.*, l.c.). Wilks has nothing to state on this point. Robson and Kīrmāṇi are specific, however, on it. Robson gives his name as "Chinapah" (Chinnappa), which is another form of "Chikkappa," and says that he would never have surrendered himself to Mīr Alī had he not been in the utmost distress for want of the necessaries of life, being almost starved on the Nandidurg Rock.—*o.c.*, 34-35. (Robson gives the name of the rock as "Nandegoody Rock," which is an obvious error). Robson says that the Pāḷegār had been "solemnly" promised to be released on his agreeing to the several conditions enforced on him. "Yet he (Mīr Alī) was so perfidious," Robson continues, "as to send him a prisoner to Bengaloor, where, in a few days, he died through grief" (*o.c.*, 34-35). Then Robson adds: "Hyder, to secure himself against any future attempts of Chinapah's son, who was then a young man, caused him forthwith to be circumcised by force, and taught the principles of Mahometan religion." (*o.c.*, 35). Kīrmāṇi says: "The Meer (Mīr Alī), agreeably to Hydur's orders, despatched the captive Poligar and his family to Bangalore; and of his sons two were made

circulated that a rescue would be attempted, the other prisoners were removed to Coimbatore.[89]

Review of Haidar's conduct of the Sīra and Chikbaḷḷāpur campaigns.

Haidar's campaign against Chikbaḷḷāpur and his subsequent conquest of the country adjoining it to the north and to the east, helped to make for the unification of the country on the one hand and on the other to secure the frontiers of Mysore. It cannot be said that he did not try to make Sīra a larger and a more compact province, while he was sincere and whole-hearted in treating it as part and parcel of Mysore. He had no doubt pretended to obtain *sanads* and contract treaties for his Nawābship and titles to signify his control over his conquests from Salābat, but that was part of the routine of the day, when everybody in the South pretended to hold land by sub-infeudation as it were. But its true significance had been wholly lost long back and it meant no more than paying sums for buying peace or ransoming places, where that seemed the more easy or cheaper course from a relative point of view. As to the terrorism he indulged in, that, again, was part of the war practice of the time. But it was rapidly dying out and Haidar's use of it, though a sign of barbarism in which he was brought up, is, perhaps, mitigated by the reflection that he used it in the present instance with some discrimination, restricting mutilation to but a few individuals. His forcible

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Mussalmans. One of them died, but the other Sufdar Khan is now living (*i.e.*, at the time Kīrmāṇi wrote his work, about 1,800) and with his troops was received into the Nawaub's (*i.e.*, Haidar's) service."—*o.c.*, 124.

89. When Haidar visited Coimbatore, sometime later, they all waited on him except Baiche Gauḍa, who refused to salute the conqueror. Unwilling to hurt the old man, Haidar asked him to be admitted through a low door, intending to accept the bending down with his head forward in passing through it as a salute and return the salute. But the obstinate old Gauḍa, to prevent Haidar from having even that gratification, presented one of his feet first, on which he was put into irons and close confinement. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 308.

conversion to the Muslim faith of Chikkappa's two sons seems hard to justify, more especially as such conversion was against Haidar's usual policy. The highest that could be said by way of explanation or in extenuation of this mark of fanaticism on Haidar's part would be to say that it was not religion but politics that dictated this course of conduct on his part. Evidently Chikkappa seemed vicious in Haidar's eyes. When he attacked him he defended himself. And what would not his sons do, if left alone? So evidently thought Haidar, and he determined on attaching them to himself by making them one with him in their faith! And in his crude way—and every one becomes crude where religion enters—he thought he could forcibly change them into Muslims to keep them ever away from asserting themselves against himself! In this he was wholly mistaken, for, as history records, others rose in the family of Chikkappa to claim the Pāḷayam, and they were recognised too![90]

Administrative arrangements for the new territories.

Immediately after the fall of Chikbaḷḷāpur and the annexation of a large part of the country to its north and east, Haidar made arrangements for their administration as parts of Mysore territory by appointing suitable men for their civil and military administration.[91] Amīls and Killedārs were duly posted and as things assumed a normal shape, he proceeded to Sīra to provide for its government.[92] Mīr Alī Razā Khān was appointed as its Faujdār.[93] After a short stay at Sīra, he resolved on reducing to subjection those who had long been held to be subject to its jurisdiction.[94] Among these were reckoned the chiefs of Rāyadurg, Harapanahaḷḷi and Chitaldrug,

Mīr Alī Razā Khān appointed Faujdār of Sīra.

90. For the subsequent history of the Pāḷayam, see *Ibid.*
91. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 124.
92. *Ibid*; Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 500.
93. *Ibid*, 147.
94. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 500-501.

situated to the north and north-east of Sīra, and Bednūr and the territory dependent on it, to the west.[95] Accordingly, in the prosecution of this objective, he proceeded, about the middle of 1762, on an expedition north-westwards, taking on the way Saṇṇakki-Bāgūr, Hosadurga and other places.[96] Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān was detached to other places near about. He took Kanakagiri, levying a tribute of Rs. 2 lakhs,[97] and then proceeded to Harapanahaḷḷi and there, "by fair and foul means," he not only made him yield but also to pay Rs. 3 lakhs.[98] At Rāyadurg, he met with a show of force[99] and excuses combined but by a counter-show of force, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān brought him to terms. He paid in Rs. 3 lakhs as tribute, Rs. 2 lakhs as a fine for his show of force and Rs. 1 lakh "as a present for his life" being spared. Medakere Nāyaka, the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug, however, attempted to evade and procrastinate. His country was overrun, with the result that in a few days, he found it prudent to compromise. He paid Rs. 4 lakhs as tribute and 2 lakhs of pagodas for a fine.[100] The result of the campaign so far was two-fold:

Campaign against the Pāḷegārs of Rāyadurg, Harapanahaḷḷi, Chitaldrug, etc.

95. *Ibid*; also De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 82, where he states that the "kingdom of Kanara" was comprised in the Subaship of Scirra (Sīra)".

96. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 26.

97. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 144.

98. *Ibid.* The phrase "by fair and foul means" is Kīrmāṇi's own. According to Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 501), the Pāḷegār of Harapanahaḷḷi was among those who obeyed the first summons, a remark which is in agreement with Kīrmāṇi's version.

99. *Ibid*, 144-147. According to Wilks (l.c.), the Pāḷegār of Rāyadurg, on the approach of Haidar, came, it is said, "spontaneously to offer submission and allegiance, and for this conduct he was ever afterwards distinguished by Hyder above all his Hindoo dependants." This statement, however, is directly contradicted by Kīrmāṇi, who gives a long account of how he procrastinated and offered excuses and even attacked a detachment sent by Fuzzul-ullāh to join Haidar on his way from Bednūr and had to attack Kanikal, one of his places "for an example" (Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 144-147).

100. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 502. According to Kīrmāṇi (*o.c.*, 144), the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug appears to have offered no opposition on this occasion. Kīrmāṇi's version would indicate that during the whole of this campaign

it added territory to Mysore and replenished the war-chest materially, making possible the greater conquest that was to come next, the conquest of Bednūr.

Conquest of Bednūr, 1763.

Towards the close of 1762, Haidar, accompanied by Medekere Nāyaka of Chitaldrug, marched against Bednūr (*i.e.*, the kingdom of Kanara or Ikkēri), ostensibly supporting the claims of a pretender, popularly known as Gaibu Rāja Channabasappa Nāyaka, aged about seventeen years, to the throne of the State, but really by way of punishing her for not supporting him against Chitaldrug under the agreement between the States of Bednūr and Mysore.[101]

Haidar's motives.

Bednūr had been reputed a wealthy city and it is possible that Haidar had had his eye on it for sometime, both to extend Mysore influence on that side to the sea and to acquire the hoarded

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in the north-west, Haidar was actively assisted by Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān. According to the *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 26), Medakere Nāyaka was mulcted of 8 lakhs of *Durgi-varahas* by way of contribution. Robson says that Haidar exacted Rs. 3 lakhs from him (*o.c.*, 27). He adds that he made the Pālegār agree "to assist him with 1,500 horse and 10,000 foot in a new expedition," the reference being, of course, to the next one against Bednūr.

101. De La Tour literally refers to Bednūr, the capital of Kanara, as "Rana Biddeluru" (*Ayder Ali*, I. 83, 87, 88, 89), perhaps after the Queen who ruled over it. It is, however, quite distinct from Rāṇi-Bednūr or Rāṇibennūr, in the present Dharwar district. In one place, he seems to identify Bednūr with "the kingdom of Bisnagar or Bassapatnam" (*Ibid*, I. 81), and in two places he speaks as if Chitaldrug was identical with "Bisnagar" (*Ibid*, I. 82, 85). This looseness in identification is, perhaps, to be attributed to the fact that Bednūr, Chitaldrug, etc., were still nominally recognised as part and parcel of the old but defunct Vijayanagar Empire. The "Gaibu Rāja" referred to is "the Raja of the resurrection" of Wilks (I. 509), because he was represented to be the same as Channabasappa Nāyaka (1754-1757), the first adopted son of Vīrammāji, strangled by orders of the latter in 1757 but alleged to have escaped for protection to Chitaldrug while half dead (*Haid. Nām.*, ff. 27; also *Wilks*, I. 503, etc.). On the subject of Pretenders in history, see *f.n.* 120 below. The agreement referred to, in the text above, seems obviously to be the *Bhāshā-Patrike* of *c.* 1700 (*vide* Vol. I. P. 321 of this work), which was never strictly adhered to by Bednūr.

money in its coffers. One account says that the news-writers of the day described to Haidar in glowing terms, saying "that from its beauty and verdure, it bestowed splendour on the Bālaghāt country, nay, that it might be said to be equal to the gardens of Paradise." The fertility of the country was, it was reported, the envy of Kāshmīr, while its beautiful fields and meadows gave delight, it was said, to the heart of the beholder. And its charms were such that if any one burned with grief entered it, were he even as a bird roasting on the spit, he would, it was remarked, regain his wings and feathers.[102] Such a country Haidar wanted to secure for Mysore. He set about, we are told, sending out in advance some "searching spies" to study the situation.[103] Coming to know of the dissensions existing between the Rāṇi and the person who was ambitious of obtaining the government of Bednur and who, to attain that object, had sought refuge with Haidar at Chitaldrug, Haidar, we are told,[104] marched into Bednūr. The pretender engaged, through the

102. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 126-129. This high-flown description of Kīrmāṇi of Bednūr is pleasing no doubt to the ear but it is spoiled by the suggestion at its end that such a country was not fit to be ruled by a Rāṇi but only by a "just and distinguished chief" like Haidar. As Col. Miles remarks, Kīrmāṇi here seems to justify in advance Haidar's invasion of Bednūr. Indeed, one would think, from the language used by him, that Haidar "had a right to dispossess the unfortunate Rani of her territory and wealth, and perhaps to take her life" (*Ibid*, 129, f. n.). The beauty of Bednūr, amidst its magnificent Malnāḍ setting, evidently was too impressive in those days to have been missed by the casual traveller. Its comparison with Kāshmīr by Kīrmāṇi is echoed in many literary works and lithic inscriptions, which go back to many centuries. One of the verses translated in the text above was thus rendered by Mr. Davenport from the Persian original for Col. Miles :—

If burnt with grief, into Bednūr, you enter,
Though as bad as a bird's on the spit be your plight,
In that beautiful country, of pleasure the centre,
Your wings and your feathers you'll renovate quite.

(See *Ibid*, 126, f. n.)

103. *Ibid*, 129-130.

104. *Ibid*, 130-131.

medium of the chief of Chitaldrug, "to gird his loins in the service of the Nawaub," which in plain terms meant that he would become a vassal of Mysore.[105] There is, no doubt, some truth in this story, and it is not improbable that Haidar made the case of the pretender his own and used it artfully later against both the pretender and the person against whom he had carried complaints. Haidar's march was distinguished throughout, if we are to believe the annalist of the times, by his affability towards the people, his gifts to them, his assurances to them of future welfare and prosperity, and his promises of safety. At the same time, those who opposed him—"those who left the circle of obedience to his commands" as the panegyrist puts it—were evidently made examples of; they were made prisoners or destroyed.[106] Whatever his motives, Haidar put through his objective in a determined manner, yielding neither to sentiment nor to appeal.

Rāṇi Virammāji's rule.

Bednūr, at the time we are writing of, had been the capital of the Ikkēri kings for a hundred and twenty-three years. After it became the capital of that well known line of kings, it had been ruled in succession by about ten chiefs, of whom Śivappa Nāyaka I (1645-1660) was the first. He improved and enlarged it and made it and the kingdom of which it was the capital famous by his wise rule. He made good roads; he fixed the revenue assessment of the country, which is still remembered for its moderation; he provided for the safety of the country by maintaining a standing army of 50,000 troops; and he extended the area of his rule by conquering the adjoining district of Kanara. This conquest brought him a great deal of booty which he expended wisely. He gave asylum to some 30,000 Christians, who, persecuted in

105. *Ibid*, 131.
106. *Ibid*, 132.

Goa and Salsette, sought protection at his hands. To these he granted many great privileges[107]. To Ranga Rāya (Śrī-Ranga VI), the Vijayanagar Emperor, he gave a place of residence in his kingdom. He also encouraged trade, maintaining a friendly intercourse with the Muslims. So famous did he become in India at about the middle of the 17th century that his kingdom attracted foreign travellers—Father Leonardo Paes and Father Vincent, the barefoot Carnelite friar—who have left laudatory accounts of his rule. Third in succession to him was Sōmaśēkhara I (1664-1671), whose widow Channammāji gave shelter to Rājā Rām, the son of Śivāji, when he was in hiding from the Mughals, until he could escape to his own country. Her adopted son Basappa Nāyaka I (1697-1714) was a pious man devoted to works of charity. His son Sōmaśēkhara II (1715-1739) attacked Sīra, the Mughal capital in the Karnātic, and took Ajjampur, Sante Bennūr and other places from the Mughals. He was entitled *Buddhi* or the Wise (Ruler). Jacobus Cauter Vissacher, writing of his period of rule, commends him as a "magnificent and powerful" king—much more so than those of Malabar. He calls Bednūr the granary of all Southern India. "The city (of Bednūr)," he writes, "where the Raja holds his court, lies some leagues inland, and is connected with the sea-port by a fine road, planted with trees, which the inhabitants are obliged to keep in excellent order. This road is so secure that any stranger might go and sleep there with bags full of money, and nobody would molest or rob him, for, if such a thing occurred, the people in the neighbourhood would not only be severely punished but would also be forced to make good the money." Sōmaśēkhara II was succeeded by his nephew Basappa Nāyaka II (1739-1754). In 1748, Basappa Nāyaka II sought the aid of Chandā Sāhib, who, at the intervention

107. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 83.

of the French, had just been released from his Satara prison by the Mahrattas, against Medakere Nāyaka of Chitaldrug, who had also in his turn sought for Chandā Sāhib's help against Basappa Nāyaka II. But Chandā Sāhib joined Medakere Nāyaka and in the decisive battle at Mayakoṇḍa[108], fought on 24th March 1748, the Chitaldrug forces were signally defeated, Medakere Nāyaka himself being slain on the field of battle, together with Chandā Sāhib's son, and Chandā Sāhib himself was captured by Basappa Nāyaka. While being transported in triumph to Bednūr, Chandā Sāhib artfully won over his Mussulman guards by informing them of his prospects if they only set him at liberty and they marched him off to the French[109]. Basappa Nāyaka II died in 1754, leaving Channabasappa Nāyaka, his adopted son, and Rāṇi Vīrammāji, his widow. Rāṇi Vīrammāji, sometimes described as Channa-Vīrammāji, ruled in her adopted son's name, keeping him under control, for about three years, at the end of which she, it is said, plotted against him and contrived, on July 18, 1757, to put him to death.[110] Thereafter, it is stated,[111] she took in adoption, on August 4, 1757, another boy—Sōmaśēkhara III of history—who was the youngest of the four sons of her maternal uncle Paṭṭaṇa Seṭṭi Channa-Vīrappa of Bankapur.[112]

108. About 26 miles S. E. of Harihar and about 20 miles N. W. of Chitaldrug; now a Railway Station on the Mysore State Railway.

109. How he joined as pretender to the position of Nizām of Hyderabad and both of them were successful against Anwar-ud-dīn at Āmbūr, and how he became recognised as the Nawāb of Arcot under French auspices, and how he later, in the fight for Trichinopoly, fell into the hands of Mānāji, and how he was treacherously stabbed by him and his head was despatched by Nanjarāja to Seringapatam, where it was suspended on the Mysore Gate, will be found referred to in Ch. VI., pp. 115-131 above.

110. This is the traditionary story as narrated in Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 503. The *Ke. N. V.* does not make mention of it, though it represents him as having died on the date mentioned.

111. See *Keḷadi-Nṛipa-Vijayam* of Liṅgaṇṇa-Kavi (*c.* 1800), Ch. XII, pp. 217-223, from which the details in this section of the text are taken.

112. About 60 miles N. E. of Bednūr; and about 5 miles S. W. of Savaṇūr; now a Railway Station on the M. & S. M. Ry., Bangalore-Poona Section. It is situated in the present North-Kanara district.

She was evidently well connected, her father's position socially and probably otherwise being high, as he is spoken of as *Paṭṭaṇa-Seṭṭi*. Sōmaśēkhara III being, however, quite a youth, Vīrammāji conducted the affairs of the State with the aid of her ministers and officers. Her rule is spoken of as having been benificent and just, being in accordance with the standard of true *dharma*.[113] Though an ardent Vīraśaiva in her religious persuasion, she was, in keeping with the traditions of the Bednūr house, friendly with the *Gurus* of the Śringēri *maṭh*.[114] It is said that having learnt that the *maṭh* was involved in heavy debts, she invited to her capital, in January 1758, the then *Guru*, Abhinava-Sachchidānanda-Bhāratī-Svāmi [115] and accorded him not only the religious welcome due to him but also presented him with a crystalline image of Śiva (*sphaṭika linga*) and an image of Gōpāla set in rubies (*ratnakhachita Gōpāla-krishṇamūrti*), together with the gift of a piece of land valued at 74 *varahas*. She endowed the Śringēri *maṭh*, besides, with another piece of rent-free land valued at 300 *varahas*. She also generously undertook and arranged for the progressive liquidation of the debts of the

113. *Ke. N. V.*, l. c. The text goes: *saddharmadim rājya pratipālanam geyyuttumirdu.*

114. Several inscriptions attest to these friendly relations between the Keḷadi (i. e., Bednūr) chiefs and the Śringēri *maṭh*. *Śringēri* 5, dated in 1621, in the time of Venkaṭappa Nāyaka, records the re-establishment of the Śringēri maṭh; while *Koppa* 61, dated in 1627, in the same reign, describes Venkaṭappa Nāyaka as the establisher of the *Vaidikādvaitasiddhānta*, one of the titles of the Śringēri Gurus; this inscription speaks of him as *devoted to the faith of Śiva and the Śringēri Guru*, i.e., the Vīraśaiva faith and the Śringēri Guru who followed the Vēdic faith. Two other inscriptions (*Śringēri* 11 and 13), both dated in 1652, belonging to the time of Śivappa Nāyaka, record the restoration of the endowments of the Śringēri *maṭh*. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1305.

115. This *Guru* of the Śringēri *maṭh* has to be identified with *Narasimha-Bhārati*, who became *Jagadguru* in 1758, according to inscriptions (see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1179). According to the Śringēri *maṭh* list, however, Abhinava-Sachchidānanda-Bhārati was *Guru* from 1741-1767 and Narasima-Bhārati from 1767-1770 (see *Mys. Gaz.*, I. 307). The *maṭh* list and the data afforded by incriptions do not always agree.

maṭh, which had then evidently become a great burden to it.[116] Vīrammāji was, however, not only religiously inclined but also possessed of the valour of a warrior-queen. She is said to have organised a campaign against the Mahratta ruler of Miraj and to have captured, through her general Vīrabhadrappa, the fort at his very capital.[117] This event should have occurred before Vīrammāji came into conflict with Haidar in 1763. We may probably set it down to about 1760 A. D. Vīrammāji is, however, depicted to us in a rather unfavourable light by other writers. These will be found referred to in an Appendix to this volume together with an indication of the reliance to be placed on them. It ought to suffice here to state that she was a woman-ruler of considerable talent, brave and daring in character and highly patriotic by temperament. While she might not have been a saint in her virtues, it is easy to see that her easy manners with one Nimbaiya gave occasion to gossip, which seems to have given her quite an evil reputation in her own time.[118] What proved an undoubted invitation to Haidar to interfere in her affairs was her alleged keeping out of the kingdom her husband's adopted son. Whether that son's death occurred or not, it opened the way for the creation of a "Ghyboo Raja"—Resurrection Rāja—Channabasappa Nāyaka, probably the artful creation of the Chitaldrug Pāḷegār, either by himself or set up by him at the instigation of Haidar's emissaries who were undoubtedly at work in and about Bednūr for some time prior to its conquest.[119]

116. The text runs thus : *ā maṭhada ruṇabhārakkam uchita varitu khaṇḍita kāyakangaḷam māḍisi koṭṭu*—see *Ke. N. V.*, l. c.

117. Mīraj is described as "*Miḍije*, near the West Coast". See *Ibid*, 223. Miraj is 86 miles north of Belgaum and is near the Krishṇa river.

118. Nimbaiya mentioned above may be identified with Nambaiya, described as *Gurikār* of the Lingāyat faith, who is said to have served under Vīrammāji. As he is spoken of as *Śivabhakta Gurikār*, he should have kept up to the formalism prescribed by the Vīraśaiva faith. See *Ke. N. V.*, 218, f. n. 2.

119. Kīrmāṇi specifically refers to the spies hovering about Bednūr prior to its invasion. The *Haid. Nām.* confirms this.

The story of the Pretender.

The young Pretender's arrival was, it is said, announced dramatically to Haidar by the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug, when he himself, on rendering his submission, was received by Haidar in his camp.[120] The circumstances of this introduction were somewhat novel. Basavappa Nāyaka, the last reigning Rāja of Bednūr, had died in 1754, leaving as his heir an adopted son named Channabasava,

120. Wilks says that the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug, on the Pretender's arrival at the camp of Haidar, mentioned to him in the course of his conversation "the arrival at his own camp of a singular visitor, whose history opened to Hyder new objects of ambition" (Wilks, *o. c.* I. 502) This statement, though theatrically put, is not correct historically. Haidar had, as mentioned above, had his eye on Bednūr for some time and had sent out his spies to tour the country and prepare the grand programme for his conquest. Kirmāṇi's version seems to enshrine the true version in this respect. Pretenders to thrones, it is interesting to note here, are well known in English and French histories. The alleged death of Louis XVII, the nominal king of France, gave occassion to the rise of a number of "pretenders". Louis XVII, as is well known, was the son of the unfortunate Louis XVI and Mary Antoinette; became Dauphin in 1789, when his elder brother, proclaimed king by the same grants, died. He was only 4 years then, having been born on March 27, 1785. He was put in prison with the other members of the Royal family, and kept there after the execution of his parents. He was reported to have died in the Temple, Paris, then a prison, on June 8, 1795, perhaps of poison, but some thought the report was untrue. Several pretenders came forward, claiming to be the Dauphin, the most notable a German, Karl Wilhelm Naundorff, who appeared in France in 1833. He died in 1845. The two "pretenders" known to English History were the son and grandson of James II (Prince Charles). They claimed the right to the throne of England. They were called respectively the Elder and the Younger "Pretender"; the Elder, who made one or two attempts to secure his claim, surrendered it to his son, who in 1745 was defeated at Culloden. They did not *personate* any but pretended they had a *claim* to the throne; they were unlike the "Gaibu" of Bednūr and Karl Wilhelm Naundorff of Germany, who personated a dead man. A true "pretender" was the so-called "claimant" in the famous Tichborne case. During the seventies of the 19th Century, a butcher from Waggs Waggs, in Australia, named Thomas Castro, otherwise Thomas Orton, laid claim to Tichborne, a village and property of Hampshire, in 1866, on the death of Sir Alfred Joseph Tichborne. He represented himself as an elder brother of the deceased baronet, supposed (and rightly) to have perished at sea. The imposture was exposed after a lengthy trial, and a subsequent trial for perjury resulted in a sentence of 14 years' penal servitude. Orton, after his release, confessed his imposture in 1895.

aged about seventeen years, under the care of Vīrammāji, his widow. Vīrammāji had formed an illicit connection with one Nimbaiya, a connection which had become so public as to be noticed by a stray European traveller, who passed through Kanara during 1757.[121] The young Rāja protested against the misdoings of his adopted mother, with the result that he was—so the story goes—secretly strangled to death in his bath by a *jeṭṭi*, a professional athlete who used to shampoo him. Vīrammāji selected a young man, on whom she bestowed the name Sōmaśēkhara, and adopted him as son and heir to the throne. The visitor who was introduced to Haidar, however, was announced as Channabasava, who, it was reported, had been saved by an artifice of the *jeṭṭi*, concealed in his preserver's house for five years, and now escaped to implore the protection and aid of his neighbours in the recovery of his ancient throne. Thus introduced to Haidar, the plan was quickly evolved to fit out an expedition to reinstate him in his alleged rights on terms and conditions mutually agreed to between the three parties.

Bednūr and its surroundings.

Situated on the summit of the Western Ghats, Bednūr overlooks what are to-day the districts of Kanara and Malabar. The country round it is one the most picturesque in the Mysore State, surrounded as it is on its three sides by high ranges of hills, whose drainage flows north-west

121. Wilks notes the fact that Anquetil du Perron, who visited Kanara in 1757, had heard of it. Anquetil du Perron (1731-1815) was the enthusiastic Orientalist, to whom we owe the discovery and the first translation of the *Zend-Avesta*. Schopenhauer derived his knowledge of Hindu philosophy from his writings. Anquetil du Perron was, it might be added, the brother of the more famous French historian in holy orders, Anquetil Louis Pierre (1723-1806), who wrote *Précisde l' Histoire Universelle*, and a *Histoire de France* in 14 vols., which has been continued by Bouillet in 6 more vols. Anquetil du Perron's *Des Recharches Historiques et geographiques sur L' Inde* was published in Berlin in 1786. The truth underlying this story is examined below.

into the Śarāvati. The hills by their height intercept the clouds of the South-West Monsoon, with the results that for nine months in the year the country experiences a climate that may be described as one of incessant rain, the rainfall in the southern portion being as much as, or even more than, 190 inches, while in the northern it is something near 102 inches and in the east it averages from 70 to 80 inches. In the old days, half the year usually used to be spent by the people in preparing provisions for what remained of it. The extraordinary moisture favours the growth not only of abundant crops of rice and areca, pepper and cardamoms, always the main wet and garden cultivation known to this part of the country, but also timber of luxuriant stature, with underwood scarcely penetrable, and a foliage which, added to a cloudy sky, has rendered it proverbial among those who visit it, that a man may pass the greater part of the year in Bednūr without a sight of the Sun. The capital and fort of Bednūr—remains of which may still be seen—were situated in a basin formed by a perfect cluster of hills, the crest of which, about 6 miles from the city, had been fortified in its weakest parts by lines, which, with the woods and natural protection of the hills, constituted its only strength, the fort itself being, from its very position, incapable of a good defence. The city walls were about eight miles in circumference, pierced by ten gates, named Delhi, Koḍiyāl, Kauledurga, etc., while the Palace, situated on a hill in the centre, was surrounded by a citadel, the whole city and the Palace being encircled by woods, hills, and fortified defiles, extending many miles in circumference. The territory dependent on Bednūr, at the time we are writing of, included not only the mountainous region just described but also extended to the west over the present maritime districts of North and South Kanara and to the east over an area of more open country stretching as far as Santebennūr and

Hoḷalkere, within about twenty miles to the south-west of Chitaldrug, whose Pāḷegār, the one who had evinced so much friendly interest in the reinstatement of the Pretender from Bednūr, had been its longstanding enemy.

The city of Bednūr.

The city of Bednūr itself, situated near a small hill, was, at the time of its conquest, not only a wealthy and beautiful city, but also one of the largest and best peopled in all India. It contained at least 60,000 souls in it, of whom at least half were Christians who felt perfectly at home in it. They had not only freedom to exercise their religion but also enjoyed many valuable privileges, which had been conferred on them on their first arrival from Goa and Salsette, flying from the horrors of the Inquisition there. This large population was, however, by no means proportionate to the extent of the city, whose circuit exceeded three leagues or about nine miles. That this could have been no exaggeration will be evident when it is remembered that there were streets in it, nearly in a straight line, of two leagues. The greatest part of the city was inhabited by great men and the nobility, whose homes were cast in the midst of a large garden, enclosing vast reservoirs of water, suited as well for the purposes of pleasure as utility. A prodigious number of trees, planted in these gardens, shaded all the streets, which were watered on each side by a rivulet of clear and limpid water, and possessed no other pavement than a fine gravel. The small mountain, near which this beautiful city was situated, had, as stated above, a considerable fortress on its summit. Situated in a plain about five or six leagues in diameter, it was environed by other mountains and forests that extended for more than twenty leagues every way. They could not be passed but by narrow passages, defended by forts at a small distance from each other. These circumstances rendered

the access to the city extremely difficult for an army, whose progress might be checked at every step by an inconsiderable force, and which could encamp but in the length of a stony passage, where it would be liable to be attacked by the people of the country who knew all the secret passages and could continually lay in ambush to annoy the enemy. The woods, too, could neither be cut down, much less burned, without infinite labour, being bamboos which cannot be burned without being first cut down and dried, nor traversed easily, for they were infested with tigers, bears, elephants and every other species of wild animals and venomous reptiles.

Haidar's preparations.

Such a mass of insuperable difficulties as presented themselves to Haidar would have deterred him from the enterprise he had set his heart upon for some time, if he had not had the artful aid of the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug and his protege, the Pretender to the throne of Bednūr, who, whether he was the real adopted son or not of the last ruler, passed for such, thanks for the cunning propaganda of Haidar's emissaries and spies. Whether his mother Vīrammāji was liked or not, and whether the pretended young prince was the beloved of the people or not, there is no doubt the fact that he accompanied Haidar, making the cunning invader's work both easy and acceptable to the people of Bednūr.[122]

122. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 84-86. Haidar would have been deterred from his enterprise, "if he had not been accompanied by the young prince, who was beloved by the people and the men in power; while the queen his mother was detested by them, as well for her haughtiness and pride, as for having contracted a second marriage with a Brahmin, contrary to the law of the place, which prohibits the widows of their kings from marrying a second time" (*o.c.*, 84-85). De La Tour was wrong in describing Nimbaiya, the person whose name was connected by wild gossip at the time with that of Rāṇi Vīrammāji, as a Brāhmin. He was a Lingāyat; nor was De La Tour right in stating that the Rāṇi had "contracted a second marriage" with him. Possibly cruel gossip was responsible for all these misdescriptions, for, as we shall see, Rāṇi Vīrammāji was a pious, religious and devoted Lingāyat and was evidently too strong for the men of her time, whether in her own kingdom or outside of it.

Haidar having determined on the enterprise, left Chitaldrug,[123] carrying the young prince with him at the head of 6,000 of his best cavalry and some *Kaḷḷars*,[124] who were well habituated to traverse mountains and forests. He had also a large number of oxen loaded with rice and with no other baggage; and advanced by forced marches towards Bednūr.

Haidar's Treaty with the Pretender.

But before he started on the expedition, Haidar, as may be expected, came to an arrangement with the Pretender and the Pāḷegār. Under this arrangement, the young chief was to be re-established in his country, for which service Haidar, it was stipulated, was to receive, besides valuable presents, Rs. 40 lakhs for the expenses of the undertaking, besides the port of Mangalore, together with a tract of country to form a communication from thence to the kingdom of Mysore.[125] The Pretender swore, without reserve, to the faithful performance of the Treaty, while Haidar, on his part, promised to strictly carry out his part of the contract.[126] Haidar also obtained some aid from the supporters of the Pretender in the shape of men, the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug evidently placing himself and his troops at the disposal of Haidar.[127]

123. De La Tour says he started from "Bisnagar," identified with "Basavapatna," see f. n. 101 above. But Wilks says Chitaldrug. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 503.

124. The "Caleros" of De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 85). Haidar had in his army a contingent of Kaḷḷars recruited from the Diṇḍigal country, of which he was Faujdār at one time. See Ch. XII.

125. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 87.

126. See Robson, *o.c.*, 28-29. The Treaty was evidently made at Chitaldrug. Robson adds that it was here that Haidar received the first impression of reducing the Bednūr country, "the reinstating of the young Rajah being the most favourable circumstance and the most conducive to his secret design." Of course, Robson did not know that the design against Bednūr had been formed for some time before.

127. Robson speaks of the "combined armies" in this connection. As the young Prince is said to have been kept "in safety for eight years" by the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug, the inference seems justifiable that it was he who placed his army at the disposal of Haidar. It is possible he raised levies in the name of the Prince and the people should have

The Pāḷegār was to receive his remuneration as well for the valuable help rendered by him.[128] All things thus arranged, the troops commenced their march towards Bednūr about the end of 1762, moving in four parallel columns, and preserving a distance from each other of from five to fifteen miles according to circumstances, for the purpose of reducing and occupying all the fortifications situated in the open country before they should attempt the fastnesses of the woods.[129] The young Pretender, who was with the combined armies, was attended with much ceremony, generally mounted on an elephant, in order to attract the eyes of his devoted subjects. This coincided with Haidar's artful design, and succeeded in attracting all the country people, who cheerfully presented themselves and furnished all the necessaries the armies stood in need of.[130] Haidar added another artifice to win over the people to his side.

Haidar's advance on the place.

On entering the territories of Bednūr, he issued a proclamation in the name of the Pretender, and called on the inhabitants to return to their allegiance. This had the desired effect. Several of the fortified places opened their gates to their lawful prince, while the opposition slackened in the case of several others. Marching by the Chitaldrug-Channagiri-Shimoga road, he first took Santebennūr, a place between Sūḷekere and Sāsalu; thence marched on to Benkipur, modern Bhadrāvati; then he arrived at Shimoga, a fortified place just on the skirt of the woods, some 43 miles due east of Bednūr. He took it without striking a blow and found a lakh of pagodas

joined his standard, whether from ignorance or from conviction that they were helping the person who was entitled to the Bednūr throne.

128. Wilks, l. c., who specially notes this part of the undertaking on the part evidently of the Pretender. At the end of the interview with Haidar, "the plan was," Wilks says, "quickly arranged of an expedition to reinstate him in his supposed rights, and to remunerate the services to be thus rendered by Hyder and the Poligar" (*Ibid*).

129. *Ibid.*

130. Robson, *o.c.*, 29.

here,[131] of which a fourth part he distributed among his troops to stimulate them to further endeavour. Rejecting an offer from Vīrammāji proposing to purchase his retreat for four lakhs of pagodas, he pushed on to Kumsi, 30 miles to the north-west. Here he got into contact with one Lingappa of Mūḍabidare.[132] He had evidently served successive kings of Bednūr and risen to be prime-minister to the late Rāja. But owing to differences of opinion between him and Vīrammāji, possibly over the fate of the adopted boy Channabasappa, he had been dethroned from office and imprisoned at Kumsi by Vīrammāji. He had lately escaped from his confinement[133] and was ready to intrigue against Vīrammāji and thus teach her a lesson. He volunteered to guide Haidar through a secret path by which Bednūr might be approached without encountering any opposition. At Ayanūr,[134] a petty place occupied by a hundred men, he first encountered opposition. The garrison here, fearless of consequences, fired at the troops. They were promptly surrounded and taken, their ears and noses being cut off, and in this state they were dismissed to spread terror before them. Proceeding still further, twenty-five miles in the north-western direction, he reached Anantapur (Ānandapur).[135] Here Vīrammāji sent a message offering twelve lakhs of pagodas. As Haidar approached the first

131. The Pagoda of Bednūr was equal to Rs. 4.

132. "Lingana" of Wilks (*o. c.*, I. 505). He is probably identical with Śivalingappa, mentioned in the *Keḷadi-Nripa-Vijayam* (XII. 217, v. 4) among the names of principal State officers of Bednūr (*mukhyaroḷ*) at the time of the accession of Vīrammāji and Sōmaśēkhara in 1757. In another place in the same text (*Ibid*, XI. 216, f. n. 1), he is referred to among the officers of the previous rulers, Basappa Nāyaka II (1739-1754) and Channabasappa Nāyaka (1754-1757), as *Angaḍi Śivalingappa*. Angaḍi and Mūḍabidare being both situated in South Kanara district, the reference to Lingappa as having hailed from either of these places may be taken as tolerably accurate. He seems to have fallen from power subsequent to 1757.

133. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 27-28.

134. This must be identified with the "Eitoor" of Wilks (*l. c.*).

135. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 27.

barrier of the works of Bednūr, she raised her offer to eighteen lakhs. But, induced by the old, wily minister, he rejected these repeated offers without a moment's hesitation. The unexpected celerity with which Haidar had advanced, threw Vīrammāji into confusion.[136] Terrified at the prospect of an immediate attack, she negotiated once again for peace, offering this time to meet the expenses of Haidar's campaign, and promising the payment of an annual tribute of a lakh of paġoḍas and an appreciable share of the peculiar products of her country—arecanut, cardamoms, black pepper, *Kakul* (a kind of wood), Sandal wood and the like.[137] Haidar proved adamant and was determined on the final conquest of the country. He sent word demanding the Rāṇi's immediate surrender, guaranteeing honourable treatment to her as a pensioner in the fort at Seringapatam. Vīrammāji proudly rejected the proposal and preferred to defend her capital city with the aid of Abdul Hakīm Khān of Savaṇūr, a place about 150 miles off to the north-east. Abdul Hakīm agreed to her request and immediately despatched 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot to her aid; while he himself, with a large force and artillery, advanced and encamped on the river Bala. The troops sent in aid entered, meanwhile, the fort of Bednūr, from the hills and forests surrounding it. When intelligence of what Vīrammāji had done and was determined to carry through reached Haidar, his rage knew no bounds. He became, it is said, violently incensed, and moving forward, encamped within one stage of Bednūr. Then, sending for his officers, he despatched them to take the forts and towns near Bednūr,[138]

136. Thus far Wilks (*Ibid*). Wilks makes no mention of the help asked of and rendered by Abdul Hakīm of Savaṇūr nor of the difficulties encountered by Haidar.

137. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 133; also *Nagarada-Kaifiyat* (*c.* 1800), PP. 538-539—A Mackenzie Ms., Vol. No. 43, in the *Mad. Or. Lib.*

138. Kīrmāṇi is here rather tantalizingly vague. The reference should be to the smaller forts and towns adjoining the capital. The referenc may be to other troops-operating elsewhere; according to Wilks—thos

while he himself with a body of his infantry and cavalry, commanded by his bravest officers, marched forward towards the fort of Bednūr with a view to invest it.[139]

The progress of the siege and conquest.

Arrived at the city's first barrier, Haidar ordered a noisy but feigned attack on the posts in his front; while he placed himself at the head of a column formed of his most select troops, and following the path pointed by the ex-minister, his guide, entered the city before an alarm was given of his approach[140]. Haidar knew no rest, it

which were moving in parallel columns, as narrated in the text above, in taking Bednūr. Both these points are referred to by Kīrmāṇi, who, indeed, furnishes us with a graphic account of how the fort and the citadel were taken. He definitely states that when her *vakīls* returned with Haidar's call for surrender, she, "free from restraint, proudly rejected the terms" of his proposal, and, "right or wrong, foolishly prepared to defend herself"; and "with this intent, she intrigued with Abdul Hakeem Khan of Shanoor (Savaṇūr), sending a large sum of money to him, and entreating his assistance" (Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 133-134). Wilks' account is so far misleading as to make one believe that with the advent of Haidar, Vīrammāji ran for her life to Baḷḷālarāyan-durga with orders to her men to set fire to the capital on the approach of Haidar; and that on the entry of Haidar into the city, her servants set fire to it in a different place (Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 505-506). This is not only unjust to her memory but is historically inaccurate. Kīrmāṇi's account is borne out by other contemporary authorities and may be accepted as both true and in keeping with the actual character and spirit of Vīrammāji. She left the city only when it became impossible for her to defend it any longer. See the text above. Also, Robson, whose account, though brief, seems accurate. He says that the city of Bednūr, being well fortified, surrounded by rocks and vast precipices, covered with impenetrable woods, held out only for one month "notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Queen and her brother, who had but little favour to expect from the resentment of the young Prince, as well as the faithless disposition of the conqueror, Hyder.' Robson, *o. c.*, 29-30. But Robson does not appear to be quite accurat when he suggests that the people "affected at the sight of their lawful King, surrendered the place", unless we take it as meaning that they did so when they found that defence was no longer possible. This may be so, as he says that before surrendering the place, "they permitted the Queen with her brother, to retire to a place of safety, most agreeable to themselves." *Ibid*, 30.

139. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 133-134.

140. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 506. Wilks states that immediately after this approach, the Rāṇi's "servants set fire to the palace in different places in conformity to their instructions." This is evidently a mistake, since his version wholly omits to make any mention of Vīrammāji's gallant defence of her city and citadel.

would seem, until he had completed the task he had set before himself. He employed himself and his troops day and night in the investment of the city. By raising batteries and taking up ground by degrees for the attack. he so strengthened the field of action on the garrison, that it became, to use the language of an annalist of the period, small as the eye of a needle. The garrison, thus tired out, quitting all the places they had fortified outside, retired into the fort, and manned the walls. Vīrammāji herself set the example by the manly courage and steadiness she displayed in defending her Capital, and her troops emulating her, remained steadfast at their posts and defended themselves in a brave manner. Despite Haidar's best efforts against them, and despite the fact that their ranks got thinned daily from the cannon and musket balls turned against them, and the miseries and calamities of the hour, both Vīrammāji and her faithful garrison continued to fight. Many of them were killed, it is true, but not subdued. Abdul Hakīm's troops—mostly Afghans—behaved splendidly, aiding in the defence of the fort and attacking the batteries of the besiegers repeatedly. The siege was so strict and close that the men determined to defend to the last. Haidar, seeing that the siege, "defended by a woman", had been protracted beyond his calculation[141], and that the monsoon would soon be on him and his army, ordered the assault to be given. Free permission being granted that they might retain their plunder, all articles of gold and silver they might take, the cavalry dismounted to a man, and with the infantry, stepped out at the charging pace, marched up the breach, firing vollies, and mounting the walls and the bastions, made the air resound with the shouts of "Take and kill." Every opponent became the butt of the ball and bayonet, and the food of the

141. Kīrmāṇi says "one year", evidently a mistake for one month (*o.c.*, 136); see also Robson, *o.c.*, 29, who says the place held out only one month.

blood-red sword. When the manlike Rāṇi saw her position grow worse, she first set her Palace on fire, her ornamented sleeping apartments coming first. These apartments had been built by her husband Sōmaśēkhara II, a prince as powerful as enlightened, with Chinese bricks and tiles, washed and set in gold, the interstices being gold, while the doors and walls were ornamented with jewels. She next burned most of her boxes of jewellery, or beat them to pieces in an iron mortar; and then accompanied by only two or three attendants, she escaped on foot by the way of a water drain, with her life only, to Kūlidrug (Kavale-durga), about 15 miles off from Bednūr, a very strong place, surrounded by a thick forest. This place she strengthened at once and awaited there events, leaving the whole country, treasures and valuables of her husband and forefathers to the iron grasp of the invader[142]. It is said that Nimbaiya, her

142. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 137. Kūlidurg, which is located by him 15 miles of Bednūr, has to be identified with Kavale-durga, west of Tīrthahaḷḷi, the stronghold of Bednūr chiefs, about 3058 ft. above the sea-level (*Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1303). It is actually about 30 miles south-west of Bednūr. According to other authorities (and among these is Wilks), Vīrammāji is said to have fled to Baḷḷāḷarāyan-durga, about 70 miles to the S.E. of Bednūr. This is a fine spreading hill in the Western Ghāt range, crowned with extensive fortifications going back to Hoysaḷa times. The citadel is a small square fort on the highest point, overlooking the South Kanara district. The pass to Kanara, north of the *durg*, is tremendously steep, though in regular use in former days. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1138-39. Robson, however, says that Queen Vīrammāji chose "the fort of Derryabathar Gurr" for her asylum, "about twelve coss distant from the capital". This would make it about 36 miles from Bednūr. According to Robson, this was "exceeding strong, built on an inaccessible large rock, on one side surrounded by the sea, and the other by a deep river." This place might be identified with the "Darria Bahadur Gurr" of Wilks' Map, a little to the west of Brahmēśvar, which again is a little to the S. W. of Bārkūr. It is identical with the "Daryā Bahadūrgarh Island" of the Survey of India Map, where it is shown a little to the south of St. Mary Isles. It is actually a little to the west of Udipi and on the sea. (A road from Nagar=ancient Bednūr—goes to it through Hosangaḍi, Basrūr, Coondapur, Hangarkaṭṭa, and Malpe, while another goes to it from Shimoga, Tīrthahaḷḷi, Āgumbi, and Malpe.) Whether Robson is right or not in his statement, it is difficult to say. It is possible, however, that the Rāṇi first went to Kavale-durga and

secret lover, and her adopted son, the nominal Rāja, Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka *III*, were also part of her entourage[143]. Immediately Haidar heard of the Rāṇi's flight, he placed a garrison in the fort of Bednūr, and followed her steps and invested the mountain fortress, and closely besieged it. After a time, and not without offering considerable resistance, the garrison surrendered, and the Rāṇi was taken prisoner[144]. Accounts differ as to what place she was despatched as prisoner. One version says, she was sent in a palankeen to Seringapatam by way of Sīra, but from other versions we can safely infer that she was sent first to Bednūr, there to await Haidar's final decision[145]. Haidar pushed on, and entering Bednūr at the head of Channabasappa Nāyaka, the Pretender, proclaimed him king, sent for the Rāṇi and her retinue, on the authority of a safe conduct (*cowle*) issued by Channabasappa, and pretended to be very considerate to them[146]. He received the Rāṇi, indeed, in the most gracious manner and even tried to reconcile her with her son, the Pretender[147].

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from there passed on to Daryā Bahādūrgarh, and from thence to Baḷḷāḷarāyan-durga. It would be otherwise difficult to reconcile the various contemporary statements found in the different sources. Evidently she changed places, having heard of Haidar's movements in pursuit of her and her party.

143. This seems correct, according to other versions.

144. Kīrmāṇi says she was, after being taken, "brought to the presence" of Haidar, who sent her a prisoner to Seringapatam. But this is not confirmed by either contemporary accounts or otherwise. The fact that they were first sent to Bednūr and then transferred to Maddagiri seems correct, because it was from there they were ultimately released by the Mahrattas, when, in their next retaliatory war, they took that place. Vīrammāji died on the way to Poona, while Sōmaśēkhara ended his days there unmarried (see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1238-1239). This point is further referred to below.

145. See Robson, *o.c.*, 30-31; De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 88, whose narrative presumes that Rāṇi Vīrammāji was at Bednūr until the insurrection against Haidar came about. This, however, is not confirmed by other authorities.

146. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 86. De La Tour writes that "Ayder used his victory (over the Rāṇi) with the greatest moderation". De La Tour says that Haidar caused "the new king to be crowned." (*Ibid*, 87).

147. *Ibid.*

And if one version is to be believed, the Pretender was even induced to grant her a considerable pension and she was allowed all the freedom she required in regard to her private life[148]. Whether all this actually occurred or not, there are grounds for believing that she had no reason to doubt that she would be treated otherwise than as became one of her dignity. But Haidar was too cunning a man to tolerate her existence any longer in her kingdom[149]. Nor would he think of allowing the Pretender to reap the benefit of the Treaty he had entered into with him. As we shall see, he contrived soon to remove both of them from the place where their presence would mean no mean inconvenience to them. Thus fell Bednūr, after a protracted siege of one month, on January 19, 1763 (*Chitrabhānu, Māgha śu.* 5)[150].

148. *Ibid.* De La Tour says that she was allowed "to live with her husband". By this, he of course means Nimbaiya.

149. See below.

150. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 27-28. The date for the fall of Bednūr given in this work, as mentioned above, tallies with the date given in the *Ke. N. V.*, ch. XII. P. 223. Peixoto dates the event January 10, 1763 (*Memoirs*, 42). Wilks places it about the beginning of March 1763 (*o. c.*, I. 506). The authority of the local sources is to be preferred here. See also and compare, on the entire topic, the *Nagarada-Kaifiyat* (pp. 538-541) with other authorities mentioned in f. n. 22 *supra*. Among these, De La Tour's account (*o.c.*, I. 82-90) is interesting as giving one portion of the story in a vivid manner. According to him, the claims of the legitimate Prince of Bednūr and the refusal of his Queen-mother to appear before Haidar and explain matters as suzerain in his capacity as Nawāb of Sira, led to his (Haidar's) invasion of the State. Bednūr easily fell before Haidar's arms; the Queen was captured and conducted to his presence; the legitimate Prince, her son, was restored to the sovereignty of the State; and the Queen and the Prince eventually united in a projected attack on Haidar's life in the Bednūr Palace, which being discovered, the Queen and her accomplices were put to death, and the Prince sent a prisoner to Maddagiri, and his kingdom confiscated. Robson's account (*o. c.*, 28-32) agrees in the main with the *Haid. Nām.*, but differs from the latter in regard to the manner in which Haidar put an end to kingly rule in Bednūr. Thus, according to him, Haidar ordered the pageant king Channabasappa Nāyaka (spelt as "Chinavas Appiah") into confinement immediately he found out that the latter contemptuously dismiseed his (Haidar's) servants whom he had ordered to fetch a favourite woman possessed of by the king. The pageant king was a few days later sent with the old Queen of Bednūr and her

And thus ended also the political rivalry that had lasted between Mysore and the Bednūr Chiefs for nearly a century and a half (1630-1763), a rivalry which had had its origins during the last days of Vijayanagar and had persisted through the ages with alternate relations of war and peace.

The destruction of the city.

The destruction of Bednūr which followed the fall of its citadel can, perhaps, be only equalled by the fate that befell mighty Rome at the hands of the incendiary Nero[151], and its pillage to the pillage that the Eternal City experienced at the hands of the Vandal Genseric[152]. Bednūr, the richest commercial city of the East[153], the pride of Śivappa Nāyaka, who enlarged it and made it

brother under a strong guard to Maddagiri, and Haidar assumed the government of Bednūr. Robson's version hardly finds any corroboration in the local tract entitled *Nagarada-Kaifiyat*, which merely mentions the confinement of the Queen and the pageant king in Maddagiri and the subsequent settlement of Bednūr by Haidar. Robson seems evidently to be narrating here from hearsay, especially as he wrote about twenty-three years after the event. Stewart's account (*o.c.*, 16) is very brief and secondhand, and sets down the event to 1762. Kīrmāṇi too antedates the event, referring it to 1759 (A. H. 1173), but his account (*o.c.*, 125-139) agrees in the main with, and supplements to some extent, that of the *Haid. Nām.* There is, however, a good deal of detail in his writing. In a long and vivid but somewhat partisan narrative (*o.c.*, 125-129), he tries to justify Haidar's conquest of Bednūr on the ground of the Rāṇi's dissoluteness, her withholding of tribute to the government of Sīra, etc. Again, in certain places, he writes from hearsay; for instance, in regard to the capture of the Rāṇi by Haidar and her despatch to Seringapatam (*o.c.*, 138). Wilks' account of the conquest (I. 502-512), though secondhand, is in general agreement with the account given in the *Haid. Nām.*

151. Nero, Roman Emperor from 54 to 68 A. D. His vice knew no restraint; it hurried him into a course of profligacy and crime; he put to death his mother and wife and in 64 A. D., many Christians suffered death at his hands, with every refinement of torture, on a trumped-up charge of having caused the great burning of Rome, suspicion of which rested on himself. Gibbon's description of the first persecution of Christians in Rome is classical.

152. Genseric, king of the Vandals, and the founder of the Vandal kingdom in Spain; became king in 429 A.D.; took Carthage; and sacked Rome in 455 A D. He died in 477 A.D., master of the seas, despite the strenuous efforts of the Roman Emperors to crush his power.

153. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 507.

the home of merchants and artisans drawn from all parts of the country[154]; the beloved city of Sōmaśēkhara II, who beautified it beyond words; and the spot most admired for a century and more by celebrated travellers from the West[155]; the one place in this whole subcontinent which for a century had not experienced the ravages of war, became the object of plunder[156]. The terror-stricken inhabitants, secure in the safety inspired by its large standing army[157], accustomed to the conditions of everlasting peace and unaware for ages of the evils that accompany a devastating war, fled *en-masse* to the woods encircling the city, with no thought of the morrow. A city, eight miles in circumference, filled with fine, tall buildings, opulent traders and merchants and jewellers, picturesque gardens, a busy and industrious population, and numerous Hindu temples and Christian churches[158], suffered as much from the effects of fire as from the ravages of the pillage that followed at the hands of a soldiery that had reckoned on plunder as its peculiar privilege. Men of the cavalry vied with those of the infantry in looting the great city. They took, an annalist says[159], "what they could take, of heaps of gold and silver, valuable stuffs, jewels, pearls, arms of all kinds, and a great number of beautiful women, the

154. *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1234.

155. Father Leonardo Pæs visited it during the reign of Śivappa Nāyaka I (1645-1660). Father Vincent, a barefoot Carmelite friar, mentions in his travels the wealthy Mussalman merchant Shah Bandari Isak, who was a favourite of Śivappa Nāyaka, and traded on the Western Coast and at Bednūr (*Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1234-35). Jacobus Cauter Vissachier seems to have visited it in the reign of Sōmaśēkhara II (1714-1739) and has left a description of its prosperous condition.

156. Bednūr had been taken only once by Bijāpur and that in the time of Bhadrappa Nāyaka (1661-1663). Śivāji's invasion in 1664 did not touch Bednūr.

157. Leonardo Pæs says that the standing army was from about 40,000 to 50,000 strong.

158. According to father Leonardo Pæs, Śivappa Nāyaka had among his subjects 30,000 Christians, originally natives of Goa and Salsette (*Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1234).

159. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 139.

value of which was sufficient to place them above all worldly wants". More humane than Genseric, though not less intent on making the most of the situation for himself, Haidar did not allow the plunder to continue for an indefinite period[160]. Nor did he permit or order, like Genseric, the transport of what remained of public or private wealth to own city[161]. The wealth of the Capital was allowed to remain in it; not, however, for its own sake nor for the use of its owners, but for the use and benefit of its crafty conqueror, who had determined on becoming the possessor of everything of any value or importance in it. Haidar not only first turned his attention to extinguish the flames of the Palace, but also personally assisted in its extinguishment. But the order for the cessation of plunder by the troops was coupled with a direction that enabled him to become the exclusive possessor of all the available booty. His arrangements for this purpose were so skilfully designed that in a few hours his official seals were placed on the doors of every public and private dwelling above the condition of a hovel, and guards were stationed to enforce respect to the only plunder that was to be deemed legitimate. The booty he thus secured, including property of every description, money and jewels of all kinds, is variously estimated, but it might, without risk or exaggeration, be valued at twelve millions sterling[162]. To Haidar, in view of the

160-161. According to Gibbon, Genseric's pillage of Rome lasted fourteen days and nights (455 A.D., June 15-29). All that remained of private or public wealth in it was diligently transported by Genseric to his vessels for being carried to his own country. It was, Gibbon adds, difficult either to escape or to satisfy the avarice of a conqueror who possessed leisure to collect, and ships to transport, the wealth of the capital.

162. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 508. According to De La Tour, when Haidar "took possession of the place, he found an immense treasure in gold, coined and in ingots, in trinkets and precious stones, that was indeed stupendous, if credit may be given to the accounts of the French, who accompanied him in that expedition. They say that the Prince caused

aims and objectives he had by then conceived, it came in as a God-send. Though, throughout his life, he habitually spoke of the wealth he thus came by "as the foundation of all his subsequent greatness[163], it descended as a curse on him and his son. The cries of a peaceful populace that had lost its all—its near and dear ones, its cherished valuables, its residential houses and what nothing can replace, its honour itself in some cases—could not go unanswered. Their cries were not loud but deep. Haidar vanquished the Rāṇi but he was vanquished by the imprecations of the Rāṇi's subjects. He neither could make the city he destroyed the capital of a new kingdom he wanted to found nor even live in it for any length of time. Its destruction opened the way to greater inroads against himself, which proved the destruction of his son and the ultimate extinction of his power. Never was heard, so readily and so quickly, such a terrible curse! the curse of a Queen and the curse of a fleeing population, a curse that has passed into a saying:

> Bednūr is burnt;
> Bednūr's Queen has fled;
> Bednūr's glory is dead;
> Bednūr shall be no Bednūr again[164].

The old Imperial City closed in sleep before the very eyes of the Rāṇi who had known it in its

pearls and precious stones to be measured in their sight with a corn measure; and that, having made two heaps of gold ingots and trinkets, they surpassed the height of a man on horse back". On this happy occasion, Haidar gratified all his troops with half a year's pay, not excepting those that were in garrison in different parts of Mysore. (De La Tour, *o c.*, I. 90-91).

163. *Ibid.*

164. The Kannaḍa original is as follows:—
Bidanūru suṭṭu maṇṇāyitu,
Bidanūru Rāṇi hōdaḷu,
Bidanūru hesaru hōyitu,
Bidanūru innu Bidanūru alla.

palmy days. Well might she have said to her oppresser :

And sleep shall obey me,
And visit thee never,
And the Curse shall be on thee
For ever and ever.

The fate of the Rāṇi.

With the flight of the Rāṇi, her fate and the fate of her country were sealed. All accounts agree she ran for her life after she set fire in anguish to the city of her forefathers, but she was followed to her hiding and, being taken, was sent, as we have seen, to Bednūr and there the pretence of a reconciliation between her and her son was sought to be made and she was even promised the consideration due to her rank and dignity[165]. Too late, she discovered the mistake she had committed in surrendering alive and bewailed the imprudence of her own conduct in doing so. She was rudely stripped of her jewels; and the unfortunate Queen, the only surviving member of the great house of Ikkēri, was compelled, as a captive, to follow the servants of haughty Haidar, who immediately despatched her to the prison house on the mighty Maddagiri (now Madhugiri) hill. Here she stayed until she was released by the Mahrattas and accompanied them to Poona, but died before she could reach that place[166]. Thus disappears from history this heroic woman. Her adopted son Sōmaśēkhara followed her and reaching Poona, died there eventually unmarried[167].

165. Kīrmāṇi writes that she was sent by way of Sīra to Seringapatam. He probably means that she was eventually to be lodged in honourable confinement at Seringapatam. Probably that was Haidar's intention. But he appears to have first sent her to Maddagiri and before he could transfer her to Seringapatam, the Mahratta invasion of Mādhava Rao followed in 1767 and she was liberated by them, only to die on her way to Poona with them.

166. *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1238.

167. *Ibid.*

A vindication of her character.

There is a story told of Rāṇi Vīrammāji, which, before we close her chapter, deserves to be referred to here, not so much to add anything to it but if possible to redeem to some extent her character which has been needlessly soiled by earlier writers. We have referred above to the attempt made by the annalist Kīrmāṇi to describe the Rāṇi as "a low minded fearless woman wearing the dress of a man," exercising unlimited authority over her country;[168] as "dissolute;"[169] and as "bad"[170]. All this because she was "ambitious of being independent" and refused to yield to the claim of Haidar that he had refused to recognise her so-called subjection to the government of Sīra,[171] to which he had himself succeeded lately. On these alleged grounds, not only the war against her was begun but also it was suggested that Bednūr was a country that Haidar had a right to take from her, and not only her country but also her life.[172] While it is difficult to uphold every act of Rāṇi Vīrammāji, especially her *liaison* with Nimbaiya, there is hardly any evidence whatever to picture her as either having lacked patriotism or to have even attempted to sacrifice her country for vice or even mere pleasure. It is doubtful if she was the "geliebte" of Nimbaiya, though her intimacy with him was lawless in the sense that it was one outside the pale of Hindu marital law. As the classical saying goes,[173] virtue rejoices in temptation, and to such temptation, Vīrammāji had evidently fallen a victim. Channabasava, who had been adopted by her husband, and who was but seventeen years of age at her husband's death, became jealous of his adopted mother, in whose hands, as guardian, all power was naturally concentrated. Vīrammāji thus became exposed to every calumny which the malice of her enemies could suggest. Under such

168. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 128.
169-171. *Ibid*; De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 82.
172. *Ibid*, 129. 173. The Latin text is : *Gaudet tentamine virtus.*

painful circumstances, the royal youth—who had come to engage to some extent the affections of the court, if not the army and people as well—was not always able to compose his behaviour or suppress his discontent. We may assume, in this position of affairs, that he was encompassed by a train of indiscreet, if not perfidious followers, who assiduously studied to inflame, and who were perhaps instructed to betray in the supposed interests of Vīrammāji, or with a view to earn her goodwill and to serve their own sordid interests, the unguarded warmth of his resentment. Vīrammāji, enraged at this conduct of the youth, is represented to have laid aside the tenderness of a mother—even an adopted mother—without assuming the humanity of a human being, and to have made up her mind to put him out of the way through the gentle operation of a massage given to him by a professional *masseur* (*jeṭṭi*). The story of the end of this unfortunate youth, the nature and evidence of the guilt of Vīrammāji personally in this affair, the manner in which his death was encompassed, the true circumstances of his death, are all buried in a mysterious obscurity. Except tradition, there is nothing to guide us.[174] And this tradition has come down to us through not very disinterested Muslim sources. We have seen above what Kīrmāṇi has recorded and what language he has used in speaking of her; but even he cannot but pay, all unconsciously, the meed of praise that is due to her for the undaunted fight she put up in defence of her country, how she inspired her troops who were throughout "faithful" to her, "remained steadfast at their posts, and defended themselves bravely," how she secured the aid of a Muslim ruler against a Muslim leader of a large army, and how she "herself behaved with as much steadiness and courage as a man."[175]

174. See Appendix V.
175. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 135-136.

"Nay," he adds,[176] "even although the Nawaub's (Haidar's) brave soldiers daily killed troops of them with their cannon and musket balls, and the sword, and burned numbers of them with the fire of hopelessness and despair, still, notwithstanding all this calamity and misery, the garrison continued to fight; they were killed, but not subdued." A woman who could inspire such bravery, faithfulness, and zeal in her behalf and in behalf of her country, should have possessed certain traits which, even if she exhibited certain human weaknesses, should have redeemed her character to a large extent. Wilks, whose whole account is tinged with a feeling akin to disgust for her, has not a word to say, as we have remarked above, to the courageous defence she set up. His account, again, is patently based on Muslim sources of a tainted kind. One such source, which he specifically mentions, makes her behave in a manner which is, to say the least of it, wholly incredible, especially when we remember she was a devout Hindu and a brave woman. Even Kīrmāṇi, who is so critical of her conduct and character, does not represent her in this evil, unbelievable and unfavourable light. That is enough to show how much Wilks should have been prejudiced against Vīrammāji. His informant, Badr-u-zamān Khān,[177] who later became Subādār of Bednūr, seems to have had a warped mind. He is stated to have told Wilks that Vīrammāji "capitulated on the condition of being reinstated in her sovereignty on her conversion to Islam; that she accordingly went through the form of renouncing her caste by eating beef, and after this wanton degradation was sent to Mudgherry."[178]

176. *Ibid.*

177. General of the Regular Infantry forces in Mysore and brother-in-law of Alī-zamān Khān. He became Subādār of Bednūr later. See Kīrmāṇi, *Tipu Sultan*, 49.

178. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 509, f. n. This recording of Badr-u-zamān's statement may be reckoned as a blemish in the otherwise great work of Wilks. It is as bad a blemish in it as that of setting out the offensive details about the vices of Theodorus by Gibbon in his famous *History*. If

Wilks seems to have felt some doubt about the memory of his informant and so by way of qualification offers a remark that should be quoted here. "I have no doubt," he says,[179] "of the main facts of the case, but I conclude that my respectable informant must have forgotten some of its circumstances. Hyder seldom adhered to the spirit of an inconvenient engagement: but he professed never to deviate from its letter, and the oracle of Delphos was not more skilful in framing an equivocal sentence. But a conversion to Islam certainly was never blended with his political views, and must have been the spontaneous offer of a woman to whom disgrace was familiar: the expectation may have been inferred, but it is probable that Hyder never made a promise on such a condition." Wilks thus suggests that Haidar should be acquitted of having made the Rāṇi's conversion to Islām the condition precedent to her reinstatement on the throne of her ancestors: he is definitely of the opinion that she herself offered to embrace Islām if Haidar would only agree to reinstate her. There is not, so far as can be made out, any the slightest evidence as to the truth of any of these suggestions. Neither contemporary writers nor writers who came a little later record either the proposal of reinstatement

even well authenticated, which it was not, Wilks need not have soiled his pages with such a *chraique scandaleuse*. We are not sure, as shown above, they were not the impure inventions of a malignant calumniator. It was an occassion for a wise scepticism to register grave doubts as to the infamous stories of the eastern counterpart of the western Procopius. (If Procopius was the secretary of Belisarius, the Roman General, Badr-u-zamān was something more than a secretary to Haidar) Wilks, as a thoughtful historian, should have pointed to the moral improbability of the account given to him. On the other hand, it is surprising, he should express his belief in it. "I have no doubt," he says, "of the main facts of the case," though he concludes that "his respectable informant must have forgotten some of the circumstances". But in mentioning these so-called "circumstances", he forgets to note that the stories chronicled by him are based on the unsupported testimony of a *single* person. (As to Gibbon, see J. C. Morison, in *Gibbon* in *E. M. L.* Series, pp. 159-161).

179. *Ibid.*

on conversion or the conversion itself of the Rāṇi to Islām, either voluntarily or on the promise of restoration.[180] No tradition has survived as to this alleged conversion. Nor does the story seem even probable. Vīrammāji fought hard to retain her country; she set fire to it when she was about to lose it; and she had finally fled. As the sequel showed, she was in touch evidently with the Mahrattas, who were bound to take action against the spoliation of her territory. In these circumstances, Vīrammāji would not have risked all chances of restoration by independent means by surrendering her name and reputation by offering to change her faith. The fact that she was found a Hindu still in her confinement at Maddagiri when the Mahrattas liberated her and took her with them to Poona, would seem to indicate that Badr-u-zamān's story was no more than an invention of his own palmed off by him on Wilks, who, despite his authority, refused to believe in it as narrated to him, but improved on it by accepting the Rāṇi's conversion as a fact, and putting the blame for it on her on the ground that she was "a woman to whom disgrace was familiar." That is a species of agrument that is always too dangerous to adopt, more especially so where we have to judge of the possibilities of a case in which the chief person concerned is a high spirited woman like Vīrammāji, who braved to fight Haidar in person and risked her all in her fight against him. Verily, it was Juvenal who wrote: "no one rejoices more in revenge than woman."[181] One would have thought Vīrammāji would have been credited, after

180. Kīrmāṇi is silent on this point. Robson, who records the conversion of the Pāḷegār of Chikbaḷḷāpur, is also silent on this point. De La Tour is also similarly silent on this episode. He indeed represents her as staying at Bednūr until after the insurrection against Haidar, who, at the end of it, is spoken of as putting her, "her husband", and all her accomplices to death. (*o. c.*, I. 90). This, of course, is wrong, as we know she survived the insurrection.

181. *Sat.*, 13,191.

all that had occurred to her, with the desire for revenge, that "feminine manhood" which takes hold of women when they feel helpless.

The parallel case of Zenobia.

The parallel case of Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra and the East, naturally occurs to one's mind. Like her, Vīrammāji was left a widow to fight for her country and her throne. Like her, too, Vīrammāji fought valiantly to the last her would-be conqueror. Like her, also, Vīrammāji had to fly for her life, at the end of the struggle. Finally, like her, she was caught and brought back a captive to her conqueror. Here the parallel ends. The conduct of Haidar towards his captive was far different from that of Aurelian, the Roman Emperor, towards his. Aurelian, on her surrender, treated her with unexpected lenity. A woman of surpassing beauty and great courage, she withstood the wordy onslaught of Aurelian against her for a time, but her fortitude deserted her soon.[182] Her courage deserted her in the hour of trial; she trembled at the angry clamours of the Roman soldiers, who called aloud for her immediate execution, forgot the generous despair of Cleopatra, which she had proposed as her model, and ignominously purchased life by the sacrifice of her fame

182. Gibbon's unsurpassable description of the conversation between Queen Zenobia and Emperor Aurelian should be read in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, I. chap. xi, to appreciate this remark. He writes:—"But, as female fortitude is commonly artificial, so it is seldom steady or constant." Gibbon remarks that "some very unjust suspicions have been cast on Zenobia, as if she was accessory to her husband's death" (Chap. XI). The fact is that she was instrumental in putting to death Māeorius, the nephew of her husband Odenathus, who, out of revenge, had conspired against his uncle and had assassinated him in the midst of a great entertainment. Māeorius had scarcely time to assume the title of Augustus (after the murder) before he was sacrificed by Zenobia to the memory of her husband (*Ibid*). Gibbon says that she had "3 sons." He gives in a foot-note their names and says that two of them were dead before the war and that on the last (Vaballathus), he adds, Aurelian bestowed a small province of Armenia, with the title of King. Several of his medals are still extant.

and her friends. It was to their counsels, which in the main had governed the weakness of her sex, that she imputed the guilt of her obstinate resistance; it was on their heads that she directed the vengeance of the cruel Aurelian. Among these were included the famous Longinus, the pure blooded Platonist, her steadfast adviser, who was beheaded as a traitor by order of the Emperor. Far different was Vīrammāji in this regard. When caught by Haidar's soldiers, she refused to yield, and despite the malicious stories told in later times, preferred the horrors of hill prison to a life of freedom at the cost of the freedom or the lives of her political adherents or advisers. And she lived to see them, in her interests, if not at her instance, to raise the standard of revolt against the aggressor and destroyer of her kingdom. As at Palmyra, so at Bednūr, the second rebellion, as we shall see, involved the execution of old men, women, children and peasants. Haidar, like Aurelian, ordered, and even tried, the re-building of the great city he had conquered. But it is easier to destroy than to restore. The seat of commerce, of arts, and of Vīrammāji, sank before long, like Palmyra, into an obscure town, a deserted fortress, and at length into a miserable village. Haidar's treatment of Vīrammāji and her son was not only cruel and in breach of his spoken word but also far different from that of Aurelian towards Zenobia. Though the Roman Emperor took Zenobia captive to his Imperial capital and paraded her through its streets on the occasion of his celebrated triumph, confined by fetters of gold, a slave supporting the gold chain which encircled her neck, she almost fainting under the intolerable weight of jewels, Aurelian presented her with a domain at beautiful Tivoli, so justly celebrated by Horace, where she spent the rest of her days with her children by her side. Haidar left Queen Vīrammāji to rot in her mountain prison, to be rescued by the Mahrattas, only

to die on the way to their capital, while her adopted son was left to his fate at that place by his rescuers, until Death claimed him as his own.

The fate of the Pretender.

Haidar did not treat any better Channabasava, the Pretender, who had to be disposed of before any arrangements could be made for the governance of the newly conquered area.[183] On his arrival at Kumsi, some thirty miles off to the north-east of Bednūr, Haidar, who had so far treated him as if he were the legitimate ruler and shown all marks of external respect, pretended to have discovered the fraud that had been perpetrated on him, if, indeed, we are to suppose that he had at any time believed the tale that had been so artfully detailed in his camp by the Chitaldrug pāḷegār Once Vīrammāji had been secured, there was an end to all the respect shown to him, a respect which had raised a smile among the Mysore soldiers, who amused themselves by saluting him with the title of *Ghaibu Rāja*, or the *Rāja of the Resurrection*, a name which became the standing joke of the camp.[184] Haidar, indeed, made up his mind to get rid of him as soon as he could after the Rāṇi had capitulated and had been secured in prison at Bednūr. He soon found reasons why he should keep Bednūr to himself. Immediately he reached the Capital, garrisoning all the places he had taken on the way, he created an opportunity "which at once would accomplish all his ambitious views."[185] The Pretender, it seems, was possessed of a favourite woman, for whom he had great affection. Haidar, wanting some plausible pretence for a rupture, sent, it would seem, some of his servants for this woman, which, coming to the Pretender's ears,

183. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 509.

184. *Ibid.* Wilks who records the story does not conceal his own astonishment at the simplicity of the Pretender, who had thought he had deceived his would-be deliverer and deceiver!

185. Robson, *o.c.*, 30-31.

he ordered them to be dismissed in a very contemptuous manner. This being reported to Haidar, he, it seems, immediately ordered the King into confinement; and a few days after sent him with Queen Vīrammāji and her retinue, under a strong guard, to Maddagiri.[186] Whether this story, which is given by a European chronicler writing within twenty-three[187] years of the fall of Bednūr, is true or not, there is no gainsaying the fact that as in the case of the Rāṇi, so in that of the Pretender, Haidar soon made up his mind to consign him to perpetual confinement. He was sent to the prison to which the Rāṇi and her associates were despatched.

Haidar's idea of an asylum for himself.

Vīrammāji and her rival being thus put out of the way, Haidar took to the more serious tasks before him. The occupation of the rest of the country was easy enough. It was more a business of arrangement than of conquest. The two principal detachments soon possessed themselves of Basavarājdurg, a fortified island, Honāvar and Mangalore on the coast; and a third, which went in search of Vīrammāji, took hold of the country to the south and south-west.[188] There remained the disposal of the conquered territories. Haidar had, since his rapid rise in the service of Krishṇarāja II, always felt that he should be prepared for any contingency that might end in his flight from Mysore. He knew the conditions in which he had risen to power; and he realized full well that circumstances might arise at any moment necessitating his quitting Mysore and seeking shelter elsewhere. Orme, the contemporary historian, writing of the events

186. Robson, who gives this story at length—*Ibid.*

187. *Ibid.* The *Haid. Nām.* would have us believe that both the Rāṇi and her own adopted son and the Pretender were all three sent to Maddagiri pending a decision of their respective claims to the throne of Bednūr. Haidar may have given this out as the ostensible cause of their despatch to a safe place, there to await his decision.

188. *Ibid.* As to Basavarājdurg, see below.

relating to 1760-1761, when the French were besieged in Pondicherry, and were seeking an alliance with Haidar for effective aid for raising the siege, makes mention of Haidar's desire to have such a safe place somewhere below the ghāts. "Not unmindful, however, of a reverse in fortune," observes Orme, "Hyder Ally cast about to get some place of refuge immediately for his treasures, and contingently for his own person; and judiciously preferred Thiagur in the Karnātic, as well for the difficulty of access to it from Mysore, as the inexpugnable nature of its fortifications.[189] How he negotiated for the acquisition of this fortress through the Portuguese monk Noronha, the so-called Bishop of Halicarnassus, by offering him a large bribe, has been narrated above.[190] Through inthis ercession, Lally agreed to enter into a treaty with Haidar, under which Thiagur was to be garrisoned by Haidar and that placa and Elavasinore nad their dependencies were "to remain the property of the Mysoreans in perpetuity as long as the flag of France existed in India." Haidar's army was to be paid one lakh a day from the day of its arrival at Thiagur and supplied with ammunition whilst serving with the French. Another stipulation was that immediately after clearing the Karnātic of the enemy (*i.e.*, the English and his ally Nawāb Muhammad Alī), the French were "to assist him (Haidar) in conquering the southern countries of Madura and Tinivelly". The first division of Mysore troops, consisting of 1,000 horse and 2,000 sepoys, arrived at Thiagur on 4th June 1760 and were later joined by small parties of the French from Pondicherry. They then marched towards Pondicherry, reaching Ariyankuppam, three miles to the rear of the French camp. From here, the officers

His aims on Thiaghur.

189. See Orme, *Indostan*, II. 636-638.
190. See *Ante*, Ch XI. p. 230.

appointed by Haidar to settle the treaty and the plan of operations in conjunction with the French government were escorted by a French detachment, and the treaty was signed on the 27th June 1760 and the Mysore troops returned promising to go back "with their whole force and abundance of provisions".[191] But the English, coming to know of the arrival of Mysore troops in July 1760, effected a diversion into the Mysore territories from Madura and Trichinopoly, with the result they were prevented from aiding the besieged French. The fall of Pondicherry on 15th January 1761 frustrated all hopes of Haidar deriving any benefit from the treaty he had concluded with Lally.[192] Thus defeated in his objective of establishing an asylum for himself in the Karnātic, Haidar cast his longing eyes on Bednūr and now that he had taken it, determined on making it his own for the future.

His selection of Bednūr.

From its situation, its historical associations, its fortifications, its proximity to the sea and its fame and reputation, Haidar seems to have concluded that Bednūr would prove a suitable capital for a territorial area which he might call his own, quite apart from the kingdom which belonged to the Sovereign of Mysore, and of which he was only *Sarvādhikāri*. Since the attempt that was made against him through the agency of Khaṇḍē Rao, only a couple of years before, he had been more than ever confirmed in the view he should have such a safe asylum, away from Seringapatam and independent of it. In all the arrangements he made, accordingly, at Bednūr, he had this main objective in view. He affected to treat Bednūr as a separate kingdom; Seringapatam and its dependencies, he, on all occasions, professed to consider as belonging to the

191. Orme, *o.c.*, II. 643.
192. *Ibid*, 643-739.

Kartar (Sovereign), the Ruler of Mysore; Bednūr, he avowed to be his own[193]. Not that he wanted to change his personal *status* at Seringapatam or lessen the strength of his position there. He began to feel that his position might be endangered at any time; nor was he wrong in the sense of danger to himself that he developed so soon after he came to occupy the supreme administrative position in the State, if we are to judge from what actually occurred later. That danger was inherent in the position of an ambitious, strong and grasping person as he was. He therefore resolved on making Bednūr the capital of a new territory to which he might retire, if necessary, and hold on to, if he could conveniently do so, even after he was worsted at Seringapatam. Bednūr was, in every way, suitable for such a purpose. What was more, it was far away from Mysore, which, with its historical associations, could, he seems to have felt, never become his own, whatever the power or authority he wielded in it for the time being. That was the main idea underlying the differentiation he made between the dominions of his *Kartar* (Sovereign) and his own. He evidently realized that what he administered as the agent was his Sovereign's and he could not lay claim to it, revolutionary though he might have been in ousting Nanjarāja from his hereditary *status* and assumed even arbitrary powers as *Sarvādhikāri*. What he conquered—though through the men and money of his Sovereign—he seems to have claimed as his own; at least to the extent that he can treat it as his own for the time being. Whatever ideas dominated his mind at the time we are writing of, there is no doubt that he desired to continue to be the *Servant* that he had so far been of his Sovereign. While he created an asylum for himself to retire to at any critical moment, he did not fall off from his sense of duty to

193. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 510.

his King and Ruler, whatever the authority or power he had assumed for himself in the exercise of the functions of his office. If that was the attitude of his mind, Haidar could not be charged, as he has been, with the desire of "blending Seringapatam with all its remembrances, among the general mass of his minor possessions" because of the importance he came to attach to Bednūr after its conquest[194]. That would have been a suicidal policy to adopt for him, for it would have meant the extinction of his power at the ancient capital, which had even a more eminent history to boast of than Bednūr, famous as this was. Nor is such a theory consistent with the view, put forward by Wilks himself, that Bednūr was no place of military strength as Seringapatam was, and Haidar "could never have intended to establish his capital, his family, and his treasures, at a place of no military strength"[195]. But, as he did so, Wilks draws the opposite inference that "the determination, therefore (to transfer the capital to Bednūr), in itself, confirms a suspicion", in his view, "of his deficiency in an important branch of military judgment; a deficiency which is the more remarkable in a mind distinguished in other respects by a degree of sagacity and penetration which has seldom been exceeded"[196]. There is hardly any reason to attribute such a deficiency to Haidar if we remembered the fact that Haidar did not mean to transfer the capital of his Sovereign's territories to Bednūr, but only made Bednūr stand by for himself, if occasion required it. It was for that reason that he made it the capital of his private or rather personal estate, as it were, carved out of the conquests he made to the north-west of Mysore. These conquests were in keeping with the

194. *Ibid.*
195. *Ibid*, 510-511.
196. *Ibid*, 511.

forward movement of Mysore since ancient days in that direction, indeed for over a century and a half; and suited his own ideas of expansion up to the sea as far as Goa, ideas which he had, as it were, inherited from his master and predecessor in office, Nanjarāja, and which conformed also to his desire for securing in advance a safe and secure place for insuring his own and his family's safety in case of an exigency. After the Khaṇḍē Rao incident, this view had been greatly impressed on his mind. Whatever the reasons that might be assigned for the steps taken by Haidar, Bednūr became for the time being an important centre of activities for Haidar. He made it the second capital, as it were, of the larger kingdom of Mysore, while insuring by its foundation his own personal safety in case any need should arise for it. He accordingly gave orders for the removal of his family, the erection of a splendid palace, which was never finished, the establishment of a mint, where, for the first time, he struck coins in his own name (*Haidari-varaha; Bahadūri-varaha*),[197] and the preparation of a dockyard and naval arsenal on the Western Coast for the construction of ships of war. For this purpose, he fortified the outlying ports of Honāvar, Basrūr, Bārakūr and Mangalore, where he began the building of "ships, palens, gallevats and other vessels"[198]. The last of these he put under the direction of Lutif Alī Bēg, a brave and excellent officer of cavalry, for whom he had great regard[199].

197. This was only a continuation of the old mint of the Ikkēri Kings. Haidar issued from this mint the *Ikkēri Varaha*, till then in circulation under the name of *Bahadūri hun*, retaining the old obverse of Śiva and Pārvati—dating from the days of Sadāśiva Rāya of Vijayanagar—but putting on the reverse his own Persian monogram or initial surrounded with a circle of dots (see below).

198. Moens, *Memo*, 151.

199. Wilks, in mentioning this appointment, is somewhat satirical in suggesting the obvious fact that Lutif Alī Bēg was "eminently

His settlement of Bednūr.

For the military administration of the new territory, Haidar appears to have appointed a Faujdār, while for the civil, he nominated, it is said, an old and trusted official of his, ennobling him for the purpose.[200] The subordinates of this official were all persons taken over from the servants who had worked under Rāṇi Vīrammāji's government. The name of the chief minister appointed by Haidar is variously given. While Wilks does not mention him by name, he says that Haidar "gave" Bednūr "a distinct minister"[201]. There is, however, hardly any doubt that the office of Dewān was first entrusted to *Pradhān* Venkappaiya of Maddagiri,[202] who by talent and training was well

ignorant of everything connected with his new duties of naval engineer and lord high admiral" (*o.c.*, I. 511). But Bēg's appointment resembled more that of a civil Lord of Admiralty than of a naval engineer and Lord High Admiral. He was the head of the board of officials who were appointed to administer naval affairs. It does not appear that he was appointed the Chief Commander of the fleet or navy that was yet to come into existence. He was evidently to act as the head of the department created by Haidar at about this time to administer naval affairs. As we have seen (*vide* Ch. XII), one of Haidar's objects was to build up a navy and with that end engaged an Englishman to take over charge of a fleet of ships which he purchased. The idea received a further impetus when Bednūr was taken and Portuguese workmen became available for working out his ideas in this direction.

200. Kīrmāṇi, in his *Life of Tipu Sultan* (P. 49), mentions the existence of such a post. Badr-u-zamān held it, but there is no evidence who was first appointed to it when it was created. There can, however, be no doubt that such an office was actually created from the date of the occupation of Bednūr.

201. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 510.

202. *Haid. Nām.* ff. 28. Kīrmāṇi, however, who wrote *later* than the author of the *Haid. Nām.*, says that Haidar "selected a man of the name of Oojni, a Kolur, an old servant of his, and an intelligent and able man, and having given him the title of Raja Ram, committed the charge of Nuggur (Bednūr) to him, giving him orders to repair the fort and its defences" (*o. c.*, 139). "Oojni" here is to be identified with "Ujjanappa" of the *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 47), and the description that he was a "Kolur" would seem to show that he belonged to Kollūr, in the present South Kanara district and formerly belonging to Bednūr itself. (There is a temple here, amongst whose endowments is the Honnār hōbḷi, an isolated bit of country which

fitted for that post. He had already seen service under Rāṇi Vīrammāji and possessed a close knowledge of the country. Under him was placed one Ujjanappa, a native of Bednūr, in whom Haidar had great faith[203]. Ujjanappa, as we shall see later, succeeded Venkappaiya in the office of Dewān, but did not prove a happy choice, being oppressive and extortionate in his methods.

The garrisoning of places, etc.

Haidar also carried out all that was needed for garrisoning the more important places taken, especially in the country to the west of Bednūr on the sea coast. Mirza Hussain Bēg, Haidar's brother-in-law, and Karīm Khān, Haidar's youngest son, proceeded with a detachment to reduce Basavarājadurg, a fortified hill in the sea, about ten miles to the west, from the sea coast. Here was secreted immense treasure belonging to the Rāṇi. Hussain Bēg took hold of a few boats from the fishermen and sailed with his followers towards the island hill and there intimating that Bednūr had fallen, asked the garrison to surrender. The garrison, having heard that the worst had happened, surrendered after a siege of three days. Immediately the troops marched out, Hussain Bēg occupied it, and took possession of the property of Sōmaśēkhara II, which had been deposited here for safety. This treasure, we are told, consisted

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belongs to-day to the South Kanara district. The Kollūr Ghāt is named after this place. (See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1315). Ujjanappa was, according to the *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.), of the shepherd community (*Kuruba*), and succeeded to the administration of Nagar (Bednūr) about January 1770 (*Virōdhi, Mārgaśira-Pushya*), on the appointment of Pradhān Venkappaiya to quell the risings of Pāḷegārs of Hassan, Mahārājana-durga and other places. Peixoto, writing of Bednūr affairs in 1770, mentions him as "Uginape", who held the post of "Commissary and Trustee of Nabob's treasury", and refers to his oppression, etc. (*Memoirs*, 145-146). It would thus seem to be clear that the "Oojni" of Kīrmāṇi became the minister of Bednūr next in succession to Venkappaiya, about seven years after its conquest by Haidar. During 1763-1770, he seems to have held a minor position under Venkappaiya, see text above.

203. See f. n, above.

of two or three boxes of pearls and diamonds, two boxes of jewellery, two elephant housings, richly embroidered and curiously wrought in gold and silver, a jewelled chain for the foot of an elephant, two sets of gold and silver bells for the Royal elephants, and two gold embroidered saddles. After garrisoning the hill, Hussain Bēg returned to Bednūr with all this treasure and presented it to Haidar, who greatly complimented him for the skilful manner in which he had accomplished his task.[204]

Haidar's State entry into Bednūr.

Having despatched Rāṇi Vīrammāji and the rest of them, Haidar made a State entry into Bednūr. Having fixed the right and auspicious moment for it, he, with the greatest pomp and display of force, made his entry into the fort of Bednūr, "bestowing," as the annalist puts it in his vivid manner, "honour on the seat of government". And for fifteen days, we are told, Haidar held here a banquet, "during which season of festivity he enjoyed the sound of music and the abundance of good things provided for the feast." He then gave, it is narrated, "to the poor, the religious, the musicians, and dancing women, presents of gold, and silver, ornaments, valuable cloths, and shawls. Also, to the brave chiefs of his army, and his soldiers who had distinguished themselves by their gallantry, and had perilled their lives in this conquest, besides what they obtained in the assault of the place, which, by Haider's orders, was what they could take,.....to these valiant men he now gave costly presents and honorary dresses, gold bracelets, pearl necklaces, jewelled gorgets, splendid swords, and lastly *jageers* or fiefs (for conditional service), according to their rank and respective capacities".[205] He then assumed his arrangements for the future administration of the

204. Kīrmūni, *o.c.*, 143-144. Kīrmāṇi, as usual, antedates this event by referring it to 1761, though it took place in 1763.

205. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 138-139.

country and in keeping with the intentions of the superseded dynasty, bestowed on Bednūr the new name of *Haidar-Nagara* and returned to his tent.[206]

Attempted assassination of Haidar.

Bednūr fell, as we have seen, about the third week of January 1763, and Haidar's arrangements for its future administration took about six months. In June, the rains commenced with their accustomed violence, and Haidar, a stranger to the rigours of the local climate, fell a victim to its dread disease, Malaria. He was in bed continuously and was no longer able to transact public business as usual. Here was the opportunity for the servants of the old dynasty to win their freedom back. Haidar had committed one mistake in fixing up his administration of Bednūr. He had omitted to find a suitable place in it to Lingappa of Mūḍabidare, the ex-Minister of Rāṇi Vīrammāji, who had made common cause with him in its conquest. Lingappa bore a grudge against the man who had so artfully used him for his own purposes but had ill-requited him for the favors he had shown. Taking advantage of the position, Lingappa and his men, who had until recently been at the head of the civil administration of the State, entered into an extensive conspiracy with Nimbaiya and Rāṇi Vīrammāji and her son for the assassination of Haidar and his minister Venkappaiya and the officials, who had by their

206. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 28; also Kīrmāṇi, *l.c.* The story is recorded by Wilks that a few days after the capture of Bednūr, some person, speaking of its population, said to Haidar, that it had been intended by the former dynasty to augment the houses to ninety thousand, the distinctive number which constitutes a *nagar*. "We will not mar the project," said Haidar, "and it shall be named Hyder Nuggur" (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 510, f. n.). The fact seems to be that being in the direct course of trade by the Hosangaḍi Ghāṭ, Bednūr, since its creation in 1640 as the capital of the Ikkēri kings, rapidly increased in size and importance, until there was a prospect of the houses reaching the number of a lakh, which would, according to Hindu conceptions of town-planning, entitle it to be called a *nagara*. Having heard of this, Haidar seems to have agreed to its being re-named after himself as *Haidar-Nagara*. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1318.

very presence as the agents of Haidar, made themselves odius to them, and the recovery of the Capital city. If Lingappa was undoubtedly the leader of the movement, the mainspring of it was certainly Rāṇi Vīrammāji. It is natural that this should have been so, especially when we remember she was the prime sufferer by the invasion. There is evidence to believe that she strived every nerve to put an end to Haidar's occupation of her kingdom. Having failed on the battle-field, she tried to put him out by any means available to her. If one authority is to be believed, she made up her mind to make friends with her first adopted son.[207] She "pretended", it is said, to be reconciled to him, and to acknowledge him as king "with no other intention than to wait for an opportunity of destroying" Haidar. With this hope, and completely to gratify her vengeance, she resolved on his death. To accomplish this end, she endeavoured to gain the confidence—so the story goes—of her (first adopted) son, "whose feeble and pusillanimous spirit", it is added, "she well knew". She reproached him, we are told, with a dissembled tenderness, that, to hasten the beginning of his reign, he had inconsiderately delivered up his kingdom to barbarians, the enemies of his religion, who would leave him only the empty name of king, after depriving him of the most valuable part of his dominions, and most probably would finish by entirely robbing him of the whole. At length, by force of insinuations, and under the appearance of a highly disinterested person, who had resigned a kingdom to him, she succeeded in her endeavours to make him regret the treaty with Haidar, and continuing to act on his fears of Haidar's future intentious, she acquired such an empire over his mind, that he was brought to consent to the assassination of Haidar, which he resolved on in the most determined

207. According to De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 87), on whose version the statement in the text above is based, he was still alive. See also f. n. 150 above.

fashion. The plot was so artfully laid that it was, in its very nature, almost certain of success. During his stay at Bednūr, Haidar had resided in the old Palace of the kings and it was expected that he would stay there on his return to the place after taking over Mangalore. From the Palace, there was, it is said, a subterranean passage to a great temple outside, known to very few except Vīrammāji. Vīrammāji had resolved on undermining the Palace and to blow up Haidar when he was at table with his principal officers at about midnight, as was his custom, hoping that at the instant the catastrophe was brought about, the troops and the people of Bednūr, animated by the Prince, who would thus be restored to the ancient throne, would easily put Haidar's forces to the sword in the resulting confusion and disorder.[208] Accordingly, one night, Lingappa led through the streets of Bednūr a crowd of armed retainers, and was about to put his scheme into execution, when some obscure hints of it were conveyed to one of the officers of Haidar by a trusty servant.[209] Haidar,

208. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 88-89. This story is detailed only by De La Tour. Wilks is silent on how the assassination was to be accomplished, except to the extent of suggesting that it was to be by means of a disturbance created.

209. So says the *Haid. Nām.* De La Tour's version is somewhat different. According to him, the project was to have been put into execution by Nimbaiya, who, he says, "belonged to the Pagoda", *i.e.*, the temple outside the city, with which the palace had a subterranean connection. On the day Haidar returned to Bednūr, the chief priest of the Pagoda —a Brāhman—who had been the first to know of the plot, made up his mind to apprize Haidar of it. Whether he was actuated by the detestation and horror of the intended crime, as the Brāhmans of the place affirmed, or whether his hatred for Vīrammāji and Nimbaiya, whose intimacy he hated, was his leading motive, he conveyed himself into the city of Bednūr, and presenting himself before Haidar, as if to compliment himself on his happy return, he advised him openly, in the presence of Vīrammāji and her son, of the conspiracy and the danger he was in. This astonishing recital—so says De La Tour—made the whole assembly tremble, but it made no impression on Haidar, who, looking round, discovered the guilty persons without difficulty. De La Tour adds that Haidar ordered these to be seized. The witnesses were then heard, and the truth being established on the spot, Vīrammāji, Nimbaiya and all their accomplices were—adds

hearing of what was being attempted, handled the situation with all promptitude. The crowd was hotly pursued by the infantry on guard at the old Palace gates and dispersed, with the aid of the available cannons, with the result that the attempt was quelled without difficulty. Order was soon restored, though Lingappa, the ring-leader, managed to escape.[210] Lingappa evidently had the active co-operation in this affair of not only the generality of the citizens who had suffered losses as the result of the plunder the city had sustained but also of the Rāṇi's adherents. Many were inflamed at the deposition of the Rāṇi and her confinement together

De La Tour—"put to death", except the adopted son—whom he calls the Prince of Canara—who was carried to Maddagiri, his kingdom being confiscated (De La Tour, *o c.*, I. 89-90). The latter portion of the story is not correct. Neither Rāṇi Virammāji nor Nimbaiya was put to death, they being sent also as prisoners to Maddagiri. As a partisan of Haidar, De La Tour does not refer to the excesses commit, ted by Haidar on this occasion, as narrated in the text above. Robson-on the other hand, bears ample testimony to the terrible cruelties practised by him when he discovered the plot. According to him, the "infamous treatment" that Haidar meted to the Prince—the adopted son—"threw the whole country into a state of confusion, and occasioned many conspiracies against him". Haidar had the good fortune, he says, to discover them, and in order to prevent all attempts of that kind in the future, "he put to death one thousand of the principal inhabitants of the city of Biddenoor, in the most cruel, inhuman method he could invent; their mangled limbs were suspended on every tree in the environs of the city. His bloodthirsty rage not being satisfied with the above cruelties, he ordered the chief persons of every town or village, of whom he had the least suspicion, to be butchered in like manner; besides many others, for the most trivial offences, had their noses or ears cut off. So that, the inhabitants of the Biddenoor country, from the dread of his cruelty, were now—*i.e.*, at the time Robson wrote, about 1786—reduced to the most servile obedience to his tyrranic will" (see Robson, *o.c.*, 31-32). Robson's version is to a large extent confirmed by Wilks who records that before evening "upwards of three hundred of the chief conspirators were hanging at the different gateways which issued from the city of Bednur", as mentioned in the text above. Wilks has, however, nothing to say about the other cruelties practised by Haidar outside the city of Bednūr, to cow down the inhabitants of the newly conquered area. But it is probable that the details furnished by Robson in this regard are true. At any rate, it is in keeping with Haidar's methods.

210. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 29-30.

with her adopted son, the Rāja, who, they expected, would succeed her on the ancient throne of Bednūr. Certain of the accounts[211] which have come down to us through the medium of later writers make it plain that all who had any grievance against the change of the regime in Bednūr combined together and made this attempt on Haidar and his officials. Haidar, undismayed, sat up, it is said,[212] on his sick bed, and directed an investigation to be made by a commission composed of some of his oldest, and, as he conceived, his most trusty civil officers. The report of the investigation was soon drawn up and read to Haidar while he was reclining on his couch and shivering in a paroxym of ague. But even in this state, his keen perception penetrated the veil which the commissioners had attempted to throw over the few facts which were known to him. Past master in the art of dissimulation, he affected not to understand anything for the moment, and detained the commissioners in a pretended conversation, until he recovered from his fit; he then rose from his couch, and, entering the audience hall, approached the witnesses and re-examined them himself, and came to his own conclusions. He forthwith ordered the commissioners to be hanged in his presence—in front of the audience hall. Further arrests followed with lightning speed, and before the shades of evening fell, upwards of three hundred of the chief conspirators were hanging at the ten different gateways which issued from the city of

211. Among these, De La Tour, as already mentioned (f. n. 150 *supra*), records a somewhat different version of the attempt on Haidar's life made by the Queen and the Prince of Bednūr. Robson, also writing evidently from hearsay, speaks of the revolt against Haidar's authority in Bednūr as having been the immediate result of his confinement of the Rāja (*o.c.*, 31). Kīrmāṇi and Stewart are silent on this affair, while Wilks' account (*o.c.*, I. 511-512) is of a secondary character and agrees in the main with the *Haid. Nām.*

212. Wilks, (*l.c.*), whose account is evidently based on oral accounts furnished to him byBadr-u-Zamān and others.

Bednūr. This done, Haidar repaired to rest with the same serenity as if he had been discussing the ordinary business of the day, and arose on the following morning visibly recovered by the consequences of the unusual exertion to which he had been compelled. Bednūr knew no more of civil or other disturbances from that date.

Reflections on the Bednūr episode.

Whatever Haidar's object in invading the territories of Bednūr, the manner in which the conquest was carried out and the methods adopted by him in quelling the petty attempt that was made against him, mark him out as one with whom sometimes the doctrine that the end justifies the means prevailed. It is also clear from his conduct that he was inclined to take extreme measures, not always commensurate with the requirements of the case, to put down popular rebellion. To say that he believed in terrorism would not be wrong. The war against the Rāṇi of Bednūr was undertaken on the alleged ground that she failed to keep up to the treaty obligation that was due from her when Haidar invaded Chitaldrug. The Rāṇi was undoubtedly right in refusing co-operation because Haidar's attempt against the Chief of Chitaldrug was an absolutely wanton one. But it is clear that the charge of her failing to help Haidar against the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug was only the ostensible cause. The real reason was that he coveted the rich territory of the Rāṇi; her amassed wealth; her sea-coast towns; and the way that the possession of these would open to him to advance further north-westwards as far as Goa and possibly the reduction, if not the expulsion, of the Portuguese from the West Coast from north to south. That was his real objective and whatever stood or came in the way, was, in his opinion, an obstacle that was bound to go. When that determination had been made by him, he would not allow either sentiment or honor to militate against its execution.

What followed was the invasion of Bednūr on the pretext of restoring the rightful heir and the reduction of that country. The treatment meted out to the Rāṇi and the Pretender, her adopted son, is alike unjustifiable, while the cruelty inflicted on the leaders of the insurrection shows an aspect of Haidar's character, which was fully confirmed later by British observers of his conduct. It is possible to argue that, in any case, in the stress of the circumstances under which Haidar was acting, Bednūr was bound to lose her individuality but it is highly doubtful if she would have lost it in the manner she lost it at Haidar's hands. In any case, we cannot deny either the Rāṇi or her supporters the admiration that is due to them for the herioc fight they put up to save their independence. Even Wilks, who writes with little or no sympathy for the Rāṇi and her subjects, would seem to impress that they were both treated with a harshness that could be hardly justified even in the atmosphere that prevailed in the 18th century in India or Europe.

The vicissitudes of Bednūr.

Under the fostering çare of Venkappaiya and as the result of the special interest taken by Haidar in it, Bednūr grew for a while, in size. Its trade also increased. The idea that Haidar had determined on settling down here and the fact that he began building in it a palatial residence for himself (outside the old fort area) and had brought down actually his family to live with him, and had established in it his principal arsenals, which employed many hands in the manufacture of arms and ammunition, continued the old mint, and issued the old Ikkēri *Varaha* with but a few minor alterations in its legends, inspired confidence in the people that there would be continuity in adminstration. Haidar also gave great encouragement to merchants, and endeavoured to introduce the cultivation of mulberry and the rearing of

silk-worms in and around Bednūr. But all to no purpose. Though for a time, the city and the country surrounding it showed signs of recovery, the charm would seem to have fled from the place and the curse of the Rāṇi had evidently taken sure hold of it. It was not long before Haidar discovered that the place was not suited to be the capital of a State. When he retreated, after the fight at Raṭṭihaḷḷi, towards it, he realized, as we shall see,[213] that the woods surrounding Bednūr would prove his ruin, as they had proved the ruin of the Rāṇi. He, therefore, made up his mind to give up the idea of making it the capital of his projected State. Sooner done than determined, he sent away his family and treasure through the woods—through a secret path—to Seringapatam. This act of Haidar gave a set back to the growth of the place for ever thereafter. Anticipating a little, we may add that what remained of its vanishing glory, it lost partly as the result of the wars with Tipū Sultān and partly through the Sultān's own acts. During the sieges it underwent—it was captured by the British in February 1783 under General Matthews and surrendered at the end of April of the same year—the palace and the town were burnt once again. Tipū tried to rebuild the town and to restore its trade but his regulations for the protection of the internal trade dealt a severe blow to its prosperity. The Kāzi he appointed added to his own mite to its further destruction by pulling down the Christian Church and the Hindu temples and breaking to pieces numerous inscribed slabs and erecting a mosque from the ruins. In 1838, a local officer recorded the great decline that had taken place in its "wealth and population," its trade having been nearly all lost from the difficulty of access to it. *Sic transit gloria mundi.* No where do we realize as in ruined Bednūr the truth of

213. See below.

the famous Greek saying that a great city is a great solitude. But the city that Vīrammāji so valiantly defended is not, however, dead but lies sleeping. It may yet wake up when the trade routes change with the coming into being of the suggested harbour at Bhatkal.[214]

Dewān Venkappaiya's degradation and death.

This account of Bednūr since its conquest by Haidar may be fittingly concluded by a brief notice of the fate that overtook its first Dewān Venkappaiya (*Pradhān Venkappaiya*). Venkappaiya, who laboured for Bednūr during the first seven years after it passed under Mysore, was known also as Venkāmātya. He belonged to a family of ministers, his father being Rāmapuri Hampeyāmātya, a name which indicates the hereditary secular office held by his ancestors.[215] He was evidently a member of the Āruvēli Niyōgi sect of Brāhmans, and as such fit by birth and training for administrative office.[216] Well educated from early life in the arts and letters of the country,[217] he appears to have entered service under Rāṇi Vīrammāji, about 1757, as an agent.[218] After working under her personally for a time, he seems to have been transferred to Hosangaḍi, in the present South Kanara district but then included in Bednūr. What other posts he held after that, we do not know, but there is evidence to believe that to considerable administrative experience, he combined a high literary reputation that added to the well-merited

214. Bhatkal is but 30 miles N. W. of Nagar *via* Kallūrkaṭṭe, which in 1893 usurped the place of Nagar as the headquarters of the taluk named after itself.

215. His mother's name as given in his literary works was Vāmāmbā.

216. *Ke. N. V.*, XII. 218, f. n. 2, where he is spoken of as a Brāhman *niyōgi* under Vīrammāji.

217. As to his literary capacity, see his works referred to later in the text.

218. *Ke. N. V.*, XII. l. c. A recent attempt to identify him with Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya of Kannambāḍi (*Kaṇvapuri*), an earlier minister of the reign of Krishṇarāja II, is merely fanciful and thoroughly fails to take note of the antecedents and details of the early career of Venkappaiya (see *Q.J.M.S.*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, pp. 36-38).

gubernatorial dignity that Haidar conferred on him. Haidar, who had always an eye for good men, should, indeed, have selected him as the fittest person to take over the administration of Bednūr at such a difficult time—shortly after its conquest and the quelling of a plot to assassinate him—thus making it appear that he but continued the administration of the country in the manner in which it had been conducted from time immemorial. Haidar, as was his wont, did not entirely leave all matters to him solely and wholly. He placed as second in command under him one Ujjanappa, a Kurubar by birth and a native of Bednūr, described as an old servant of his and one who had been ennobled by him with the title of "Rājā Rām".[219] Venkappaiya carried on the administration for seven years and did much to infuse confidence in the people that the change in the rulership of the country would not mean any unhappiness to them. So efficient, indeed, were his services at Bednūr, that Haidar appointed him, while still in charge of Bednūr, to investigate certain alleged frauds attributed to an official of the name of Timmappa in the Mysore territory (*Kartara-sīme*). This work he carried out with such ability that his labours ended in adding materially to the coffers of the State. He was as good apparently as a general as an administrator. For the next duty to which he was deputed was the quelling of risings, in 1770, of certain Pāḷegārs in Hassan, including those of Mahārājan-durga, Bēlūr, Vastāre, etc., Ujjanappa succeeding him at Bednūr. We next see Venkappiya taking part, in April 1771, in the action against the Mahrattas near Mēlkōṭe, escaping from the battle-field there with Tipū. In the same year, about May 1771, he was deputed to the ruler of Coorg to negotiate for the passage of convoys to Seringapatam. Haidar showed his appreciation of

219, See f. n. 202 *supra*.

his services by appointing him in 1772 to the post of Dewān of *Mahalāti Cuchēri*, and in April 1774, put him at the head of the embassy which visited Raghōba at Poona, the other members being Appāji Rām and Harikār Narasappa Nāyaka. Haidar next sent him, in the same year, as governor of Sīra, Maddagiri and Channarāyadurga. These eleven years of hard work, though they had brought him preferments and promotions, did not prove sufficient to win entirely Haidar's confidence. Haidar had indeed honoured him by his personal presence at his second marriage about November 1771, but did not, as was usual with him, entirely confide in him. He deprived him of his office, in 1779, on the ground of alleged misuse of power and forced him to make good revenues to the extent of 60,000 *varahas*, and after that sum had been collected from him, he was insulted and thrown into prison in Seringapatam, his authority (*amalu*) being withdrawn, though left with the empty title of *Pradhān* with an allowance of Rs. 1000. At the intercession of Appāji Rām, he was, however, released from prison, and summoned for military service, but died of diabetes before joining, in November 1782.[220] Such was the manner in which Haidar requited his valuable services, services rendered under conditions which there is reason to believe Haidar himself highly appreciated at the time! There was, as we shall see, an element of suspicion in the make-up of Haidar's character, which always undid the best of his instincts and made him the most ungrateful man that the world had ever known. There can be no doubt whatever that Venkappaiya rendered services in Bednūr which smoothened matters greatly for Haidar while they reconciled the population to the new regime and made possible the rebuilding of the State which warfare had greatly unsettled and ruined. From all accounts,

220. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 28, 42-43, 47, 51-55, 69, 92.

Venkappaiya was not only a man of great capacity, both in the civil and military departments, but also of high integrity and honour. The charges trumped up against him—misuse of power and failure to collect revenue—were both unjust and incapable of proof. The object of preferring them was to put him out of the way, for he had grown big and may prove another Khaṇḍē Rao! Even if he had not entered the administrative service of the State, Venkappaiya would still have left a literary name behind him. He appears to have been the author of several Sanskrit and Kannaḍa works, some at least of them having been written before he took up office. Among these are the following:—*Alamkāramaṇidarpaṇam*, *Kāmavilāsa-Bhāṇah*, *Mahēndra-Vijayāḍimah*, *Vīrarāghavīya-Vyāyōgah*, *Lakshmīsvayamvara-Samāvatārah*, *Sītākalyāṇa-Vīdhī*, *Rukmiṇī-Svayamvarānkah*, *Hanumajjayam* (*Hanumad-vilāsa*) and *Karnāṭa-Rāmāyaṇam* (*Rāmakathāmritasāra*).[221] Venkappaiya's name had spread far and wide at the time, as far as Poona on the one side and *Fort St. George* on the other, as both a skilful negotiator and an honourable minister.[222] Venkappaiya was succeeded in his office by his colleague Ujjanappa, in January 1770, when the former left Bednūr, as stated above, to quell the Pāḷegār disturbances in the Hassan country. As elsewhere noticed, a foreign observer, writing of Ujjanappa at the time, says that he held charge of the treasury at Bednūr and was oppressive and extortionate in his methods[223]. But he passed muster under Haidar's *regime* because of those very habits, while the fate that overtook Venkappaiya, the honest and versatile officer

221. *Mys. Or-Lib. Mss.*, Nos. 2570 (P.L.), B. 341, 351, 360 and A. 142-143 (P.). See also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 129-133.

222. His embassy to Raghōba at Poona has been mentioned above. As to Madras, we note in the *Fort St. George* records, mention made of him as *Vingapah*, see *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XXV. 226.

223. See f. n. 202 *supra*.

who did much for Bednūr's revival in the new order of things, shows that Haidar could go wrong hopelessly sometimes.

Further conquests in the north, 1763: Sōde.

With Bednūr as the base of operations, Haidar, about the middle of 1763, sent an expedition further northwards, under Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, against Sōde (the "Sonda" or "Sunda" of English and other sources), Ankōle and Panchmahal, former dependencies of Bednūr.[224] The Rāja of Sōde fled, after offering a feeble resistance, from his more elevated possessions, to Tukkolighur, near Goa, in lower Sōde. In his distress, he surrendered the whole of his territory below the ghāṭs to the Portuguese, in return for a fixed annual subsidy to be paid to him, an arrangement which has been continued with his descendants to this day. This conquest helped to replenish the coffers of Haidar. Marching on, he took the fortress of Opir and, after an ineffectual attempt on the fort of Rāma, on the point of the cape of the same name, made the Portuguese yield to him the country of Kārvār, coterminous with Goa.[225]

Savaṇūr.

The conquest of Sōde helped to stretch the boundaries of Mysore far to the north-west of the Tungabhadra. Haidar saw that if he could but attach Savaṇūr to his interest, and induce the

224. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 29. Cf. De La Tour (I. 91-92), where particulars which supplement the account of the *Haid. Nām.* will be found. Robson briefly refers only to the expedition to the "Sonda country, a little distance from Goa." (*o.c.*, 32). So also Stewart (*o.c.*, 16) and Wilks (I. 512-513). Stewart calls the chief of Sōde "Kirpa Raj, the Zemindar of Sunda," who submitted to Haidar. Wilks refers to the place as "Soonda". Kīrmāṇi is silent on this topic.

225. De La Tour, *o.c.*, 1. 91-92. A stray Portuguese notice of Haidar (1764), lately brought to light by Dr. S. N. Sen, speaks of the "Nabobo himself" having "suddenly entered into the territories" of the Rāja of Suṇda, while the latter "was negotiating with him for peace," and "corrupted the fidelity of his vassals with a huge sum of eight lacks of roupies," and taken "possession of his capital Sundem, and in the same manner of all his strongholds," etc. [See S. N. Sen, *Early Career of Kanhoji Angria And Other Papers* (1941)—*A Portuguese Account of Haidar Ali*, pp. 86-87.]

Paṭhān Nawābs of Kurnool and Cuddapah to join him, he would be establishing a sort of defensive cordon along the whole extent of his northern border, besides acquiring three corps of hardy Paṭhān cavalry to serve with his armies. In this view, he took the present opportunity of bringing round the Nawāb of Savaṇūr, the more so as he had, in the war against the Rāṇi of Bednūr[226], sided her against Haidar and had impeded the progress of Haidar's campaign. Haidar accordingly sent an envoy to him to win him over to his side by gentle persuasion. Abdul Hakīm Khān, the Nawāb, was, however, in a curiously difficult position in regard to the Mahrattas, his neighbours. His country lay between the rivers Tungabhadra and the Malprabha, in the direct route of all the Mahratta armies proceeding to Mysore or Arcot. Too weak to resist the Mahrattas, his position led him to adopt the policy of aiding them on the condition of being supported against the Nizām of the Deccan, who claimed his submission as the representative of the ancient State of Bijāpur. While thus bending to the interests of the Mahrattas, the Nawāb had made an effective arrangement for his own protection at but little cost to himself. Haidar's envoy could not break through this pact; at least his arguments failed to carry conviction to the Nawāb's mind. Doubtful of the issue of the negotiations, Haidar had directed Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, whom he had directed to attack Savaṇūr on his way back from Sōde, to play a waiting game until he was sure of the result of the envoy's misson. Neither terror nor persuasion, nor both jointly, would induce the Nawāb to yield to Haidar's proposal. He therefore determined to risk the consequences of a

226. Kīrmāṇi makes the help given by the Nawāb of Savaṇūr to the Rāṇi of Bednūr the cause of the war undertaken against him by Haidar. But Wilks makes no mention of this fact, nor does he mention the help rendered by the Nawāb to the Rāṇi in his account of the Bednūr war. See Kīrmāṇi, *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 140; Wilks, I. 503-507; also 514-515.

positive refusal, with the result that Haidar moved his troops to form a junction with those under Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, who, on his way back from Sōde, had halted at Rāṇi-Bednūr, ready to advance on Savaṇūr, immediately he heard the negotiations broke off. Abdul Hakīm, unwilling to shut himself up in his town, set out with about 4,000 horse and a rabble of irregular foot. These latter were spread over the plain to make them appear more than they actually were, while the Paṭhān horse were preserved in a compact body to take advantage of events. Haidar, who had directed the main body of his troops to follow him from Bednūr, took no account of the infantry movements, and determined on a disposition whose object was to envelope the whole of the Nawāb's troops and to cut off their retreat. The Nawāb charged the principal column when in the act of deploying, cut through it with considerable slaughter, and with great coolness and judgment prepared to overset the infantry, already formed in line, by a charge on their flank. At this moment, a reserve of artillery opened with effect on this close and compact body of cavalry and produced such confusion as to compel the Paṭhāns to retire and disperse. Haidar saw his opportunity now and charged with his own cavalry. The fugitives were pursued to the very gates of Savaṇūr, while only a small remnant of the infantry, who stripped themselves bare and passed as peasants, escaped the sabre on the plain.[227] The gallant but imprudent

227. Kirmāṇi's account of the fight is somewhat different. According to him, on the morning Haidar arrived at Savaṇūr, his Kuzzak (predatory) horse appeared wheeling round the Savaṇūr troops. These, mistaking the Kuzzaks as the troops of Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, advanced quickly and tried to attack them. Haidar gave orders to his troops who were posted in ambush immediately in front of them, to fire and charge. They, firing volleys, rushed upon the Afghan cavalry, most of whom lay dead on the field. What remained, fled, and "never drew the breath of courage until they reached the river Bala." Hakīm Khān, the Nawāb, "having also lost his senses," we are told, left the whole of his baggage, and retired to the capital

effort of the Nawāb ended in his submission. Haidar secured all that he desired, besides a military contribution of Rs. 6 lakhs.[228] But money not forthcoming, either because the Paṭhān could not hoard, or because the Mahratta horsemen had left none for others to take, the Nawāb, having no credit with *Sāhukārs* and moneylenders, was obliged to make payment in kind—in the shape of elephants, camels, tents of velvet, gold cloths, Burhanpur cloths of great value, costly arms, muslins, silks, shawls and the like, the whole representing accumulations made at the expense of hundreds of thousands of pounds, which, in actual value, perhaps, exceeded four times the amount of the contribution nominally levied[229]. The object of the campaign against Savaṇūr being thus accomplished, Haidar returned to Bednūr, charging Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān with a large force to march still further to the northward extending his conquests. The Mahrattas, least expecting any attack from the south, had left several of their strongholds in that direction uncared for.

The Kuzzaks, however, pursued him to the gates of the fort, and took "many of his cavalry and their horses."—Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 140-142.

228. Kīrmāṇi says that the contribution paid was Rs. 1 crore (*o.c.*, 142). According to Wilks (I. 516), it was Rs. 2 lakhs, but, being exacted in kind, it was probably as much as four times, or Rs. 8 lakhs. According to the *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 30-31), it was fixed at 3 lakhs of *varahas*, which at Rs. 3 per *varaha* would be equal to Rs. 6 lakhs. The Mysore *varaha* was equal to Rs. 4; the Fort St. George *varaha* was equal to Rs. 3½, though the Masulipatam one was, like the Bednūr one, equal to Rs. 4.

229. On the Savaṇūr war, De La Tour, Robson and Stewart are wholly silent. Kīrmāṇi, as usual, antedates the event, setting it down to 1761 (A. H. 1175). Wilks' account (I. 514-517) does vary much from that furnished by the *Haid. Nām.*, but he gives no date to the campaign against Savaṇūr. As he makes the campaign against Sōde begin in December 1763, the advance against Savaṇūr, which came shortly after that event, may be taken to have followed it immediately thereafter, say about the beginning of 1764. If De La Tour is to be believed from a casual reference he makes, Haidar owed his victory at Savaṇūr to "the bravery and spirited evolutions of the French cavalry under M. Hughel." But he is wrong in stating that it was a "signal victory" over "the three Nabobs near Sanour (Savaṇūr)", as he puts it, meaning the Nawābs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savaṇūr, for all the three did not take part in the fight at Savaṇūr. See De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 76.

Effects of Haidar's forward policy on the Mahrattas.

By his recent conquests, Haidar had, to some extent, overshot his mark. His ambitious mind had no doubt for the time triumphed over the resistance of the Rāṇi of Bednūr and the independent Pāḷegārs, who since the break up of Vijayanagar, had gathered strength, each unto himself. These victories, though they did not by any means always prove easy, brought trouble on him. They created jealousies and antipathies against him and Mysore. His policy of expansion brought him into collision directly with the Mahrattas on the one side and with Nizām Alī on the other. Haidar knew the trouble that was in store for him. Sīra, though really a conquest from the Mahrattas, he had pretended to receive in the garb of a formal investiture from Basālat, who, in his turn, pretended to be the Nizām and in that capacity the deputy of the Mughal Emperor. He realized perfectly well that the Mahrattas would not consider it as anything other than a wresting of territory that was theirs. At the same time, he had to reckon with the real Nizām, Salābat Jang and his more able minister and brother Nizām Alī, to whom the fictitious part of the transaction would only give offence, for it was a direct usurpation of his supposed authority. To ward off possible blows from both these quarters, he tried to win both of them off by despatching to them two different diplomatic missions.[230] To the Nizām, he sent one

230. According to Wilks (I. 514), Haidar sent Appāji Rām to Nizām Alī, minister of Salābat Jang at Hyderabad, and Mehdi Alī to Mādhava Rao, the Pēshwa at Poona. This seems a mistake, as will be perceived from the references quoted from the Madras *Fort St. George Records* below for the years 1763 and 1764. As a matter of fact, Appāji Rām was the accredited Mysore Vakīl at Poona for many years during Haidar's time. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 514, 554-555, 686-687, 703, 714. etc. As to Mehdi Alī, he was sent, evidently for the first time, to Nizām Alī in 1764 and it is in connection with that mission that Wilks mentions his name in his work (I. 514). As the year to which this despatch of ambassadors refers is 1763-64. both according to Wilks and the *Fort St. George Records*, it must be held that Wilks has transposed the names of both of them.

Mehdi Alī Khān, with public gifts and a private *Sāhukār* credit exceeding considerably the amount that he paid to Basālat Jang. Haidar's object in sending the mission to Nizām Alī was not only to appease him for the good-will he had shown to Basālat but also to win him off and even play him off against the Mahrattas. During the years 1762 and 1763, Nizām Alī had carried out campaigns against the Pēshwa and had taken Daulatabad in the former year and had reduced to ashes the city of Poona in the latter. Such a person would be useful in the fight against the Pēshwa, who was bound to retaliate for the aggressions against Vīrammāji and the conquest of the countries until lately in Mahratta hands. Immediately after he effected the conquests, he sought the artful aid of diplomacy to get Nizām Alī's consent to them. Early in 1763, accordingly, he first settled with Nizām Alī the Sīra affair and then started "negotiating with him about finishing the affairs of Mysore" and even proposed to pay him a visit.[231] This suggestion was evidently nothing more than a pretended offer to show respect to Nizām Alī and was replaced by the despatch of Mehdi Alī Khān, his Vakīl, who, it is said, paid to Nizām Alī six lakhs of rupees *Nazar* and obtained *Sanads* for the districts of Sīra and Bednūr from him. Nizām Alī, in return, honoured, it would seem, Haidar, with a *mansab* of 7,000 horse, the *manki* (or fish) standard, a palanquin with a fringe to it and the title of *Bahadūr*. He also made the gift of an elephant to Mehdi Alī Khān and agreed that Haidar should later pay his respects to him on the banks of the Krishṇa.[232] Evidently Haidar had even higher ambitions, to obtain the supremacy over the whole of the South of India, under cover of Nizām Alī's pretended overlordship, for it was also given out at about this time

231. *Fort St. George Records-Mily. Count. Corres.*, XI. 46, *Letter* No. 32, dated February 5, 1763.

232. *Ibid*, XII. 166, *Letter* of Ānanda Rao, gumāsta to Nizām Alī, dated April 3, 1764.

that Haidar obtained a *sanad* not only for Sīra, Sunda, Bednūr and Sēringapatam but also for Cuddapah, Kurnool and Karnāṭak at the hands of Nizām Alī.[233] Nizām Alī, all the better for the money, pretended friendship but held over further action. To the Mahrattas, Haidar sent, for the same purpose, and provided in the same manner, one Appāji Rām, an able and vivacious Dēśastha Brāhman. But not only was injury here more direct and substantial but also there were other complications. Added to these was the fact that Bālāji Rao, the Pēshwa who died in 1761, had been succeeded by Mādhava Rao, probably the greatest of his line, who, though young in years, carried a wise head on his shoulders. He was indeed little disposed to acquiesce in the conquest of any part of the Mahratta territories.[234] Haidar had thus to prepare himself against an invasion of Mysore, more formidable, both from the number and quality of the troops as from the talents of their leader, than he had reason to expect from his experience of previous contests with the Mahrattas. Haidar did well in sending Appāji Rām to Mādhava Rao. Whatever the diplomatic skill of Mehdi Alī may have been, and he was evidently successful in his mission to Hyderabad, there is no doubt that Appāji Rām, of whom we shall hear further in the course of this narrative, was a witty, clever and astute man of great address, who knew how to shape his conduct to the needs of the passing hour. He was one of those honest men who knew and understood court life to a fault and was naturally gifted to be an ambassador sent to lie abroad in the interests

233. *Ibid*, 171-172, *News-letter* from Nizām Alī's camp, down to April 3, 1764.

234. Mādhava Rao succeeded his father in September 1761, in his 17th year. He organised a campaign against Haidar immediately he was able to turn his attention to him. The vigour of his administration was such that within ten years he re-established the Mahratta ascendency in the north. His death in 1772 at the early age of 38 proved a great blow to the Mahratta power (see below).

of his country.[235] Though Haidar, by one of those instinctive acts of his, so characteristic of him, sent the right sort of persons to the two courts of Hyderabad and Poona, the result did not prove beneficial to him. That shows the enormity of the offence he had given them in their estimation. What, however, did great damage to Mysore with the Pēshwa was Haidar's conquest of the Mahratta territories in the neighbourhood of Sīra and part of those which lay within the jurisdiction of Murāri Rao. A worse affront he had offered was his war against Bednūr and its annexation and extending further his operations to the northward with the avowed object of extending the northern frontier of Mysore up to the Krishṇa by an alliance with the Nizām against the Pēshwa.[236] Mādhava Rao had not only been not inattentive to the course of these transactions but had also been approached actively on behalf of Bednūr.[237] Bednūr, indeed since the days of Śivāji, had been friendly towards the Mahrattas. Its rulers had come to a working understanding among themselves and had established cordial relations with each other. When Śivāji succeeded to the so-called rights of the Bijāpur kings, he did not assert any supremacy over Bednūr.[238]

235. Sir Henry Wotton (1568-1639), the diplomatist and scholar, came under temporary eclipse, it is said, for his definition of an ambassador as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth." It was written in Mr. Christopher Fleckamore's Album. Wotton was Ambassador of James I for twenty years, chiefly at Venice. He was the author of the famous saying "The itch of controversy is the seat of the churches," which, at his instance, became his epitaph.

236. See above. 237 See below.

238. Venkaṭappa Nāyaka of Keḷadi (1582-1629) beat off an invasion of the Bijāpur forces under Raṇadullā Khān. His brother and successor Vīrabhadra Nāyaka (1629-1645), by an embassy to Bijāpur, stopped a more formidable invasion by the same general. He transferred the capital to Bednūr. Śivappa Nāyaka (1645-1660), his successor, was a great ruler. He withstood several Bijāpur invasions, which did not end in any advantage to Bijāpur. His son Bhadrappa Nāyaka (1661-1664) was, however, successively attacked and he retired to Bhuvanagiri for a while. But peace was concluded and he returned to his capital. Śivāji's descent on the coast of Kanara in

When, after Śivāji's plunder of Hubli, in 1673, Channammāji, the widow of Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka I, who carried on the Bednūr government from 1672 to 1697, heard of the despatch of his fleet to take possession of Kārvār, Ankōle and other places, she solicited a friendly arrangement with him, and Śivāji readily agreed to it. She consented to pay yearly tribute and permitted a *Vakīl* from Śivāji to reside at her Capital.[239] In keeping with this arrangement, she gave shelter to Rāmarāja, the son of Śivāji, when he was in hiding from the Mughals, until he could escape to his own country.[240] Even after the death of Śivāji, the Rāṇi continued her friendly attitude, paying the annual tribute agreed upon to his successor.[241] But Mahratta policy, however, changed for the worse with the death of Śivāji. The Pēshwa Bālāji Rao, in his campaign of 1753-1757, deputed Mahadāji Purandare, with a detachment, to attack Bednūr in 1755, but, though he plundered the place, he could do no more, because he quarrelled with Muzaffar Khān, the Commandant of the Mahratta Artillery.[242] In 1756, however, Bālāji Rao conceived designs against Bednūr and sent out one Balwant Rao to attack and take it. He asked him "to march to that place as soon as possible, that the garrison had been very sickly,

1664 did not touch Bednūr, though it included the sack of Barcelore (Kundapur) and the plunder of all the adjacent tracts, including most of the rich mercantile towns, including Kārvār, where the English factory paid £ 112 sterling as its part of contribution (see Grant-Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, 90-91; *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1235).

239. Grant-Duff. *o.c.*, I. 201-202, quoting Marathi Mss. Duff, however, does not mention the name of the "Rana of Bednore", who, he says, agreed to pay the annual tribute and to receive a *Vakil* "at *his* capital." The "Rana" was actually a woman and it was Channammāji, who, doubtless perceiving that Śivāji waged war against the Sultān of Bijāpur, made a friendly adjustment with him.

240. *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1236. This Rāmarāja may be identified with Rājā Rām, the son of Śivāji the great, who was raised to the Mahratta throne in May 1680. (Grant Duff, *o.c.*, 134).

241. Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 231.

24 Kincaid and Parasnis, *History of the Maratta People*, III. 84. There is no reference to this event in Grant-Duff.

that the Rana's son, as well as the Rana, was dead, and that the whole would fall into his hands before the arrival of Gopaul Hurry, when they must conjointly attack Chittledroog."[243] The Pēshwa had evidently news of the ill-feeling between Vīrammāji and the adopted son of her husband, Channabasappa, which, according to certain accounts, had ended in the murder of Channabasappa. But he was wrongly informed as to the death of Vīrammāji herself. The ruling Rāṇa at the time—1756-1757—was Vīrammāji, who had succeeded her husband Basappa Nāyaka II jointly with his adopted son Channabasappa Nāyaka, whose history has already been narrated. Bālāji Rao desired to take full advantage of the differences between the Rāṇi and her adopted son, just the very cause which had induced Haidar to intervene in Bednūr affairs. Balwant Rao having been detained in Cuddapah on levying contributions from the Pālegārs round about Sīra, Hoskōṭe, Muḷbāgal and other places, which he had taken, could not, until February 1757, turn his attention to this direction, and before that, events had occurred in Hyderabad, which called him away northwards. "Had this scheme" of Bālāji Rao "been practicable at the time", says Grant-Duff, the historian of the Mahrattas, "it would in all probability have prevented the rise of Hyder Ally."[244] While undoubtedly the wealth of Bednūr helped Haidar in prosecuting his further campaigns, it is doubtful whether its non-conquest would have prevented his "rise." However this may have been, there is no doubt that the Mahrattas from the time of Śivāji had had a watchful eye on Bednūr, and its conquest by Haidar, in 1763, made them

243. Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 494, quoting a copy of an original letter from the Pēshwa to Balwant Rao Gaṇapati Mehendale. "Gopaul Hurry" referred to was Gōpāl Hari, who was at the head of a force intended to attack Mysore a little later during the same campaign, and with whom Balwant Rao was to act after reducing Bednūr.

244. Grant-Duff, l. c.

uneasy for the double reason that he had poached into ground which had been included exclusively in their own sphere of influence since Śivāji's time and had plundered it of its immense wealth and been using that very wealth in further aggrandizing himself and that too at their cost. They were thus fully in a mood to listen to the piteous cries of Vīrammāji and her adopted son, who were both captives in Haidar's hands.

Vīrammāji's appeal for deliverance.

It was in this state of affairs that many influential men of Bednūr, who had not been suspected of any complicity by Haidar in the previous attempt against him, made up their mind to make known to the Pēshwa Mādhava Rao what had transpired in their city.[245] Haidar was away at the time from Bednūr and Vīrammāji's cause had gained evidently good supporters, who put themselves at the head of the movement in her favour. It is possible, though there is no direct proof for this, that the Rāṇi and her adopted son managed to send secret emissaries to him, for his subsequent conduct towards them would seem to indicate that he should have been previously in touch with them. However

245. Robson, *o.c.*, 32-33. Robson is plain on this point and there is nothing on record to doubt his version. His words are: "During Hyder's absence from Biddenoor country, many of the great men who had not been suspected in the former affair, plucked up courage and applied to Mahadorow, one of the Mahratta chiefs, and promised him all the assistance in their power, if he would march a strong body of troops to relieve them from Hyder's tyranny. Accordingly he marched into the Biddenoor country (where Hyder had but just arrived) upon his receiving information of this universal defection." De La Tour has nothing to say on this subject. Stewart, who dates the event in 1763, agrees with Robson (*o.c.*, 16-17). He says that the "Mahrattas, jealous of the near approach of Hyder to their frontier, and applied to for assistance by the inhabitants of Bednore, sent, in 1763, a powerful army, consisting of 60,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, to dispossess the usurper." Kīrmāṇi suggests that it was Haidar's movement "towards Bednūr" that made Mādhava Rao turn against him, fearing "his own districts to be threatened" (*o.c.*, 167). Kīrmāṇi, however, does not directly connect Mādhava Rao's invasion to any request from the people of Bednūr.

this may have been, Mādhava Rao made up his mind, both on his own account and on account of the Rāṇi of Bednūr, to invade the Mysore country and retake all the conquered territories.

Pēshwa Mādhava Rao's first invasion of Mysore, 1764-65.

Mādhava Rao, being for the time free from other cares, concentrated his attention on Mysore. The time was propitious. Basālat Jang, the friend of Haidar, was engaged in a conflict with his brother, Nizām Alī, in the direction of Kurnool and could not, even if he desired, help him, while Nizām Alī also could not, even in his own interests, think of a diversion towards Mysore to oppose the Mahrattas. Nor indeed would he desire such a diversion, for if the Mahrattas put down Haidar, it would be but a very desirable end in itself for the time being, especially as he had come to an accommodation with the Mahrattas, in 1763, after the sack of Poona.[246] Haidar's phenomenal rise, within three years, had astonished the Mahratta world. The increase in his forces and resources made it incumbent on Mādhava Rao to provide with adequate care for the augmentation and equipment of the forces intended to oppose him. A large army soon assembled at Poona. Mādhava Rao proposed to take personal command of it, while his uncle Raghunātha Rao was to remain at Poona and to conduct the government. But Rāghunātha Rao—evidently in secret communication, if not in league, with Haidar—insisted on the command being vested in him. Seeing that right was with the nephew, and that he was supported in his claim by Sakhārām Bāpu, Prime Minister of the Pēshwa at the

246. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 517. Wilks (I. 514-515, 517-518) makes Mādhava Rao undertake the invasion only to recover the Mahratta dominions. Grant-Duff, similarly, suggests that the Mahrattas were not unconcerned spectators of the rapid progress of Haidar and they assembled a large army at Poona for directing the same against him (*o.c.*, I. 544). Robson and Stewart as the earliest writers have evidently had independent sources from which they have drawn.

time we are writing of, he pretended to yield, but quitted Poona in anger and retired to Nāsik. These discussions and the time necessary to gather together a large army enabled Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān to extend Mysore's northern frontier across the Warda, Malprabha and the Gatprabha, nearly to the banks of the Krishṇa, all fordable rivers except during the rainy season. Gōpāl Rao Patwardhan, the chief of Miraj, which lies immediately to the north of the Krishṇa, reinforced by Mādhava Rao by a considerable body of troops to check the progress of Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, until the main army should arrive, determined to give him battle. Finding himself superior in numbers, he crossed the Krishṇa accordingly but was defeated with great loss in April 1764.[247] Early in the succeeding month, Mādhava Rao crossed the Krishṇa with an army of 30,000 horse, about the same number of infantry, besides artillery. Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, leaving a strong

247. See Wilks, *o.c.*, 518; Grant-Duff, l. c. On the movements and position in general of Haidar and the Mahrattas up to April 1764, see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. 37, *Letter* Nos. 29 and 30. No. 29, dated February 21 or in April 1764, refers to the impending arrival of Burān-ud-dīn, one of Haidar's commanders, near Dharwar, and the consequent preparations made to check his aggression. From No. 30, dated April 17, 1764, we learn that Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān—referred to as Faiz-ullāh-Khān—was moving at the head of 10,000 horse on hearing of the Mahratta advance on the south; that Haidar, who was three nights' journey from Bednūr, had sent 2,000 horse from Bankāpur; that Mokhdum, his brother-in-law, also moved thither at the head of 1,000 horse; that Gōpāl Rao Patwardhan from Bankāpur and Dharwar awaited them; that the Paṭhān Nawāb of Savaṇūr was about to join the Mahrattas, who were to cross the Tungabhadra in a day or two to meet the Mysoreans at Savaṇūr, and that Haidar, while sticking to his post, was arranging to victual his army, &c. A *Fort. St. George* letter gives the following details relating to the military position of Haidar about this time: "Hyder Naigue has a train of artillery, consisting of 100 piecies of cannon; and has collected together immense quantities of powder, lead, etc., and about 25,000 bullocks for the carriage of water, grain, &c.; he has given to every soldier in his army also two leathern guglets to carry water in, and ten measures of wheat flour. Twenty horses are always ready before his door for his own riding. Meer Phize Ullah Cawn is appointed to the command of the van of his army..." (*Mily. Count Corres.*, XII. 174, *News-letters* down to April 3, 1764).

garrison at Dharwar, deliberately fell back as Mādhava Rao advanced.[248] Haidar, then at Seringapatam, hearing of Mādhava Rao's advance, ordered the assemblage of the troops. He marched towards Shimoga; from there proceeded to Basavāpaṭṇa; crossing the Tungabhadra, advanced to Harihar and from there passed on to Shikārpur *via* Māsūr-Maḍagu tank, where he encamped.[249] From there, recalling all his detachments, he advanced towards Savaṇūr and took up a position near Raṭṭihaḷḷi,[250] about 50 miles south of Savaṇūr and about 20 miles to the west of Harihar. He encamped there, on an eminence, which overlooked a vast plain towards the front. He chose this place deliberately, for the thick woods to his rear protected him, affording cover as they did for his infantry against the superior numbers of Mādhava Rāo's cavalry up to the town of Bednūr, a distance of over 100 miles. Here, he mustered 20,000 horse, 20,000 irregular foot and his train of artillery, consisting of about 25 field-guns.[251] Mādhava Rao's army, which had by now been joined by the Nawāb of Savaṇūr with 1,000 horse and 12,000 foot and by Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe with 5,000 horse from Harapanahaḷḷi,[252] was thus three times stronger

248. Grant-Duff, *o. c.* I. 544-545. Wilks says that Mādhava Rao's cavalry was "reputed at 60,000" and suggests that this may be taken to be an "exaggeration" for a force 30,000 to 40,000 strong (*Ibid*, 519).

249. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 167-168. See also and compare *Sel. Pesh, Daft.*, vol. 37, *Letter* No. 32, dated May 6, 1764, referring to Haidar's movements thus far.

250. About 20 miles due east of Beḷagāmi. It is on the Kumudvati, just across the present Mysore border and about 20 miles to the n. e. of Śirāḷkoppa in the present Shimoga district. It may be said to be roughly midway between Śirāḷkoppa and Harihar. Ānavaṭṭi, situated not far away from the south bank of the Warda, is about 30 miles n. w. of Raṭṭihaḷḷi and about 20 miles due north of Sorab.

251. Wilks, *o.c.*, 519, f. n. See also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l. c., which refers to Haidar's strength as 12,000 horse and 25,000 foot. The numbers may be taken to be relatively approximate, though Wilks, who has based his account on local writings, is to be preferred.

252. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l.c. Grant-Duff places this event subsequent to the action at Raṭṭihaḷḷi (*o.c.* I. 545). Murāri Rao, according to Duff, had been lately restored by Mādhava Rao to his traditional osition of "Sēnāpati" in the Pêshwa's army.

than Haidar's. His artillery was probably superior in number to Haidar's, while his regular infantry was perhaps composed of a better description of men though perhaps not so well-disciplined as Haidar's. His irregulars, composed of Arabs, were possibly also superior to Haidar's; while his pikemen were certainly inferior to those of Haidar, who were made up of Bēḍars from Chitaldrug from about this period.

The battle of Raṭṭihaḷḷi, May 36, 17-64.

Haidar's plan was, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān having retired before the advancing enemy, to make them attack him in the place he had chosen for himself. He, therefore, determined, after choosing his place, to be purely on the defensive. But his object was wholly frustrated by Mādhava Rao declining to attack him there. While his forces were pinned to the ground on which they had taken their stand, Mādhava Rao's forces had full freedom of movement. Mādhava Rao's superiority of cavalry indeed enabled him to obtain more correct information than his adversary, and assisted by the experience of Sakhārām Bāpu, he determined not to attack Haidar's united forces in the position they had chosen but to despatch detachments for recovering the places north of the Warda, driving out the Mysore garrisons from all the towns and villages they had lately occupied. This plan of operations, if left unchecked, would have ended in the investment of Haidar and his forces in his own camp and the interception of his supplies. Haidar quickly saw how the enemy's judicious plans had rendered useless his own dispositions. He instantly made up his mind to try a stratagem, by which he determined to bring on a general action, and if possible still lead the enemy by pursuit to attack him in his own chosen position. With this objective in view, he confided the command of the camp to Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, and moved out on the plain with a select corps of 20,000

men. His pretension to retire and draw Mādhava Rao towards the reserve, however, failed of its purpose. Haidar's manœuvres, indeed, terminated in his becoming the dupe of his own design. Such an artifice, shallow and petty as it was, would have succeeded with a general less capable than Mādhava Rao. It betrayed a lack of appreciation of the capacity of his enemy. Mādhava Rao's forces, which had by now advanced within three miles from Haidar's encampment,[253] in keeping with their immemorial rules of warfare, showed themselves at first in few numbers; then, small bodies began to skirmish, and drew Haidar forward to the distance of six or seven miles, until their irregular swarms of horse assumed a more fixed distribution, and discovered to Haidar the whole of the enemy army closing upon him in every direction. Haidar quickly perceived how Mādhava Rao's army had gradually thickened and at last presented solid masses of horse moving round between him and his camp. He understood that his feint had failed of its purpose. Without hesitation, he tried to convert his feint of retiring into dispositions for a retreat to his camp. These he made with steadiness and skill. He forced the corps which was posted to intercept his retreat, and retired, hard pressed for a time, towards Raṭṭihaḷḷi, hoping yet to end a hardfought day by drawing Mādhava Rao to the ground which he had chosen for action. Mādhava Rao had too much penetration to be so easily deceived. Haidar was not only foiled in all his objects, but also sustained a severe loss involving the flower of his army.[254]

253. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 168. Kīrmāṇi says that the Mahrattas marched towards Haidar and "encamped about three miles distant from him and the next morning advanced to attack him." This encampment can refer only to the last movements preceding the attack on the part of Mādhava Rao.

254. Kīrmāṇi says that the Mahrattas surrounded Mysore troops, "forming a ring round them" and although charged desperately, still they (Mysore troops) constantly repelled the attacks with "the greatest

Haidar's retreat on Ānavaṭṭi.

Distressed for supplies, he was forced to fall back the next-day[255] on Ānavaṭṭi, about thirty miles north-west of Raṭṭihaḷḷi, where he had prepared an entrenched camp, with his artillery mounted in batteries on all the rising grounds surrounding it,[256] just where the thick woods begin, and effectively assured a communication with his supplies. Not to be outwitted, Mādhava Rao did not decline to follow him to this position. He would neither quit him nor allow him rest. Within a few days of Haidar's retreat, Mādhava Rao moved his flying columns in different directions to invest Haidar in his new camp. He placed on the top of a small hill all the guns of his artillery which carried farthest, and from there cannonaded the Mysore camp and caused no little inconvenience to it.[257] Haidar, ever ready for an opportunity to show off his superior skill, imagined he perceived here an opportunity for cutting off one of Mādhava Rao's columns[258]. He moved out for this purpose with 2,000

steadiness and courage, and maintained their ground throughout the whole of the day" (*l.c.*). On the subject of the tough fight at Raṭṭihaḷḷi, see also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. 37, *News-letters* Nos. 31 and 32, dated May 6, 1764, from the Mahratta camp. The loss on Haidar's side, according to letter No. 32, was between four and five hundred men and 100 horses killed and 200 men injured; that on the Mahratta side, according to the same source, amounted to 500 men and 150 horses killed and many injured, no officer, however, being injured except Raghunāth Bāba, who died by a gunshot. The battle of Raṭṭihaḷḷi, in the light of this letter, is to be dated May 3-6, 1764.

255. So Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 520. Kīrmāṇi, however, says that Haidar quitted the ground "at night" straight to Cheroli, Anoti and Jara, and there, placing his rear to the *jungul*, he encamped". Evidently the march began actually in the night and ended after daybreak. Of the places mentioned by Kīrmāṇi, "Anoti" is Ānavaṭṭi, while "Jara" is probably Jedda, which is to its N. W., on the opposite bank of the Warda, almost facing it. "Cheroli" is probably Chincholi, now in the Bombay Karnāṭak—situated between Belgaum and Miraj on the M. & S. M. Railway line, 183 miles from Savaṇūr and 230 miles from Harihar, the present Mysore frontier.

256. Kīrmāṇi, l.c.

257. *Ibid*, 169.

258. So Wilks, l.c. Kīrmāṇi, however, says that Haidar's object was to silence the Mahratta artillery, which was causing so much inconvenience to his camp. He describes it as a night attack (*o.c.*, 169-170).

regular infantry, 1,000 select horse and 4 light guns,[259] all selected men, leaving the rest of his army under the charge of Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, and his treasury he entrusted to the care of Dilāver Khān. His aim was to make a night attack, not only to cut off one of the ever advancing Mahratta columns but also to dislodge the enemy's battery on the hill top. With this double object he marched, under cover of the thick jungle, straight on the Mahratta artillery. He was once again inveigled into advancing too far, with the result he was completely surrounded. The road was so bad that his troops were obliged to cut down the trees to obtain a passage. By the time they managed to arrive on a plain near which the Mahratta artillery had been set up, night vanished and the morning shone forth brightly. The Mahrattas, aware of the approach of the Mysore troops, immediately surrounded them and setting up their familiar cry of "Take and kill" and curveting and leaping their horses, charged on all sides. Haidar, as was his wont on occasions of this kind, had regularly and skilfully formed his infantry into a hollow square, so that the Mahratta onslaughts can be withheld. But as his misfortune would have it, although he gave orders to commence a fire from his guns, not one of them would go off, and fire seemed to take no more effect on them than so much ice. Haidar, utterly undismayed, at length dismounted from his horse, and taking a match in his hand, placed it on the touch-hole of one of his guns. It was, however, of no use, as the fuse did not take fire. Hopeless of any service from his artillery, he endeavoured to keep off the Mahrattas by a sharp fire from his musketry, and fought on to the very extent of his means. But it was in vain. He had been caught

259. Kīrmāṇi gives the following figures: 5,000 matchlock infantry marksmen, about 1,500 horse, and 4 light guns, from his bodyguarp (*Ibid*).

in a trap, surrounded as he was on all sides. The Mahrattas, at no time outwitted, at last, charged in a body[260] and mixed with the Mysore troops, shoulder to shoulder, and breaking through their ranks, threw them into confusion and slaughtered them mercilessly. Venkaṭa Rao, Haidar's Dewān, was killed in the mêlee, while Zamān Khān, his bosom friend, was wounded. Some of his troops, under pretence of bringing aid or ammunition, actually ran off to avoid destruction. The Mahrattas, seeing the field their own, pursued the fugitives, as long as they could do it, and plundered and slew them. Haidar, by his intelligence and awareness, just managed to escape from the general slaughter, followed by but fifty of his cavalry, mainly through the fleetness of their horses, the remainder being destroyed to a man.[261] Having thus escaped, Haidar sat down under a tree, and surveyed with wild passion the field so favourable to his enemy. Just at this time, a drummer with his drum arrived at the place where he sat, and stood before him. Haidar, recovering from his stupor, ordered him immediately to beat a charge. The Mahrattas, fearing that reinforcements had arrived, left the field hurriedly, leaving on it all the baggage they had taken. Haidar collected what remained of his forces and marched back to his camp, where he was joined by Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, who arrived there with his forces by a forced march. A further attack of the enemy followed but the Mahrattas retired with the guns

260. Kīrmāṇi, never at a loss for curious metaphors, compares the Mahratta charge on this occasion to "a flight of crows". He writes: "At last, the Mahrattas, like a flight of crows, charged in a body", etc. (*o.c.*, 170).

261. So Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 520-521. Kīrmāṇi, however, makes no mention of these fifty cavalrymen who, according to Wilks, are said to have followed Haidar. On the other hand, his individual escape is thus emphasised by him in a striking simile:—"The Nawaub.....escaped from the slaughter, and like the Sun without a peer, and alone, sat down under a tree," etc. (*o.c.*, 171).

they had taken.[262] Haidar was so impressed with the part played by his troops that he ordered the wounded to be brought to his camp for medical treatment and for the payment of compensation for the wounds they had received.[263]

Raṭṭihaḷḷi and after.

Mādhava Rao could not continue operations any further, as the season was advanced, and the monsoon had burst, it being past the middle of June 1764, when the affair at Ānavaṭṭi closed. He was compelled to retire to a place less exposed to the rains than that. He accordingly crossed the Warda and marching some 40 miles to the north-east, cantoned his troops at a place not far away to the east of Savaṇūr.[264] As the rains began to abate a little, Mādhava Rao sent out detachments for reducing the whole of the eastern dependencies of Bednūr and the adjacent parts of Mysore. Haidar,

262. This account is based partly on Wilks (l.c.) and partly on Kīrmāṇi (*o.c.*, 168-172). Grant-Duff's version is based admittedly on Wilks and on certain Marathi Mss., which are not specifically referred to. Wilks' account, however, is a condensed one and does not include details of the fight between two forces after Haidar had been surrounded. Kīrmāṇi's narrative, despite his desire to be partial to Haidar, discloses access to independent material. His similes make his version graphic to a degree.

263. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 172.

264. Wilks describes Mādhava Rao's place of retirement for the monsoon season "to the eastward of Savanore" (*o.c.*, I. 521). Grant-Duff says that Mādhava Rao "fixed his headquarters at Nurindra" and sent troops for shelter into all the villages 20 miles round. He adds the remark that he has been unable to find this place (Nurindra) by that name in any map known to him (*o.c.*, I. 545 f. n. 2). Mr. S. M. Edwardes has no light to throw on the identification of this place in his edition of Duff's *History*, cited here. Kīrmāṇi says that the Mahrattas retired to "Binkapore" (modern Benkipore, now Bhadrāvati) for the rains and there placed themselves in cantonment (*o.c.*, 172). On the position and movements in general of the Pēshwa and Haidar during the period, see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. 37, *Letters* Nos. 34, 36 and 37 (down to June 1764). *Letter* No. 34 speaks of Pēshwa Mādhava Rao's intention of cantoning in the Karnāṭak in view of the approaching monsoon; No. 36 refers to his movement towards Savaṇūr, then reported to be threatened by Haidar; and No. 37 reports his having intended to canton his forces in the neighbourhood of Dharwar, &c.

on his side, could do nothing. Halting and staying where he was cantoning and had taken refuge (*i.e.*, at Bednūr),[265] he could only look on with despair his troops, wretched, spiritless and suffering from sickness from the inevitable consequences of its situation. About the middle of July, the Pēshwa, having posted Gōpāl Rao Patwardhan at Savaṇūr, advanced with the main army against Haidar. Haidar, as was his wont, systematically retired into the woods, from which it became difficult for the Mahrattas to dislodge him. When, however, the Pēshwa moved away towards Gadvāl, Haidar, all of a sudden, appeared before Bankāpur and threatened to march upon Savaṇūr. To counteract Haidar, the Pēshwa fell back and encamped at Gajēndragaḍh, relieving Savaṇūr. Thereupon Haidar withdrew to Hāngal and eventually disappeared in the forests, suffering heavily in a skirmish he had with Gōpāl Rao.[266] The Pēshwa, proceeding further, invested Mudhol,[267] and it became his foremost objective to humble down Haidar[268] by attacking him from the sea and reoccupying the key-states of Suṇḍa and Bednūr with the help of the Portuguese and the Sāwant.[269] Towards the close of September, Mādhava Rao invested Dharwar.[270] As anticipated, Dharwar capitulated early in November, though only after offering a stout resistance, in which fell Hari Paraśurām Sōman, an able officer.[271] With it the whole of the country north of the Warda was in the hands of Mādhava Rao, with the exception

265. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. 37, *Letter* No. 37, dated June 23, 1764.
266. *Ibid*, *Letters* Nos. 38 and 39, dated July 11 and 12, 1764; also *Letter* No. 40, dated July 13, 1764.
267. *Ibid*, *Letter* No. 40 cited above.
268. *Ibid*, *Letter* No. 41, dated August 20, 1764?
269. *Ibid*, *Letter* No. 42, dated August 25, 1764.
270. *Ibid*, *Letter* No. 44, dated September 26, 1764.
271. *Ibid*, *Letters* Nos. 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54, dated November 1, 5, 6 and 8, 1764. See also Nos. 45 to 48, referring to the siege during October 1764.

of Mundagūr, which surrendered shortly after. A detachment, under Gōpāl Rao, despite the rains, not only plundered the country on the northern banks of the Tungabhadra but also levied tribute from the Pāḷegārs of Harapanahaḷḷi, Rāyadurg and other neighbouring places, and finally fixed his camp at Hosdurga, about 39 miles south-west of Chitaldrug.[272] Hearing of this, Haidar advanced with a detachment, consisting of 6,000 horse, 9,000 sillāhdārs, 4,000 regular infantry and six light guns, fell on Gōpāl Rao and scattered his forces in every direction.[273] Gōpāl Rao himself escaped with what he could lay his hands on, and took the road to Sīra. Some of his camp followed him and sought refuge in the fort there, while others sought the road to Poona. Many others were, it is said, killed by Haidar's troops, who, disguising themselves as Mahrattas, joined the enemy's foraging parties and relieved them of their belongings, resulting in a loss to them of 5,000 horses, besides 19 elephants and 90 camels, besides slaying many of them.[274] Feeling assured that the war would soon end, Mādhava Rao sent word to his uncle Raghunātha Rao to take over the command, a step which, though it proceeded from motives honourable to Mādhava Rao, were wholly detrimental both to his own interests and to those of his nation. He hardly realized the fact that Raghunātha Rao was in secret league with Haidar and that what had been won by him on the battlefield was to be lost almost immediately by the treachery of his uncle. Raghunātha Rao accordingly instantly left Nāsik and arrived with his troops as the army in the south was about to cross the Warda.[275]

272. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 172-174.

273. Kīrmāṇi compares their flight to the "falling leaves before the desolating winds of autumn" (*Ibid*, 174).

274. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 175. There is no mention of this fight either in Wilks or Grant-Duff. Barring some obvious exaggerations, there is no reason why we should doubt the fight itself mentioned by Kīrmāṇi.

275. Grant-Duff, l.c.

Haidar's defeat at Anavaṭṭi, December 1764.

Towards the close of the year, the weather began to clear and an approach to the thick forests of Ānavaṭṭi was rendered possible. Mādhava Rao, without delay, opened the campaign with the employment of a large body of pioneers, specially organised for the purpose and equipped during the rainy season. His main object was to cut, in the first instance, a wide opening, through the forests, to the south of Haidar's entrenched camp, and thus progressively build up a line of circumvallation, which would effectively surround the whole of Haidar's camp and cut off his communication with Bednūr. As Mādhava Rao's men began to fell the gigantic trees behind Haidar's camp, Haidar saw the inevitable fate that awaited him. As he could by no means allow his communication with Bednūr to be cut off, he forthwith abandoned his entrenched camp and began a hasty retreat. The close and vigorous pursuit that Mādhava Rao kept up during the first days, though it impeded Haidar's movement by making him halt often and fight the enemy with the whole of his forces, did not affect more than the rear of his army. What added to Haidar's trouble was the close nature of the country, which made Mādhava Rao's work easy for him but not effective. On the third day, however, the route lay through more open country and afforded to Mādhava Rao good opportunity to move a column between Haidar and Bednūr, the point on which he was retreating. This forced Haidar to stand a general action, which he by no means could avoid. He made his dispositions instantly and offered battle to the enemy. His troops, however, could not stand the onslaught made on them. Their impetuosity was so great that the action terminated in a disorderly rout in which he lost in killed alone, it is said,[276] 3,000 horse and double that number of infantry,

276. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 522. Grant-Duff's account is a mere summary of Wilks.

while the shattered remnants of his army immediately sought refuge, in their dismay, in the depths of the woods near about. Haidar reached Bednūr with only 2,500 horse and 10,000 infantry, the rest of his army being, for the time being, scattered in all directions, while several thousands of them had actually been destroyed. Haidar felt the pulse for peace, but the negotiations broke down as evidently the terms offered would not suit Mādhava Rao. As Mādhava Rao advanced, garrison after garrison surrendered on the first call. Thus fell to him Hāranahaḷḷi without resistance; next fell Ikkēri without a fight; and Kumsi was reduced after a resistance of but two days, while Ānandāpur,[277] between these two places, held out for a while and finally surrendered, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān retiring from it immediately he heard that Mādhava Rao's army was advancing on it. The despondency of Haidar's army had been communicated

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Wilks' account seems based on what he evidently heard from the survivors of the action, from whom he seems to have had the details personally. "It is admitted by all who shared in the contest of this day", he says, "that although the dispositions of Hyder were respectable, the conduct of his troops was destitute of firmness and spirit". There seems a tinge of exaggeration here, for it does not obviously allow anything for the impetuosity of the Mahratta attack which admittedly determined the fate of the day. This rout at Ānavaṭṭi (called "Jadi Hanwati") was duly reported to Nānā Fadnis by Bālāji Śankar (see *Sel. Pesh. Daft. o.c.*, *Letter* No. 55, December 1764). It is not a little curious that on the whole of this final fight Kīrmāṇi has not a word to say. He ends the war by saying that Mādhava Rao "found himself surrounded by such difficulties, his heart gave way", and by the mediation of Vakīls and ambassadors, "the war was concluded," which is hardly correct (Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 176).

277. "Anantapur" of Wilks. Wilks calls this place throughout by this name. "Ānandāpur" is really its correct name and it helps us to distinguish it from "Anantapur," the headquarters of the district of the same name, one of those which goes to make up the Ceded Districts of the Madras Presidency. The *Sel. Pesh. Daft.* (*o.c.*, *Letters* Nos. 59, 60 to 63) also refers to the place as Anantapur. The transition of the name from Anantapur into Ānandāpur in modern times is quite obvious, the letters 't' and 'd' in Kannaḍa being interchangeable. Ānandāpur, as elsewhere noticed, is now a railway station on the Shimoga-Arasāḷu section of the Mysore State Railway.

to them and their power of resistance was completely broken for the moment.[278]

Haidar at bay.

Thus beaten back, Haidar occupied, by about the end of January 1765, those lines behind Bednūr, which, as we have seen,[279] with the woods and the natural protection of the hills around it, formed its only strength. He now realized, for the first time, that the means by which he had himself achieved the conquest of Bednūr were also open to his enemies; that woods, although a protection to men individually animated in their defence, afford effective means of concealment to troops not forward in the performance of their duty,[280] and that he had made the worst possible selection for an asylum for himself. Without any the slightest delay, indeed, before even he occupied the lines, he made arrangements to despatch in secrecy his family, by a route through the woods, to Seringapatam, while successive detachments with treasure followed them to the same place.[281]

Opens negotiations for peace, February 1765.

Haidar saw that there was only one way out of the difficult situation in which he found himself. After taking Ānandāpur, Mādhava Rao prepared to invest Bednūr itself.[282] Haidar saw all would be

278. See Wilks, l.c.; Grant-Duff, l.c.; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, *Letter* No. 59, dated February 28, 1765. See also and compare Peixoto (*Memoirs*, l. c.), who refers to Raṭṭihaḷḷi as "Ratali", Ānavaṭṭi as "Anoutim", etc., and agrees in the main with the other sources in respect of the details of the course of the campaign of 1763-1765.

279. See *Ante*, P. 436.

280. Wilks' phrase is perhaps more impressive. He says "that woods, although a protection to men individually, animated in their defence, *are equivalent to the concealment of night for troops* who are not forward in the performance of their duty" (l. c.). He adds that "neither Hyder nor Tippoo Sultan, after this period, ever attempted to occupy a *jungle* (wood), although many opportunities occurred when they might (if not diffident of their troops) have done so with infinite advantage" (l. c., *f. n.*).

281. Wilks, l. c.

282. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o. c.*, *Letter* No. 63, dated March 30, 1765, fro Mādhava Rao to Nānā Fadnis, in which he says he had established

lost, if he now persisted in further war. He tried to retain what he should if he cared for himself. He knew that Vīrammāji and her old courtiers and people were in touch with Mādhava Rao and the continuance of the war would prove disastrous to himself. Haidar, always ready to seize a favourable opportunity, saw in the presence of Raghunātha Rao an easy escape. With the coming into power of Mādhava Rao, Raghunātha Rao was deeply anxious to secure a retreat for himself, if perchance his ambitions were foiled in his own country by the superior talents and bravery of his young nephew. He had kept up, in consequence, a secret and treacherous intercourse with Haidar through his ambassador Appāji Rām.[283] Haidar, with the cunning which characterized him, opened negotiations by sending a Vakīl, while the ground was being prepared by Naro Śankar and Gōpāl Hari, who had been entrusted by Raghunātha Rao with the duty of the final adjustment of the terms. Raghunātha Rao advised Mādhava Rao that the favorable time had arrived for the conclusion of peace and Mādhava Rao, quite unaware of his uncle's treachery, agreed to the suggestion, and what was more honorable to him, though wholly disastrous to him and the Mahratta cause, left the conduct and conclusion of the treaty to his uncle. Now, if ever, was the time to crush Haidar, his most dangerous foe. But Mādhava Rao, guileless as he was and unaware of the true character of his uncle, allowed himself to be deceived. Raghunātha Rāo granted the most favorable terms to Haidar, considering the desperate situation to which Haidar had been reduced. Among these were undoubtedly some secret

outposts in the Bednūr province and had laid siege to and taken Ānandāpur, and was preparing to invest Bednūr also, when Haidar sent his vakīl suing for peace.

283. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 714, where he refers to this intercourse thus: "An intercourse of civility had long subsisted between Hyder and Ragoba (Raghunātha Rao); it was through his mediation that the peace of Bednore had been effected in 1765," etc.

articles which became the foundation of that good understanding which ever afterwards subsisted between him and Haidar.[284]

The Treaty of Bednūr, March 1765.

This treaty became known as the "Peace of Bednore," having been dictated to Haidar under its walls.[285] Under its terms, Haidar engaged[286] (1) to restore to Gōpāl Rao of Miraj, Bankāpur, Harihar, Basavāpaṭṇa

284. That the treaty was concluded in pursuance of the advice of Raghunātha Rao is made clear from a letter addressed by Mādhava Rao himself to Nānā Fadnis (see *Sel. Pesh. Daft., o. c., Letter* No. 63, dated March 30, 1765). Unfortunately the text of Raghunātha Rao's advice in favour of concluding a treaty has not been published in the extract made available in the *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, quoted above. Raghunātha Rao is styled "Dāda" in this letter, a term of filial respect, "Dāda" meaning "father", he being Mādhava Rao's uncle.

285. Wilks calls the treaty by this name, l. c. He, however, places it about the end of February 1765 (*o. c.*, I. 523). From the *Haid-Nām.* (ff. 32), it would appear that the treaty was concluded before 23rd March 1765: *Pārthiva, Chaitra śu.* 2. Peixoto, who hardly specifies the terms of the treaty, dates it 23rd May 1765 (l.c.) But the date given in the *Haid-Nām* is in keeping with the Marathi letters cited here.

286. For the terms of the treaty, which are variously given, see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 523; Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 546; Kincaid and Parasnis, *o.c.*, III.91-92; *Haid-Nām.*, l.c.; and Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 176. Kīrmāṇi says that "the war was concluded on the payment of two lakhs of Rupees" by Haidar. This Rs. 2 lakhs should be taken as referring to what was paid by him for other expenses, as mentioned in one of the *Letters* cited below, quite apart from Rs. 28 plus 5 lakhs paid as indemnity and *nazar*. Stewart (*Memoirs*, 16-17) says that Haidar paid Rs. 60 lakhs (£600,000), which seems wholly baseless. He himself cites no authority for his statement. See also *Sel. Pesh. Daft., o.c., Letters* Nos. 59 (February 28, 1765), 60 and 61 (March 12, 1765). In the first of these, letter No. 59, the first mention of peace negotiations is made. In the second, we have a report of the terms proposed. It mentions Rs. 28 lakhs as the amount agreed to be paid by Haidar for the expenses of the war; Rs. 5 lakhs as *nazar*; and Rs. 2 lakhs for other expenses, making a total of Rs. 35 lakhs. In the third letter, we have mention only of Rs. 28 lakhs as the amount agreed to be paid. This, however, does not mean that that was the only amount actually paid. The *Haid-Nām.* and Wilks mention thirty-two lakhs as the amount agreed to be paid and actually paid (l. c.), which seems not correct. Grant-Duff, following him, repeats the same figure and adds in a footnote (l. c., *f. n.* 4) that the only Mahratta Ms. where he found any mention of the terms, states 15 lakhs of tribute and the expenses of the war to be defrayed by Haidar. This, however, is not covered by the three letters quoted above. Kincaid and Parasnis (*o.c.*, III. 92) mention, in one place, that Haidar

and other places included in the Mahratta territories; (2) to relinquish all claims on Nawāb Abdul Hakīm of Savaṇūr and his country; (3) to cede back to Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe of Gooty all his places; and (4) to pay twenty-eight lakhs (*aṭhāvīs laksha khaṇḍaṇī jāhāli*) towards the expenses of the war, besides five lakhs as a gift (*nazar*) and a further two lakhs for other expenses, the total thus to be paid in cash amounting to Rs. 35 lakhs. Mādhava Rao, on his part, was to retire on receipt of the money.

Reflections on the Treaty.

When these terms were communicated to Mādhava Rao, he was by no means pleased with them. But, as an honorable man, having authorized his uncle to conclude the treaty, he felt bound to ratify its terms. There is no indication in the records of the period that he was at all aware of the secret terms of the treaty which Naro Śankar negotiated on behalf of Raghunātha Rao. It is possible he did not know of them; if he had known them, it is doubtful if he would have accepted

agreed to pay Rs. 32 lakhs by way of indemnity, but, in another place, state that Mādhava Rao withdrew his forces from the Mysore frontier after the receipt of Rs. 35 lakhs. (Both the statements occur on page 92). The fact seems to be that Haidar agreed on the whole to an indemnity of Rs. 35 lakhs and actually paid before Mādhava Rao crossed the Tungabhadra. Letter No 61, quoted above, says that Hari Gōpāl and Naro Śankar, the Mahratta officers on the spot, are trying to see that these terms are carried out actually. Naro Śankar of this letter is the "Naro Shankar Dani" mentioned by Kincaid and Parasnis (l. c.) and "Naroo Shunkur" of Grant-Duff (*o.c.*, I. 521 and 538). He bore the title of "Raja Bahadur" and had been one of the principal officers with Sadāśiva Rao Bhao in his advance towards Delhi, and subsequently commanded for a time in the citadel of Delhi. He had been raised to the office of *Mutālik* by Raghunātha Rao, which meant virtually the conferring of the office of *Pratinidhi* on him (*Ibid*, 538-539). It is no wonder that he placed implicit trust in him. He had been for long one of the principal officers in the Deccan before he was called northwards. (*Ibid*). On the entire subject of Haidar's relations with the Mahrattas (1763-1765), see also and compare a recent article by Dr. N. K. Sinha, where he has mostly drawn upon Peixoto's *Memoirs* and the Marathi letters utilised here (see *Proc. I. H. R. C.*, Vol. XVI. pp. 76-79).

the treaty. Mādhava Rao, while respectful in his attitude towards his uncle and ready to conciliate him by yielding even power to him to the extent that he thought it would be consistent with his situation, was not one likely to yield to him, if he proved himself venal. That apart, the treaty was hardly just to Rāṇi Vīrammāji and her supporters and what is worse, hardly just even to Mādhava Rao, from whom a higher degree of respect for his own plighted word was bound to be expected. While it is regrettable that he should have agreed to a treaty of peace at the very time he could have taken Bednūr itself and released the Rāṇi and reinstated her or her adopted son, and turned back Haidar across his original frontier, he allowed himself to be practically superseded by his uncle and by him deceived of the full fruits of the campaign, which on the whole had proved successful to Mādhava Rao. It was Raghunātha Rao who stood in the way of the continuation of the war, because of the secret alliance he had set up with Haidar. Mādhava Rao did not want an open rupture with him, though his mother was for steps which might keep Raghunātha Rao under restraint. What induced Mādhava Rao to take a milder attitude was that by himself Raghunātha Rao was not intractable, though while under the influence of his ambitious wife, he was difficult to deal with. Moreover, Raghunātha Rao was in a position to obtain the help of the Nizām of Hyderabad or of Jānōji Bhōnsle of Berar or of both even, as affairs then stood. This being so, he had to act with some caution and have some regard for himself. In these circumstances, he desired to be friendly with his uncle, until at least the time when he could win over the Nizām to his side. The fact that hardly after he wound up the Mysore campaign, he endeavoured to conciliate by a secret treaty the Nizām at the expense of Jānōji, shows that he had other plans on hand before

he could further continue the campaign against Haidar. He found the Nizām ready for an offensive alliance against Jānōji, with the ultimate object of engaging Mādhava Rao and his army in co-operation against Haidar. The fact that about the beginning of 1766 he entered into a secret compact with the Nizām is fully evidenced by their joint invasion of Berar, and the humbling of Jānōji by making him cede three-fourths of the districts he had recently taken during the last war he had waged was a politic moderation on the part of Mādhava Rao, who left Jānōji something to lose while he advertised to the world that it was the Nizām and not himself who had gained by the war.[287] While thus the instinct of self-preservation led Mādhava Rao to lift the siege of Bednūr and conclude peace with Haidar, which was by no means unprofitable to him, there was other justification as to why he could not continue his campaign against Haidar. He had already spent over a year in its prosecution and had to refit his army if he was to continue the war. There is evidence to believe that apart from the losses of men and equipment incidental to a long campaign, he had had to requisition fresh supplies of equipment and fresh reinforcements to make good the losses sustained.[288] Mādhava Rao thus desired to further strengthen his position before he attacked Haidar's and relieved Rāṇi Vīrammāji or restored her to her kingdom. At any rate, there is evidence to believe that he disired definitely not to risk another rainy season in Mysore which would soon be on him, if he continued his stay at Bednūr and prolonged his operations. Haidar evidently knew this and the other demands on Mādhava Rao's time and improved

287. The details of this war against Jānōji will be found narrated in Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 547-548.

288. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, *Letters*. Nos. 45 (October 15, 1764) and 53 (November 1, 1764), from Mādhava Rao to Nānā Fadnis, requisitioning a fresh supply of ammunition.

on it by being friendly to Raghunātha Rao and even yielding in his behaviour, especially in the matter of the excessive money demands made by Raghunātha Rao. To avoid an open rupture with his young nephew, the Pēshwa, who did not favour the easy terms offered by him, Raghunātha Rao had to successfully pretend that he was exacting from Haidar much more than what he could stand.[289] Likewise, Haidar's occupation of Sīra appears to have been tacitly admitted in the negotiations that preceded the treaty of Bednūr, while all discussions relating to the Pāḷegārs of Chitaldrug, Rāyadurg, Harapanahaḷḷi, etc., seem to have been studiously avoided by both the parties to it. Mādhava Rao laid other contributions during the dry season from March to June 1765. A proper understanding with these Pāḷegārs and with Murāri Rao was not impossible, as the latter had been conciliated and the former had been beaten on the field. He considered further that the restoration of the places taken from Murāri Rao would furnish the certain means of regaining soon Sīra and the countries to its south-east, immediately he could find time to repeat his visit. To Haidar, who was not inappreciative of keeping silence on all these topics, it seemed best not to talk of them, for that would help him, from an opposite consideration of the very same reasons, to evade all these retrocessions.[290] Though the termination of the

289. Stewart (*Memoirs*, 16-17), writing evidently on oral testimony, says that "Hyder Aly, finding himself unable to contend with the Mahrattas in the field, confined his operations to the defence of Bednūr, which being situated in a jungle or forest, and surrounded by several miles of strong entrenchments, enabled him to repel the attacks of his enemies, *until the approach of the rainy season, when the Mahrattas consented to retire.*" This statement shows that Mādhava Rao was wholly unwilling to spend another rainy season at Bednūr as he was then circumstanced. But Haidar knew as well as Mādhava Rao that the Treaty of Bednūr that ended the war was not to be contemplated as a final settlement of accounts between Haidar and the Pēshwa at Poona.

290. On this particular aspect of the matter, see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 523-524.

war can thus be justified without doing any injustice to the reputation of Mādhava Rao, there is no doubt that it sealed the fate of Rāṇi Vīrammāji and her people. Though, as we shall see, she and her son were released in 1767, she was destined to be released only to die on her way to Poona and her adopted son to die later at the Mahratta capital. Her last hopes were blasted with the return of Mādhava Rao about the close of March 1765.[201]

A retrospect and a prospect.

There remains one other point to consider in this connection. Did Mādhava Rao find it impossible, despite the men, money and time he had spent on the campaign, to subdue Haidar immediately he entrenched himself before the walls of Bednūr, after he was compelled to desert his entrenchments at Ānavaṭṭi and retreat on Bednūr? It will be recalled that Haidar had been beaten back successively from Raṭṭihaḷḷi to Ānavaṭṭi and from Ānavaṭṭi to Bednūr, and this apart from the withdrawal of his forces from Dhārwar to the southward until he was joined by Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, his general. The trench warfare at Ānavaṭṭi began early in January 1765 and went on for nearly a full year, indeed, until the treaty of Bednūr was signed. In this situation, if a contemporary account is to be believed,[202] Haidar was frequently attacked by the enemy, whom he, by the strength of his situation, as often repulsed with considerable loss. Mādhava Rao, seeing no prospect of an early termination of the war and the restoration of the

291. Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 523) says that Mādhava Rao left Mysore territory after payment was made to him "about the end of February 1765." But he appears to have been in Mysore up to about 30th March 1765, when we find him writing to Nānā Fadnis about the conclusion of the treaty of Bednūr with Haidar (see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *o.c.*, *Letter* No. 63, dated March 30, 1765). The *Haid. Nām.* is probably correct when it says that the Mahrattas retired to Poona on March 23, 1765 (*Pārthiva*, *Chaitra śu. 2*) (see ff. 31-32).

292. Robson, *o.c.*, 33.

Rāṇi of Bednūr, "proposed to return to his dominions and leave Hydur in quiet possession of Biddenoor country", Haidar agreeing to pay Rs. 40 lakhs to Mādhava Rao and twenty more to his minister.[293] Though the latter portion of the statement is not true, the former would make possible the inference that Mādhava Rao resolved upon deserting the Rāṇi's cause finally at the end of his campaign and that he compromised on a basis which was profitable to himself, and that because, he saw he could not subdue Haidar on the field. Apart from the nature of the trench warfare, which Mādhava Rao succeeded after all in making Haidar to give up,[294] there is little evidence for this

293. This story is told by Robson, l. c.

294. Trench warfare, as we know, from recent European experience, is to-day even less fruitful of quick results. Despite the assembly of masses of men and of materials, there is no progress. There is no evidence of that quick killing of each other, that evidence of the results of violence with which war has been so long associated in the peoples' minds. It does not conjure up the picture of unremitting military action, counter-action, destruction and desolation, which we associate with a general action. Nor does it facilitate the occurrence of those major military events, which not infrequently prove decisive factors. Men may be lost, but relatively to the loss, the territory gained is poor. Before many months elapsed, Mādhava Rao saw the uselessness of trench warfare and took to the gigantic feat of cutting through the forests behind Haidar's trenches. He swept round, in true Napoleonic fashion, the unprotected right flank of Haidar's forces. This supreme effort on his part resolved the deadlock that had been reached and compelled Haidar to protect his rear. This he did, as we have seen, by giving up his entrenchments and beating a retreat. If Mādhava Rao had not done what he did, there is no gainsaying the fact that he would have lost more men, incurred greater loss of ammunition and, what is worse, absorbed greater time in gaining the results on which he was bent. The lessons of modern trench warfare are yet to be learnt, despite the losses of men and material involved in the European conflict of 1914-18. Indeed the fact that fixed defences and intensified fire power have revolutionised war within the past twenty-five years seems hardly yet realized. It was the failure of the flank movement involved in what was called the Schlieffen plan in the war of 1914-18 that made trench warfare a permanent feature of war as conceived to-day in Europe. The Maginot and Siegfried Lines represent the second stage of this kind of warfare, which consists of the settling down of the opposing armies into an unbroken line of trenches, involving the loss of strategic mobility for both sides and

suggestion. Both Mādhava Rao's character and his subsequent campaign which he prosecuted vigorously and which led to the release of the Rāṇi of Bednūr and her son, show that he only postponed to a future date what he could not carry out conveniently in his first campaign, as the time occupied by it had been prolonged beyond expectations and his presence was required elsewhere for undertaking warfare in another region for the very purpose of continuing the war against Haidar in a more vigorous manner, with a view to humble him the more effectively. Whether the restoration of the Rāṇi or her son would as a matter of fact have come after that anticipated success, at his hands, is not difficult to say. Mādhava Rao's next campaign came off in the cold weather of 1767, when, after taking Maddagiri, he liberated the Rāṇi and her son. He ended it, as we shall see, by ceding back to Haidar the occupied territories on payment of Rs. 35 lakhs. On his march back after the receipt of this amount, he took the Rāṇi and her son with him. The Rāṇi died on the way to Poona, while her son died later at the Mahratta capital. Mādhava Rao's next Mysore campaign came off in the cold weather of 1769, which was the swiftest and the biggest one he undertook. But in the middle of this campaign, as will be narrated below, he fell ill and left its completion to one of his generals. The campaign ended by the treaty of Seringapatam between Haidar and Triambak Rao in June 1772. The result of this third campaign was that Haidar was compelled to surrender all the territory that formed Śivāji's conquests in Mysore, including Kōlār,

rendering opportunity of manœuvring almost impossible. It may be that this deadlock can never be broken by military effort alone. Mādhava Rao instinctively saw the impossibility of the situation and adopted the device of turning the right flank of his enemy. The Germans find it difficult to-day to adopt this old solution because of the existence of neutral territory on both sides, which they cannot break through.

Bangalore, Hoskōṭe, Chikbaḷḷāpur, Doḍbaḷḷāpur and Sīra, besides the fortresses of Maddagiri and Gurramkoṇḍa. This meant the reduction of Mysore to a smaller area; in fact, the loss of all its territories beyond the present districts of Mysore and part of Hassan. This retrocession in favour of Mādhava Rao included Bangalore, Kölār, Tumkūr and Shimoga districts, thus comprising the whole of the old Bednūr territory. Mādhava Rao had thus an opportunity to restore Rāṇi Vīrammāji's adopted son or a *scion* of that family to the throne of Bednūr. He was still presumably alive at Poona but before Mādhava Rao could do any thing, he himself died on the 18th November 1772 and with his death all chance of his restoration vanished out of sight. After the death of the adopted son, which followed not long after, there were no claimants left on his behalf and the turn of events that came off in 1773 confirmed Mysore in the possession of all the territories that had been ceded back to Mādhava Rao only two years before, despite the adverse attempts made by the Mahrattas, as will be narrated below.

The Pēshwa's first campaign and after.

Mādhava Rao's first campaign in Mysore, however, impressed Haidar that he had to deal with a new force that had made itself felt on the Mahratta side. He had seen how under that influence the Mahrattas had recovered without difficulty and with all expedition from the rout at Pāṇipat and how they had equally quickly sought to recover their lost position in the Karnāṭak. Whether the relief of Bednūr was a mere pretext or a real objective, they had, under the leadership of the young Pēshwa, pushed forward and driven back Haidar to the south of the Tungabhadra. The campaign of Mādhava Rao had lasted, it is true, for over a year and had cost him men and money but the outstanding fact was that Haidar, though not crushed, had had to pay a heavy indemnity and meet other charges as well, and he knew

equally well he had not seen the end of his troubles on the Mahratta frontier. He knew also he had to reckon with Mādhava Rao. He had resolved on a friendship with Raghunātha Rao, the Pēshwa's uncle, to meet all possible contingencies that might arise, and, as we shall see, he was making up his mind to get into closer touch with the new Nizām, Nizām Alī, who had displaced his brother Salābat Jang and who, if he joined Mādhava Rao, would prove a combination which would mean a danger to Mysore generally and to Haidar personally. And Haidar was uncertain of the English at Madras and he had his own designs against them, especially as he had yet to square his accounts with them in the matter of the Trichinopoly deal. This was the position as he saw it and at the time the treaty of Bednūr was signed by both the parties to it, and the Mahrattas crossed the Tungabhadra satisfied, if not wholly elated, with their partial success.[295] After the Mahrattas retired to their homelands, Haidar turned his attention to those who had conspired with them to bring this invasion on him from across the border. Many permanently fled from the country rather than fall into his hands. Those who had the misfortune to be caught were punished with

295. On the whole subject of this campaign of Mādhava Rao, see *Haid. Nām*, ff. 31-32; *Sel. Pesh. Daft*; *o. c.*, *Letters* Nos 29-32, 34, 36-42, 44-55, 59-63; *Fort St. George Records*, *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XII. 171-175, *News-letters* down to April 3, 1764; XIII. 32-34. Among other authorities on the Mysore-Mahratta tangle (1764-1765), De La Tour has nothing to say on the subject. Robson's account (*o.c.*, 32-34) is very meagre, though, as mentioned above, he maintains that the Mahratta rupture with Haidar was the direct result of, and conditioned by, his conquest of Bednūr. Stewart antedates the event, referring it to 1763, while his account (*o.c.*, 16-17) is very brief, based mostly on later writings, though he maintains the same point of view as Robson. Kīrmāni postdates the event, placing it in 1766 (A. H. 1078? 1180). His account (*o.c.*, 167-177) agrees in general outline with the account of the *Haid. Nām.* It, however, does not set down the sequence of events correctly and omits all mention of the rout at Anavaṭṭi. Wilks' account (*o.c.*, I. 517-523) is in general agreement with the course of affairs described from contemporary sources, though he also omits all mention of material parts of the fight.

"the greatest rigour and barbarity."[296] He then made arrangements for governance of the country during his absence. He does not seem to have disturbed the civil administration already fixed for it, but left Tipū, his son, in command of the place, while he nominated 'Ālā Mean, who had married Haidar's sister, to the command of a strong fort, a few miles off from Bednūr.[297]

Overtures for the cession of Madura and Tinnevelly countries, 1763-1764.

During the time the Mahratta war was in progress, Haidar received a pressing message for help from Muhammad Yusuf Khān, who commanded Madura in the English interests and had rebelled against them and been, in consequence, closely invested by them at Madura.[298] Muhammad Yusuf was, in some respects, a remarkable man. Commonly known as *Khān Sā*—an abbreviation of *Khān Sāheb*, a double title denoting dignity—he

Muhammad Yusuf's adventurous career (down to 1754).

296. Robson, *o.c.*, 33. Though he is the only person who furnishes any information on this head, he is most laconic in his description of what was perpetrated. His words should perhaps be taken as illustrative rather than descriptive of the fate that overtook those who were concerned in the affair. Knowing as we do Haidar's general character and remembering what he did after the insurrection that followed the conquest of Bednūr, we can picture to ourselves what he should have done.

297. The identity of this place has not been possible. But it may be Anantapur (*alias* Ānandāpur), which is about 25 miles to the north-east of Bednūr. It was in olden days a stronghold of Bednūr, with a fort, which, though now in ruins, figured much in the wars of the 18th century. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1271-1274, for further information about its annals.

298. See, for the whole story of Yusuf Khān's adventurous career, S.C. Hill *Yusuf Khan, the Rebel Commandant*, which is both luminous in its treatment of the period and of the man, and well documented from the point of view of the critical historian. The sources relied on by Mr. Hill include the records at *Fort St. George*, Madras; the *Orme Mss.* in the India Office; papers in the Dutch and French Archives; Mss. in the British Museum; the Public Record Office, and the Bibliotheque Nationale. Among other authorities consulted by him should be specially mentioned Le Chevalier Marchand's *Precis Historique* (Paris, 1771), and Comte Louis Laurent de Federke Maudave's *Letter* dated 20th April 1764 and *Relation* (*Archives du Ministere des Colonies*, Paris, unpublished).

was born of good Hindu parents and had turned a Muhammadan in his later life and taken the resounding name and title of Muhammad Yusuf Khān, a name and title that stuck to him ever after.[299] His life-history shows that he was eminently a product of his times. Early in his life, he ran away from his house,[300] took service under Chevalier Jacques Law, the famous French General who figured on Chandā Sāhib's side from 1744 and afterwards became in 1767 Commander-in-Chief of the French East India Company. At the end of some three and a half years of service, he was dismissed by Law, evidently for misconduct. Through Law's aid, however, he learnt English and French, and probably also Portuguese. He then joined the service of the Rāja of Tanjore, with whom, however, he does not appear to have stayed for long. He next sought service under Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of Arcot, and rose under him to the position of Subādār, corresponding to Captain in the then English army at Madras. He is believed to have married a Portuguese woman, of whom little is known.[301] Leaving Muhammad Alī's service, he

299. According to tradition, he was born of Vellāla parents. His Hindu name was, it would appear, Maruthanāyagam Piḷḷai. He is said to have been born at Paniyūr in the present Rāmnāḍ district (see *Yusuf Khan*, 1). His predilection for Vellālas was great. His agent at Madras, during the siege in 1758, was a Vellāla named Moota Piḷḷai, more correctly Moothu Piḷḷai (see *Orme Mss.*, 278, P. 13). His guide when he visited the Mīnākshī temple at Madura and decided to restore its revenues, when he held Madura, was one Muttarughu Piḷḷai, evidently Muttalugu Piḷḷai (see Taylor, *O. H. Mss.*, *Pandion Chronicle*, 41). On the birth of a son to him, he was presented with a golden cradle by Tāṇḍavarāya Piḷḷai, Prime Minister of Rāmnād (see *Mackenzie Mss.*, XVI. 5-13). For Yusuf Khān's early life, see *Yusuf Khan* Ch. I. He was always on good and friendly terms with the Maravas of Rāmnāḍ and they favoured him as against his opponents, see *Ibid*, 1.

300. He is said to have been wild in his youth and disobedient to his parents (*Yusuf Khan*, 1).

301. The Tamil ballad, *The War of the Khān Sāheb*, gives her name as *Maza*, which is probably short for *Mazzaroth*, a distinctly scriptural name (*Ibid*, 5).

joined Chandā Sāhib and in this new rôle, he served under one Muhammad Kamāl, who held Nellore in Chandā Sāhib's interests. With Razā Sāhib, he is known to have taken part in storming the trenches at Arcot, in 1751, when Clive commanded there.[302] He, later, however, deserted with his troops to Clive,[303] and joined the English and served with distinction under Dalton, in 1752, in defeating Mons.d' Auteuil, the French Commander, at Utatūr and Volkoṇḍa.[304] He helped materially Lawrence, the English General, in holding Trichinopoly against Nanjarāja and the French after the breach of the secret treaty by Muhammad Alī, especially by bringing in safely the convoys on which Lawrence so much depended.[305] He proved himself so useful in this work that an attempt was made by the Mysoreans to get rid of him, so that the fall of Trichinopoly may be facilitated.[306] Lawrence was so much impressed by his abilities and zeal for service, that he wrote more than once to the President and Council at Madras commending him to their approbation. "Besides his intelligence and capacity," he reported, "I cannot too much praise his zeal and alacrity for the service. He always prevents my asking by offering himself for everything; and executes what he goes about as well and as briskly as he attempts it. Some mark of your regard by a letter and some little present would keep up that useful spirit besides rewarding merit."[307] In his own *Journal*, however, Lawrence had written of him in even higher terms. "He is," he noted down, "an excellent

302. *Ibid*, 10-11.

303. He seems to have raised troops while yet in the service of Muhammad Kamāl at Nellore. It was evidently for this reason—his service under Kamāl in the Nellore country—that he was known as the *Nellore Subādār* (*Ibid*, 3, f. n. 4). He joined Clive a little before the battle of Kāvēripāk (Orme, *Indostan*, I. 346-347).

304. *Ibid*, 10-11.

305. *Ibid*, 14-18; also Orme, *o. c.*, I. 357.

306. *Ibid*, 15-17, quoting *Orme, Mss.*, 13, pp. 115-181; see Orme, *o.c.*, 348-353.

307. *Ibid*, 19; *Mily. Cons.*, 20th March 1754.

partisan (*i.e.*, an officer of the irregular troops), knows the country well, is brave and resolute but cool and sensible in action--in fact he is a born soldier, and better of his colour I never saw in the country. He never spares himself, but is out on all parties, and by his good intelligence brought in provisions to keep us in a moderate plenty we wanted much to prolong the time till Mahfuz Khan could join us."[308] The President and Council at Madras, in view of this high commendation, appointed Muhammad Yusuf, on 30th April 1754, as Commandant of all the Company's sepoys and presented him with a gold medal "as a distinguishing mark and reward of his bravery and good service."[309] Still higher rewards awaited him.

The history of Madura, 1736-1754.

The history of Madura since the time it passed into the hands of Chandā Sāhib is briefly told. When he got it from Queen Mīnākshi in 1736 under a false oath, he put his elder brother Baḍā Sāhib in possession of it.[310] When Chandā Sāhib was in dire straits at Trichinopoly in 1741, Baḍā Sāhib advanced with a large convoy and escort to his brother's aid and was there defeated and killed.[311] The Mahrattas next

308. *Orme Mss.*, 13, p. 78. Orme, in his *Indostan* (I. 346-347), describes him in identical language. He speaks of him as "an excellent partisan, whose merit had raised him, from a captain of a company, to be Commander-in-Chief of all the sepoys in the English service.....he was a brave and resolute man, but cool and wary in action, and capable of stratagem : he constantly procured intelligence of the enemy's motions, and, having a perfect knowledge of the country, planned the marches of the convoys so well, that by constantly changing the roads, and the times of bringing the provisions out of the woods, not one of them was intercepted for three months." Orme evidently owed his description in part at least to Lawrence.

309. See *Yusuf Khan*, 19-22; *Mily. Cons.*, 13th May 1754; 14th May 1754; 23rd September 1754; 30th September 1754; 27th March 1755. See also Orme, *o.c.*, I. 421; and Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, I. 74.

310. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 39. Orme spells his name as "Buda Saheb." See also *Ante* Ch. IV. pp. 72-73, where this subject is noticed in an attempt to trace the Mysorean relations with the Mughals (1736-1737).

311. *Ibid*, 44.

occupied it,[312] but on the advance of Nizām-ul-mulk, in 1744, they yielded possession of it. But Nizām-ul-mulk's possession of it was more nominal than secure and Anwar-ud-dīn, the Nawāb of the Karnātic, claimed it as the representative of Nizām-ul-mulk in the South, though he too never took effective possession of it. On Anwar-ud-dīn's death and the coming into power of Muhammad Alī, Abdul Rahīm, his brother, was nominated to it. But it does not seem that any attempt was made to occupy either Madura or Tinnevelly until two years later. In 1751, he marched with Lieut. Innis and took possession of Tinnevelly. But while he was away in Tinnevelly, Ālam Khān, a soldier of fortune, who had been formerly in the service of Chandā Sāhib, and afterwards in that of the Rāja of Tanjore, wrested Madura (in 1751) from Abdul Rahīm.[313] After taking possession of the place, he declared himself in favour of Chandā Sāhib and held it in his interests.[314] Captain James Cope, who was in charge of Trichinopoly, was sent by the English at the request of Muhammad Alī, to retake the place.[315] Muhammad Alī, however, repeated his request and put obstacles in the way of Captain Cope proceeding on his mission. Captain Cope at last

312. *Ibid.* Trichinopoly fell into Mahratta hands on the surrender of Chandā Sāhib on 26th March 1741, and the rest of the country was occupied by them shortly thereafter.

313. *Ibid*, 169. Orme says that Ālam Khān "had lately left this prince" (i.e., the king of Tanjore) and gone to Madura, "where his reputation as an excellent officer soon gained him influence and respect, which he employed to corrupt the garrision (at Madura), and succeeded so well, that the troops created him governor, and consented to maintain the city and his authority for Chunda-saheb, whom he acknowledged as his sovereign." It seems fairly inferable from the latter statement that Ālam Khān was in close touch with Chandā Sāhib and that he took possesion of Madura only in his interests. His subsequent conduct—his proceeding to Chandā Sāhib's succour in 1752—fully confirms this inference. The city of Madura, as it existed at about this period, is thus described by Orme:—"Its form is nearly a square 4,000 yards in circumference, fortified with a double wall and a ditch."

314. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid*, 169-171; see also *Pub. Cons.*, 17th Dec. 1750.

started in February 1751, with a force consisting of 150 Europeans and Coffres and 400 sepoys and one gun. He was impeded in his progress by "woods, poligars, rogues, etc.," as Orme facetiously puts it,[316] and by Muhammad Alī himself, who made requests that some minor forts should be subdued, which his own officers could not reduce. At Madura, Cope was joined by Abdul Rahīm, with 2,500 horse, 3,000 peons and soldiers and Topasses under Lieut. John Innis, and one gun. Cope was warned by Innis of treachery on the part of Abdul Rahīm's chief officers, who had sworn to deliver Cope's head into the hands of Ālam Khān. Undaunted, Cope took up a position, some 500 yards from the fort, but so well protected that no gun could reach it and opened a continuous fire against the fort from a twelve-pounder that he brought up and mounted. Soon he effected a breach but, despite his gallant efforts, was driven off with the loss of 90 men. Retreat became a necessity and Cope returned unmolested to Trichinopoly on 10th April 1751.[317] The greater portion of what remained of Abdul Rahīm's troops—500 horse and 1000 peons—went over to Ālam Khān. Ālam Khān continued in possession for a year and then left for Trichinopoly, where he died gallantly fighting.[318] Before his departure, however, he put Madura in charge of one Mayana, described as a relation of his.[319] In June 1752, Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of Arcot, with a view to compensate

316. *Ibid*, II. 268-276.

317. James Wilson's *Narrative*, *Orme Mss.*, 15, p. 4. Cope's retreat became known at Fort St. David 26 days after his arrival at Trichinopoly—see *Pub. Cons.*, 6th May 1751. Orme gives a full account of Cope's attempt—see *Indostan*, I. 169-171.

318. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 209, 216. Orme says his head was taken off by a cannon-ball, as he was encouraging his troops to advance—*Ibid*, 216.

319. Orme states that when Ālam Khān proceeded to Trichinopoly in aid of Chandā Sāhib, he kept the countries of Madura and Tinnevelly under the management of three Paṭhān officers, "named Mahomed Barky, Mahomed Mainach, and Nabi Cawn Catteck; the first of these was generally known by the appellation of Mianah, the second

the claims of Nanjarāja on Trichinopoly, "meant to give up the fort of Madura with its dependencies," which included, to use the words of Orme, "a very large district."[320] But, as may be expected, this was but a patent fraud, for the place was not in his possession.[321] Ālam Khān's deputy was in actual

of Moodemiah; but Nabi Cawn Catteck by his own proper name" (Orme, *o.c.*, 399). From this, it would seem not incorrect to identify "Mahomed Barky" *alias* "Mianah" with the "Māyana" of later writers. Barky was the son-in law of Nabi Khān. All these three were the signatories to a paper which Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of Arcot, subsequently produced as evidence of title to the sovereignty of the Madura and Tinnevelly countries (*Ibid*).

320. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 244.

321. It was, indeed, acknowledged later, in 1755, that Muhammad Alī actually made over Madura to the Mysoreans, his offer being cancelled on the alleged ground of the Mysorean alliance with the French. (*Mily. Cons.*, 25th Aug. 1755). But, as we know from other sources, Ālam Khān's deputy Miana was in charge, and he handed it over to Khoob Khān, the Mysorean officer, a Paṭhān, because they had both been friends of the French, the allies at one time of Mysore as also of Chandā Sāhib, his master's master. This explains the position as set down in the text above. It is possible—though there is no *direct* evidence on the point—that Nanjarāja bought up Miana and induced him to hand over Madura to Khoob Khān. The subsequent allegation of Muhammad Alī that Miana and his associates had acknowledged his sovereignty over the countries held by them or that they had "professed themselves his servants and subjects" is doubted by Orme, the historian of the time. "The writing" Muhammad Alī produced in support of the statement made by him was hardly believed by Orme and the President and Council of Madras. As Orme says, "at this time, Chundasaheb indeed had perished; but the Nabob (Muhammad Alī) himself was involved in such difficulties by the resentment of the Mysoreans, that there does not appear any reason why the Pitans (i.e., the Paṭhāns Miāna and his two associates) should give such a declaration, unless they did it from a conviction of the very little advantage which the Nabob could derive from it. It is certain they never afterwards heeded these professions of obedience, but continued to act without controul, and acted only for themselves; granting immunities, remitting tributes, and even selling forts and districts for presents of ready money. This venality coinciding with the spirit of independence and encroachment common to all the Polygars, procured them not only wealth but attachments. In this mode of licentious government, they continued agreeing among themselves in the division of the spoil, and ruling with much power" (Orme, *o.c.*, I. 399). It is this "venality" that suggests the inference that they were capable of being bought up by Nanjarāja. But, as Orme adds that they were "ruling with much power" until the expedition

occupation of it and he passed it into the hands of Khoob Khān, a Jamādār in the service,[322] who had joined the Mysore army under Nanjarāja. He had been, before then, deputed by Nanjarāja to serve with Haidar Alī and his brother Śābās in putting down certain Pāḷegār chiefs—those of Rāyakōṭa, Hosūr and Bāgalūr—in the Bārāmahal area in 1751. When Muhammad Alī, in 1752, pretended to hand over Trichinopoly fort to Nanjarāja,[323] Jamādār Khoob Khān Saiyid Budduṇi Dekhani and Umar Singh were despatched with Katti Gōpālarāj Urs and Venkaṭa Rao Beraki (Barakki) and an army consisting of 2,000 foot and 700 horse, to enter and take charge of it.[324] They were deceived into entering it and confined there.[325] They were later released.[326] Khoob Khān's administration was evidently of a misguided character and it could not last.[327] Whether this was so or not, there is no

of Col. Heron, when Miana, who commanded the city of Madura, abandoned it and took refuge with the neighbouring Pāḷegārs of Nattam while his two associates did the same with another neighbouring Pāḷegār and returned to their respective charges immediately Heron left Madura (*Ibid*, 399-400), it is clear that Khoob Khān Sāhib's possession could not have lasted long.

322. He is mentioned by Kīrmāṇi by *name* at least *twice* and by *implication* thrice in his work. (See Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 32, 38 and 39). At p. 32 of his work, he gives Khoob Khān's full name and titles thus: "Khoob Sāhib Dukkuni Jamadār" i.e., Jamādār Khoob Sāhib, who belonged to Dekhan.

323. See Orme, *o.c.*, I. 243, 246 and 271.

324. Kīrmāni., *o.c.*, 38.

325. *Ibid*, 39.

326. *Ibid*, 50.

327. One authority, the *Pandion Chronicle* (included in Rev. Taylor's *O. H. Mss.*, 41) says that Khoob Khān defiled the town by killing and eating cows and by cutting down cocoanut trees. *Khoob Khān* has been identified wrongly with *Cope* (Nelson, *Madura Country*, III. 270-271). As pointed out by Hill, Capt. Cope was an English officer who was never in the Mysore service. He was mortally wounded at Kistnavaram and died on 4th February 1752 (*Mily. Cons.*, 10th Feb. 1752). Col. Heron speaks of a "Khoob Sāheb" as a Mysore officer, creating trouble with some horse and sepoys in Madura. This "Khoob Saheb" may be justly identified with "Khoob Sāhib Dukkuni Jamadār" of Kīrmāṇi. As stated above, Khoob Sāhib is mentioned by Kīrmāṇi as a Paṭhān in the Mysore service. He is, besides, referred to by Nawāb Muhammad Alī as "Coob Saib" (i.e., Khoob Sāhib) Jamādār belonging to the "Mysorian" (see *Count. Corres.*, 1754, No. 22).

question that the Hindu chiefs—the Toṇḍamān and the Maravan and other Pāḷegārs—urged on Muhammad Alī the restoration of the Hindu dynasty in Madura, but he, as might be expected, turned a deaf ear to them.[328] The Maravan Pāḷegārs took advantage of the situation, took the lead, and re-established, for a while at least, the old Hindu reigning family[329] When Khoob Khān was turned out, Miāna and his associates re-appeared on the scene and re-occupied Madura.[330]. They do not appear

328. There is some doubt whether Khoob Khān could have acted so foolishly as he is represented to have done in the *Pandion Chronicle*, especially as one acting on Nanjarāja's part. It is possible, his mistakes or his attempts at assertion of authority turned the local people against him, who took occasion to restore the native dynasty of rulers.

329. The *Fort St. George Records* for 1754 state that repeated representations were made to the English at Madras and to Muhammad Alī to restore the ancient dynasty to power by the Toṇḍaimān and the Pāḷegār chiefs of the Marava country, but they both either refused to entertain the appeals or act by themselves for obvious reasons. The English were anxious to get the revenue collections to themselves so that the money advanced to Muhammad Alī may be paid off, while Muhammad Alī wanted to secure the country to himself as against every other claimant or demandant. That was the reason why his brother Mahfuz Khān schemed against him, and that was also the reason why Chandā Sāhib and his representatives had their eyes on the Madura and Tinnevelly countries. That gave an opportunity to Nanjarāja, the Mysore Daḷavāi, and his agents to get hold of it in their scheme of southern conquest. Their previous connection with these countries helped them to execute their designs on them from time to time.

330. We do not hear of Khoob Khān any further even in Kīrmāṇi's work Orme seems right when he suggests that the three Paṭhān officers occupied Madura and Tinnevelly as the representatives of Ālam Khān (*Indostan*, I. 399) and not on behalf of Muhammad Alī. Orme's account, however, does not either refer to Khoob Khān's temporary occupation and to his being turned out, or to the restoration of the Hindu dynasty for a while. That seems to be the reason why the occupation of Miana and his two associates appears in his pages as a continuous one. It was apparently far otherwise; first, they occupied the country after Ālam Khān's death; then evidently handed over possession of it to Khoob Sāhib; and again reasserted their authority after the old Hindu dynasty and its protagonists had turned out Khoob Sāhib. The period is undoubtedly a confused one, so much so that indeed Hill, in his *Yusuf Khan* (p. 30), is forced to remark that "it is difficult to obtain any exact information as to what happend in Madura for the next two or three years," i.e., from 1752 to 1755. The account in the text above is based on

to have paid any rent to Muhammad Alī, though the latter produced a document alleged to have been executed by them, on 29th November 1752, that they held the Madura and Tinnevelly countries under him. Nothing more conclusive would seem to be necessary that the alleged document was a forged one and that they had, as Orme says, "acted for themselves," and not, as suggested by Muhammad Alī, in "obedience" to him. But Muhammad Alī persuaded the Madras Council into action evidently by suggesting that the conquest of Madura and Tinnevelly countries would help to reimburse their empty coffers. The English too found, at about the time peace was concluded between them and the French in 1754-1755, that they should first endeavour to get back from Muhammad Alī the expenditure they had incurred in the war they had waged in his behalf. The English being his chief, if not the sole, creditors, were thus called upon to help him to secure possession of the territories that he claimed as his own, including among them the Madura and Tinnevelly countries. Muhammad Alī accordingly requested, on 25th November 1754, that an expedition might be undertaken for the purpose against Miana and his associates.[331] His legal right to these territories was based on a *farman* alleged to have been received from Delhi on 24th March 1751,[332] appointing him

a consideration of all the different authorities. Hill's account (*o.c.*, 30-31) omits to note the occupation of the country by Miana and his associates for a second time. Hill follows Orme and dates their occupation as having come about 29th November 1752, the date of the alleged written document in favor of Muhammad Alī, referred to above (see Orme, l.c. For the text of the document, see *Count. Corres.*, 1755, No. 32).

331. *Madras Fort St. George Records*: *Count. Corres.*, 1754, No. 422.

332. The alleged *farman* bore the date 29th January 1750. It will be found in *Count. Corres.*, 1751, where it is appended to document No. 28. The Madras Council were quick enough to note a peculiarity about the *farmans* produced by Muhammad Alī. "It has been more than once observed," they remarked in one of their consultations, "during the course of this war (the Karnātic War), that whenever anything

Nawāb of Arcot, and ruler over the dependent territories of Madura and Tinnevelly, while the document alleged to have been executed in his favour by Miana and his associates was held to be a fair answer to the French complaint that the English were helping him in attacking their allies. Thus induced, the Madras Council determined on subduing the Madura and Tinnevelly countries in the interests of Muhammad Alī.

1754-1755.

The President and Council at Madras, accordingly, chose Lieut.-Col. Alexander Heron for this duty. He had arrived in India in September 1754 as Major of the Madras garrison and Third in Council, and he joined the forces at Trichinopoly, which were then cantoned at Uraiyūr. Here he was joined by Yusuf Khān, who was then in high favour at Madras as his adviser[333]. He left Uraiyūr about the beginning of February 1755 with 500 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys, the latter commanded by Yusuf Khān, besides 1,000 horse led by Mahfuz Khān, the elder brother of Nawāb Muhammad Alī,[334] who also accompanied

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material has been on the carpet, the Nawab (Muhammad Alī) has always received, or pretended to receive, such letters from Court (the Court at Delhi) as might divert us from our plan if disagreeable to him, or encourage us to pursue it if suited his purpose" (see *Mily. Cons.*, 29th April 1754).

333. Hill, *Yusuf Khan*, 21 and 32. Heron could not hit it off with Yusuf Khān and began soon enough to prefer complaints against him. See his letter to Orme, dated 10th January 1755 (*Orme Mss.*, 48, p. 34). Knowing the character of Heron, we have, as Hill suggests, to treat his observations *cum grano salis*.

334. Mahfuz Khān was the elder brother of Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb, but, being alleged to be the son of a woman of low origin, is said to have been passed over for the Nawābship of the Karnātic (Hill, *o.c.*, 26, f.n. 3). Hill, however, quotes no authority for his statement. Orme merely mentions the fact that Mahfuz was the "eldest son" of Anwar-ud-dīn (*Indostan*, I. 73). De La Tour, on the contrary, makes Muhammad Alī (and not Mahfuz Khān) the low born son of Anwar-ud-dīn. After stating that Anwar-ud-dīn had several sons, he remarks that "Maffous Khan, his eldest son, was designed for his successor; but his predilection was in favour of a son whom the law excluded from the succession, as being born out of the house, and by a Bayadere, or woman reputed common. He gave

the expedition during a part of its progress[335]. After reducing the Pāḷegār of Kumāravāḍi, two miles off the road to Diṇḍigal, he arrived at Madura on 5th March 1755. Miana fled in terror and Madura thus fell to Heron without a blow. He next marched on to Tinnevelly, where Moodemiah and Nabi Khān, Miana's associates, were in power[336]. These joined Pulidēvar, chief of the western Pāḷegārs of Tinnevelly, whose chief town was Nelkattam-sevval. Here he received overtures for peace from the Maravan chiefs, and Heron, without reference to the Nawāb or the Madras Council, concluded a treaty with them.[337]. Next he pushed on to Tinnevelly, which he reached on the 25th March 1755. Here the Pāḷegārs would not yield. Heron took Nellicotah, identified with Natta Kottai,[338] but failed to reduce Nelkattam-sevval. Meanwhile, details of his irregular conduct—both as to the atrocities committed by him and his troops and the corrupt practices indulged in by him —reached Madras, and the Madras Council determined to recall him[339]. The successes of Bussy in the Deccan also induced them towards this move, though the real

Trichinopoly, a strong place on the Caveri, with a considerable territory, to this son, who was named Mehemet Ali Khan" (De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 14-15).

335. He left shortly after the submission of the Pāḷegār of Kumāravāḍi, see Hill, *o.c.*, 35.

336. Hill, l.c.

337. In justice to Heron, it must be stated that he was misled into making this treaty by Nawāb Muhammad Ali. Col. Heron, in explaining his conduct in this regard, produced a letter from the Nawāb, authorizing him to forgive the Maravans on their complete submission and payment of the alleged tribute due. But the letter was so dubiously worded that it left ample scope for the Nawāb to repudiate his permission if every condition laid down was not fulfilled to the letter! (see *Mily. Cons.*, 27th May 1755). This sort of trickery was in keeping with Muhammad Ali's character. See Col. Donald Campbell's *Letter* 26th May 1767 (*Orme Mss.*, 308, p. 27).

338. Caldwell, *Tinnevelly*, 95.

339. Among the charges were that he received Rs. 20,000 from Mahfuz Khān while further sums were given to the other English officers and their *Dubashes* (agents). See *Mily. Cons.*, 17th Sept. 1755.

reason was that in illegally enriching himself, Heron had failed to make the expedition pay its own expenses. Among the chief charges against him were that he had paid more attention to the amount of the presents brought to him than to the collection of the amounts due; his taking a present from Mahfuz Khān, the Faujdār of Madura and Tinnevelly, and making him renter as well of these countries without the requisite sanction[340]. Apart from the question whether he made a good or a bad bargain from the financial point of view, in thus leasing the countries to Mahfuz Khān,[341] there is hardly any doubt that the Madras Council and the Nawāb were extremely indignant at Heron's action. He started back from Madura on the 2nd May 1755. On his way, he was severely attacked at the Nattam Pass by the Kallars and narrowly escaping a serious disaster[342],

340. Heron had no authority vested in him to appoint any one as the renter; he had to collect the alleged tributes due with another civil officer and a representative of the Nawāb.

341. Hill, after going into the question, arrives at the conclusion that it does not appear that "Heron made such a very bad bargain with Mahfuz Khan", when he allowed him to become renter on payment of an annual sum of Rs. 15 lakhs; moreover, it has to be noted that the lease was to be for three months only (see Hill, *o.c.*, 33-39). All the same, he had no authority whatever to rent and much less to take a present from Mahfuz Khān for the favor he was showing.

342. Heron makes light of the disaster in his official report, in which he declares that "the principal loss of the baggage was private property" and that the Company lost their old tents which were almost unserviceable, a few barrels of damaged ammunition and a few firelocks that had been delivered into the Quarter-Master's stores to be mended. These few men would not have suffered had they not been sick and unarmed and straggled out of the road. "We met with no other difficulty on our route" (Heron to Madras Council, 7th June 1755, *Mily. Cons.*, 19th June 1755). Capt. Joseph Smith, in his account of the expedition, gives a very different version of the affair (*Orme Mss.*, India, III. 608-612. It accompanies a letter dated 4th July 1763). Smith ends his account with these words: "The behaviour of our commanding officer and captains on that day deserved every punishment you can name. However they are at rest—We will let them remain so." Except Smith, all of the officers were dead at the time the letter was written (see Hill, *o.c.*, 40-43, for the text of the letter). Wilson, in his *History of the Madras Army*, I. 75, accepts Capt. Joseph Smith's version.

was tried by Court-Martial on various charges and dismissed the Company's service[343]. It does not appear he had a fair trial, but however that may be, he broke his arrest, and escaping to the Dutch at Sadras and thence to Pondicherry, got safely to Europe[344].

Muhammad Yusuf's subsequent career (down to 1764).

Dissatisfied with his brother's administration, Muhammad Alī, in 1756, urged on the English at Madras to take decisive steps to subjugate the region[345]. Not being able to spare any European troops for the purpose[346], they sent, in 1756, Muhammad Yusuf, the commandant of all their sepoys, with 1,400 men, with orders to combine them with the troops of Mahfuz Khān and Muhammad Alī and take command of the whole force, and with its aid to restore order. Muhammad Yusuf soon found that Mahfuz Khān was there for his own purposes and not to do anything to the bidding of either Muhammad Alī or the English. With his connivance, the Madras sepoys stationed at Madura were disarmed; Madura fort was occupied; and the surrounding Pāḷegārs openly began to assist Mahfuz in re-establishing himself in the place. Mahfuz had the greater reason to do all this in his own behalf, as the country had been re-assigned at the instance of his brother Muhammad Alī to another renter who had been granted plenary civil and criminal jurisdiction within the country on condition that he would maintain not less than 1,000 sepoys belonging to the English Company. Hearing of what had happened, Muhammad Yusuf marched at once on Madura, and encamped 4 miles off to its

343. The articles of the charges against him of which he was convicted were: (1) perverting the intention of his commission, and (2) breach of orders (see Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II. 476).

344. Wilson adds that he absconded to Pondicherry before the publication of the sentence (*o.c.*, I. 70, f. n. 1).

345. Hill, *o.c.*, 50-51; Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 182-195; also Appendix B to that work.

346. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 421.

southward with 1,500 sepoys and six field-pieces. Finding he could not storm the place, he sent word to Captain Calliaud at Trichinopoly. Calliaud marched towards Madura and opened negotiations with Mahfuz but he soon saw that the matter was beyond a peaceful settlement. In May 1757, he made a gallant attempt to carry Madura fortress by a night surprise, but was repulsed with loss[347]. In July following, he made another attempt but was again unsuccessful[348]. Eventually the place was given up to Calliaud on his paying a large sum to Mahfuz and his party. This, however, did not mean peace to the country or peaceful occupation to Muhammad Alī's party. Disturbances continued on all sides. The Kaḷḷars ravaged the country in every direction. Haidar, evidently in touch with Mahfuz[349], and keen on making the most of his position at Diṇḍigal, invaded, in

347. *Ibid*, I. 421-422; II. 210-212.
348. *Ibid*, II. 221-225.
349. Orme notes the fact that proposals had been made, according to Capt. Calliaud, in May 1757, to Haidar at Diṇḍigal "for aid against the English and their adherents, the Pulituvar (one of the Pāḷegārs) offering to pay 500,000 rupees, and the Jemautdars of Maphuze Khan to give up the districts of Sholavanden (Solavandan) in which are comprised a strong pass, and the only road, between Madura and Dindigal" (Orme, *o.c.*, II. 209). This statement would seem to show that Haidar, acting as the agent of Nanjarāja at Diṇḍigal, had come to an understanding with the Pāḷegārs of the Madura and Tinnevelly countries, under which he was to get possession of Madura, Solavanden being, as it were, the key to it. Orme, however, adds that "nevertheless it was not intended that the (Madura) country when conquered should be given either to the Mysorean (*i.e.*, Nanjarāja) or Maphuze Khan; it was to be restored to a descendant of the ancient kings who lived in concealment in the country of the greater Moravar (Maravar); and Maphuze Khan was to have a suitable establishment in Mysore" (*Ibid*, 209). The arrangement would seem to have been that Madura was to be restored to the descendant of the old Naik family under the hegemony of Mysore and Mahfuz Khān was to be provided for in Mysore. The fact that the latter part of the arrangement was later carried out by Haidar and Mahfuz Khān settled down in Mysore and accompanied Haidar in his Malabar expedition shows that Calliaud's information was well founded. This news, according to Orme, increased "the necessity of attacking Madura as soon as possible" and induced Capt. Calliaud and Muhammad Yusuf to leave Tinnevelly and move towards Madura (*Ibid*)

November 1757, the country round Madura and could only be beat off with difficulty[350]. He actually took Solavandan which offered no resistance and entered the district of Madura without opposition. He continued several days under the walls of the city, but, finding it much stronger than he expected, contented himself with plundering the country, sending off the cattle and other booty to Diṇḍigal. On the approach of Muhammad Yusuf, he took post with a part of his army near the issue of the Pass of Nattam, in order to intercept his march. Muhammad Yusuf, however, attacked him, and, with the advantage of superior discipline, and the execution of his filed-pieces, obliged the Mysore troops to decamp the ensuing night, Haidar himself returning with his detachments to Diṇḍigal.[351] Haidar, however, did not rest content here. He sent word to the French at Śrīrangam, who sent a detachment of Europeans and sepoys with artillery to Haidar, who, on their arrival, was, it is said, preparing to return against Madura[352]. The news, though premature, was believed, and Muhammad Yusuf determined to be there before Haidar and the French detachment.[353] Coming back from Tinnevelly, he retook Solavandan and awaited Haidar's advance[354]. But Haidar, thus anticipated, abandoned his intentions and awaited developments.[355] No revenue worth the name could be collected, just the very thing that both the English and Muhammad Alī most desired to secure.[356] The English tried to get Muhammad Alī to recall Mahfuz Khān, his brother, but failed in their attempts to achieve this object.[357] Worst of all, their needs elsewhere soon compelled them to withdraw Muhammad Yusuf from Madura.[358] His departure meant

350. Orme, *o.c.*, II. 250.
351-355. *Ibid*, 252.
356. *Ibid*, 250-251.
357. *Ibid*, 252.
358. *Ibid*, 252-253. Towards the close of 1758, he was recalled on the fall of Fort St. David (*Ibid*, 560), and did excellent service under Capt. Preston in cutting off the French convoys when on their way to Lally's camp at Madras (*Ibid*, 383; Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 183).

undisputed power for Mahfuz Khān in the whole of the country. In this state of affairs, the English sent back Muhammad Yusuf, this time as the renter of Madura and Tinnevelly countries. He arrived at Madura in the spring of 1759 and soon established himself as the chief authority in it.[359] But though the English favoured him and even perhaps regarded him as a person suitable for their purposes at Madura, Muhammad Alī made no secret of his dislike for him.[360] Muhammad Yusuf also, by his violent methods and his audacious acts—he made over the key of Travancore without the knowledge of his employers—alienated to some extent the support of the English even. However this may have been, in this state of affairs, his offer to lease the country he had so far helped to subdue, for a further period of four years, was refused by the English.

His rebellion, 1763.

Enraged at this refusal, and finding himself in a position of undoubted strength, Yusuf determined to throw off his allegiance and began to collect troops[361]. The time he chose was opportune. The English had suffered in their reputation in their attempt to take Vellore from Murtaza Alī in 1762. Murtaza Alī's defence, unaided by a single European, covered, as Col. Monson wrote, the English with derision and the Nawāb (Muhammad Alī) with debts. It is true Murtaza Alī was forced to surrender, after a siege of 2 months and 21 days, and was carried away prisoner to Arcot. But some of his dependents betook themselves to Yusuf Khān at Madura. A good part of the English forces had also been despatched, in August 1762, to attempt the conquest of Manilla, Capital of Philippine Islands. Travancore had been befriended by Yusuf Khān by the cession of the Kalakkadu district.

359. *Ibid*, 467-468.

360. *Ibid*, 468, 495-496, 560. Muhammad Yusuf arrived at Madras on 4th May 1759 (Orme, *o. c.*, II. 560; Wilson, *o. c.*, I. 184).

361. Wilson, *o. c.*, I. 185.

The French partisans—Marchaud and others—from Tanjore had joined him. The other European settlers, the Danes and the Dutch, were no doubt at peace with the English but they had, with the sanction of the English, opened a business connection for the sale of military weapons and stores, which Yusuf Khān knew he could buy in secret so long as he was able to pay the price that might be demanded. He had plenty of money with him and he knew he could spend it to better purpose on fighting Muhammad Alī than on seeking to appease him by paying it to him. Thus strengthened from every side, Yusuf Khān was ready to offer the stoutest resistance he was capable of. In 1763, accordingly, a strong force was sent against him by the English to Madras and he was in September of that year besieged in Madura.[362]

His appeal to Haidar for help.

Most of his friends deserted him but he held out until October 1764 with great energy and skill, renovating and strengthening the fort at great cost and repelling the chief assault with a loss of 120 Europeans (including nine officers) killed and wounded. Nor did he, in his hour of trial, forget one other source of possible help at such a critical period of his position. Realizing the growing power and influence of Haidar, he opened up negotiations with a view to securing the help of one who could turn the scale in his favor.[363] Muhammad Yusuf, accordingly, about the middle of 1763,[364] commissioned Alī-zamān Khān, his agent at Mysore, to propose to Haidar that if he helped him to raise the siege of

362. *Ibid*, 186-187.

363. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 33-34.

364. The *Haid. Nām.* refers the incident to 1763-64: *Svabhānu-Tāraṇa*. This work refers to Muhammad Yusuf as *Sardār Yisā Muhammad Kumandār*. It states that the siege had been on for thirty-seven months. This period must be taken to refer from October 1761 to October 1764, when Muhammad Yusuf was caught and hanged (15th October 1764).

Madura, he would cede to him the fort of Madura and also take service under him. Alī-zamān Khān was the brother-in-law of Badr-u-zamān Khān, one of Haidar's chief officers.[365] The fact that Muhammad Yusuf had twice foiled the attempts of Haidar against Madura, did not deter Muhammad Yusuf from pressing for this aid at a time of trouble. Muhammad Yusuf knew how cordially Muhammad Alī was hated by Haidar, the more so because he had so disgracefully broken his promise to cede Trichinopoly to Mysore. He also knew that the English had earned Haidar's ill-will because they had supported Muhammad Alī and his cause against the just claims of Mysore. Haidar, however, was too deeply involved at the time with the Mahrattas and could not readily respond to the call. Nor could he have been easily induced to detach the necessary forces for relieving Muhammad Yusuf. There is reason for the belief that he had not only "objects of great necessity and importance on hand," but also he "did not consider it convenient or safe at that period to detach any part of his army."[366] He accordingly prolonged the negotiations for some time on different

365. See Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 161. Kīrmāṇi states Alī-zamān Khān was a Navāyet and had been married to a sister-in-law of Badr-u-zamān Khān. Kīrmāṇi adds that Alī-zamān Khān "arrived at the presence" and made proposals on behalf of Muhammad Yusuf. Likewise, the *Haid. Nām.* states that Muhammad Yusuf sent word to Haidar through Alī-zamān Khān. From these statements, it would seem that Alī-zamān Khān, though agent for Mysore affairs for Muhammad Yusuf, was permanently stationed at Seringapatam. He had been evidently sent out on the mission and had gone over to Haidar on the mission with which he had been commissioned. Evidently Muhammad Yusuf had sent another emissary to Haidar, if we are to believe Muhammad Alī, Nawāb of Arcot. In a letter to the Madras Council, dated 12th February 1763 (see *Count. Corres.*, 1763), Muhammad Alī, writing of the machinations of Yusuf, states that he had "entered into a union with Haidar Naik and sent one Ghulam Hussain to him." This was evidently another emissary sent on a special mission to Haidar—quite other than the representative Alī-zamān Khān.

366. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 161.

pretexts, in fact until Yusuf's fall became almost a certainty.[367] The fight at Madura thickened while the negotiations were being carried on. Though at first little progress was made against Muhammad Yusuf, except that the fort was more rigorously blockaded, eventually he was treacherously seized by Marchaud, the officer in charge of the French contingent, and handed over to Major Charles Campbell, who then commanded the English among the besiegers.[368] He was hanged on

367. *Ibid*, 162.

368. Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 188-196. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) states that Sēshagiri Rao, Dewān of Muhammad Yusuf, proved treacherous and had Bakshi Bāvā Sāhib arrested and kept in confinement. Kīrmāṇi states that Muhammad Yusuf was "taken through the treachery of Seonas (Śrīnivāsa) Rao, a Brahman of Tanjore and other Jamadars" (*o.c.* 162). In Mons. Marchaud's *Precis Historique* (p. 41), we are told that "two Moor Chiefs, Srinivasa Rao and Baba Sahib, were leading authors of the conspiracy" against Yusuf. We are told that the latter had private causes of complaint against Khān Sāhib (*i.e.*, Muhammad Yusuf), by whom he had often been ill-treated and burned to revenge himself. To these motives of hatred were joined (those produced by) the reflections of every one upon the existing state of affairs and upon the course which ought to be followed. They felt that it would be very dangerous for them to be captured, arms in hand, defending this rebel, whilst to deliver Khān Sāhib to the Nawāb (*i.e.*, Muhammad Ali) would be a mode of making their peace, and they resolved to sacrifice him to their safety and vengeance. The Sēshagiri Rao and Bāvā Sāhib of the *Haid. Nām.* should perhaps be identified with the Śrīnivāsa Rao and Bābā Sāhib of Marchaud—see Hill, *o.c.*, 219; App. III (*b*), 263; Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 162. It is, however, difficult to reconcile the statements contained in the *Haid. Nām.* with those made in Marchaud's *Precis*. The *Haid. Nām.* would make us believe that two officials of Muhammad Yusuf, Sēshagiri Rao and Bāvā Sāhib, were opposed to each other in their attitude towards their master. While Sēshagiri Rao, his chief civil official, was against him, his military adviser (*Bakshi*) was in his favor. That was evidently the reason why Sēshagiri Rao had Bāvā Sāhib arrested, so that he may not be in a position to turn the army against Sēshagiri Rao and in favor of Muhammad Yusuf. According to the *Precis*, however, both the chief officials of Muhammad Yusuf proved inimical to him and joined in handing him over to Muhammad Ali.—Whichever version is true, there is no question that the French officer Marchaud took a leading part in the treacherous act of betraying Yusuf and allowing Muhammad Ali to wreak his vengeance on him. All the records available show, as Hill remarks, that Marchaud was one of the leaders, if not the chief of the conspiracy, though he says in his *Precis* that the Khān was made prisoner by the Indian officers and that he was made prisoner himself and ran great risk of losing his life in his effort to defend Yusuf. His letter to

the 15th of October 1764 in the most ignominous manner, near the camp, about two miles to the west of Madura, and his body was buried at the spot.[369] Haidar thus lost a chance to secure control over the Madura and Tinnevelly countries and with it also the chance to wrest back Trichinopoly as well.

Haidar's dilatory attitude towards him.

What, indeed, induced Haidar to adopt this dilatory attitude is not clear. Mons. Marchaud in his *Precis* suggests that Haidar either did not trust the offer to make

Col. Campbell, published by Hill, and copies of his letters in the Madras Record Office, however, tell a different tale. These prove definitely that he was the man who conceived the idea of betraying Yusuf, and the two Indian officers, being corrupted by him, helped him in his nefarious act. It is undoubted bribes were offered to him, but whether he betrayed Yusuf for obtaining money, as the Dutch account would suggest, or whether he was impelled to this act to save his own men, who, as deserters, ran the risk of death, if captured by the English, is open to question. Hill suggests the latter as the motive which prompted the betrayal but there is no evidence to support this view (Hill, *o c.*, 237), especially as we know independently from contemporary records that attempts were systematically made to bribe him. Yusuf always suspected him and watched him closely, though Marchaud managed to communicate with the besiegers (*Ibid*). Released in 1765, he is said to have died in 1773 at Rucil near Paris (*Ibid*, 237-238). That Yusuf was in correspondence with Haidar and the kings of Travancore and Tanjore was abundantly proved from the papers found in Madura by the captors. An attempt was made by Muhammad Alī to take action against these, but the English at Madras held that Haidar and the king of Travancore had committed no overt act hostile to the English Company and that Muhammad Alī's treatment of the king of Tanjore was so bad as to completely explain the king's hostility (*Mily. Cons.*, 27th Oct. 1764). To complete the story of what became of Yusuf's Indian betrayers, it may be stated that Muhammad Alī, after instantly hanging Yusuf, put out the eyes of Śrīnivāsa Rao (*Tamil Ballad*), while his Muhammadan confederate was rewarded by the gift of a village (Hill, *o.c.*, 219, f. n. 4).

369. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 34; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 162; Wilson, I. 195, and App. E, 386, where a translation of a passage from the *Life of Wallajah* is set down, giving an account of Muhammad Yusuf and how he died only after the removal of a magic ball deposited in his thigh (Hill, *o.c.*, chs. VI to XV, 47-226). J. H. Nelson says that the magical ball of gold was imbeded in the "flesh of his right arm" and that this rendered him safe from bodily harm. (See *Madura Country*, Part III, 281). Kirmāṇi says he was impaled (*o. c.*, 162), but there is no authority for this statement. His body was, however, dismembered, according to the custom of the age.

common cause against the English or because he foresaw his speedy fall and "refused to take part in his quarrel or join him."[370] Probably the latter cause proved the deciding factor. Haidar was not the person to risk his fortunes on a man doomed. It is possible he had evidence before him—probably from Alī-zamān himself—that Yusuf was bound to fail and that it would be wise for him not to antagonise the English at an inconvenient opportunity. Kīrmāṇi suggests as a fact that Haidar wantonly "prolonged" the negotiations on different pretexts and that he did not consider it convenient or safe at that period to detach any part of his army. Apart from the Mahratta war then in progress, the determining cause should have been the utter hopelessness of Yusuf's situation at the hour he asked for aid. Haidar would not have missed, if he had thought well of it, an opportunity like the one that had offered itself to get hold of both Trichinopoly and the Madura and Tinnevelly countries. The fact that he had encouraged the establishment at the Mysore court of an agency on behalf of Muhammad Yusuf shows that he—as a neighbour with an effective army and ample military stores at Diṇḍigal—could have had no fear of Yusuf, either as a military adventurer or as a crafty politician. On the other hand, he should have thought it but right to keep a watchful eye on him and if possible use him to Mysore's advantage when an opportunity offered itself. As it turned out, Yusuf's rebellion came at an inconvenient opportunity for Haidar and he could hardly have jeopardised his own position in trying to help another, even with the view-to-make something of it for himself.

A critique of Mr. Hill's position.

Mr. Hill, in discussing Yusuf's connection with Haidar, takes a nearly identical view, though he presents the case in a different way. It was not to the advantage, he

370. Hill, *o.c.*, 262.

suggests, of the latter (*i.e.*, Haidar) to assist Yusuf Khān except so far as to damage the Nawāb (Muhammad Alī), and the English without creating a possible rival to himself. As regards the possibility of Yusuf becoming a "rival" to Haidar, there was no possibility of that, for their situations were different. Even if Yusuf had succeeded in his rebellion against the English and the Nawāb Muhammad Alī, he could not have had any opportunity to long maintain himself in his position at Madura in the face of Haidar himself at Diṇḍigal and the English and Muhummad Alī not farther away at Trichinopoly. And as for spreading himself beyond Madura--north-westwards to Mysore or north-east wards to Madras—that would have been altogether impossible for him, having regard to the obstacles before him. Mr. Hill also suggests that Haidar might have learnt much from Yusuf's ways and methods and generally from his career. Haidar Alī must have watched, says Mr. Hill, Yusuf's career "with keen attention and learned much from it, especially in regard to the adaptation of European methods of warfare to Indian armies. The necessity of European discipline and European instructors, the preparation of his own military supplies, such as muskets, guns, cannon-balls and powder, the supply of his own horses to his cavalry, possibly the advantages of attacks by night, were all matters in which Haidar Ali followed if he did not actually imitate Yusūf Khan." Mr. Hill does not quote any authority, direct or indirect, in support of this suggestion. As stated at length in an earlier chapter of this work,[371] Haidar evolved his new technique in imitation of what the French and the English in their respective areas in South India had done. He adopted their systems of military discipline to his own purposes

371. See *Ante* Ch. XII. pp. 319-337 *et seq*, where the authorities are set forth in detail.

to the extent necessary. He saw to it that the Indian soldier in his service was amenable to discipline of the kind introduced by the French and the English in Southern India. Further, Yusuf rebelled in 1764, by which time Haidar had already evolved his technique independently by himself as the result of his own personal observation in the warfare which he had himself engaged in. In regard to buying of horses, he followed, as we have seen,[372] the time-honoured system that had descended to him. As to preparation of supplies, there was a well-regulated system in vogue in Mysore, which he improved upon. Nor is there any reason to think that what befell Yusuf necessarily provided a lesson to Haidar in the matter of how far European officers should be trusted in higher command. We have shown above,[373] that in this matter Haidar never yielded the command over his whole army into the hands of the European officers he employed. Nor did he, as we have seen, allow them to deal with troops that were not distinctively their own. Neither did he forget to see that the Topasses he entertained[374] and his own regular armies were under his own personal control and that the number of European troops in his service bore some proportion to the strength of his Indian section taken as a whole. Thus, while his army in 1767, for instance, was about 200,000 strong including 25,000 cavalry, the number of Europeans was only 750, with 250 cannoners. While he was just to them, permitted them self-governance in their particular domain, helped them to maintain discipline according to their own views and systems, he never allowed the European officers and their portion of the army to domineer over the Indian sections or to dictate to him. He was strict to a degree and

372. *Ibid*, XII. pp. 277-280.
373. *Ibid*, pp. 357-361.
374. See De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 136, *n.*), who notes the fact that Topasses were regarded as his best troops, "and those he can most rely on."

when any one sought to do mischief, he was, as we have seen in the case of the Irish officer, Turner,[375] not slow to condemn him to the prescribed punishment, including the last penalty, though he allowed him to be tried previously by Court-Martial by his own compeers. In actual warfare, Europeans in his army never knew the place assigned to them. Haidar, for instance, kept them ever in suspence, despite their impatience to know the post any of them would be assigned to in case of an attack. It was a rule with him never to make public his order of battle, and caused the guards of every place to be changed daily, though, according to the news, the enemy was on the point of arriving.[376] One other point to note is that Haidar, friend and a firm friend too of the French, never entirely depended on them. His European section was a composite one, composing of representatives of all European nations. Though the French were larger in numbers, he did not treat them as superior to the rest. Indeed, his distrust of the French—from the other points of view—was so great that he never entered into a regular treaty of alliance with them at any time. Indeed, his policy in this respect was definitely made up early in his career and his son Tipū kept to it rigidly. Mr. Hill himself notes this fact, but fails, it is to be feared, to draw the right inference from it. Haidar was, in fact, carrying through the policy of Nanjarāja, his master, and Nanjarāja's predecessors, of extending the power and dominion of Mysore all through Southern India, and that policy did not admit of partners being taken except as paid colleagues, who did their duty for the salary paid to them. The French, too, fond of territory from early times, never showed themselves eager that Haidar should

375. *Ante* Ch. XII. pp. 345-346.
376. See De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 202.

confide fully in them. Law of Lawriston, for instance, tells us how impossible it was for Haidar to trust them.[377] Haidar's confidence was shaken in them ultimately when they—even Mons. Hughel—refused to proceed to the conquest of fort Rama which would have led to Goa, when his army was ready for the march because it was Portuguese territory. De La Tour notes the fact that "this inconstancy of the French, and other similar events, gave Hyder to understand that he should not well support a war with any European power, and that he could not depend upon the Europeans in his service, excepting when they themselves were at war with his enemies."[378] This conviction was borne in on Haidar fairly early in his relations with them—at least as early as 1763, if not from 1761, when Lally, who had till then not cared for an alliance with any Indian State, first bent low to make advances for an alliance with Haidar for the transfer of Tiaghur (Tyāga-durg) and Elavasinore to him, in return for aid in relieving Pondicherry, then closely besieged by the English.[379] Haidar, accordingly, cannot be held to have been influenced to any extent by the career or conduct of Muhammad Yusuf or by the fate that overtook him owing to his having employed Europeans of the class then seeking service at Indian courts. Muhammad Yusuf shot up as a meteor and fell.

377. See *Et'at de l' Indeen* (1777), 81.

378. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 92-93. French policy in India was entirely dependent on the state of affairs in Europe. This could not have been understood by Haidar or any of the Indian powers, at any rate until they had had some experience of them.

379. It is interesting to note here the following passage from Orme, in which he describes Mons. Lally's attitude to the proposal received from the Portuguese monk Noronha, otherwise called the Bishop of Halicarnassus, who negotiated the treaty between Lally and Haidar:—"Mr. Lally, seeing no other means of procuring relief to the necessities which began to threaten Pondicherry, repressed the contempt with which he had hitherto regarded the military faculties of the princes of India, and sent two of his officers to conclude the treaty with Hyder Ally" (*Indostan* II. 637; see also, *Ante* Ch. XI. 229-231).

His career was all too brief and it was spent in too limited a sphere to influence that of Haidar who was infinitely his superior in talent, endeavour and action.

Haidar's loss and gain from the Yusuf Khān episode.

Though Haidar lost an opportunity to acquire a province for Mysore, he gained, besides a few recruits for the army,[380] a friend for himself, who became a great figure in his immediate entourage for many years to come. This was Alī-zamān Khān. After the death of Muhammad Yusuf, Alī-zamān elected to remain, at Haidar's invitation, in Mysore. Haidar, "pleased with his manners, his mild disposition, and the charms of his conversation, made him," we are told, "his constant companion."[381] Sometimes, however, Haidar was offended with him, or even treated him with caprice. Being a very stout man, the Khān was not able to mount a horse, and therefore, when he went out, Haidar, evidently to secure his pleasant company, gave the loan of his own elephant.[382] Haidar evidently saw

380. Mr. Hill suggests that that it is not at all unlikely that many of Yusuf Khān's old soldiers went to Haidar, while Yusuf's own son was, since 1780, in Mysore (Hill, *o.c.*, 233). The following extract from a letter dated Palamcotta, 1st August 1780, from Capt. James Edington to the Madras Council, is interesting in this connection :—"It is said that Yusuf Khan's son at the head of 10,000 men is ready at Dindigal to enter Madura and Tinnevelly districts, where he expects to meet many friends on his father's account" (*Mily. Cons.*, August 1780). Evidently Haidar held out hopes to Yusuf's son of office of some kind in Madura and Tinnevelly as the result of his invasion of the Karnātic in July 1780. Yusuf's son could not have been older than 18 years at the time referred to, as he is said to have been born about 1762-63 (Hill, *o.c.*, 6). According to the *Tamil Ballad*, both he and his mother Maza escaped first to Travancore. Yusuf's son should have escaped from there to Mysore, from where he should have gone to Diṇḍigal with a force to help Haidar.

381. Kīrmāṇi, *l.c.* In another place, Kīrmāṇi notes that Haidar was fond of sporting his wit, or of joking with his associates and companions, particularly with Alī-zamān Khān, see *o.c.*, 485.

382. *Ibid.* Alī-zamān Khān was one of Haidar's representatives when he made peace with the English in 1769 at the gates of Madras—Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 285. The other was Mehdi Alī Khān, who was also a Navāyet—*Ibid.* See also below. He was present at the fight at Raṭṭihalli and was wounded in it (Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 171). He was taken prisoner with

no objection to stoutness—in moderation—and indeed seems to have quite enjoyed the company of a stout person. But what made him feel attracted to and sometimes feel repelled by the presence of Alī-zamān was something in his character and his make up which made him no persuasive ambassador but a welcome friend and genial company. He was apparently like one of those stout men, so well described to us in an old and famous sonnet[383] as being blessed by opposite qualities. He hoped, yet feared; he resolved, yet doubted; he was cold as ice, yet burnt as fire; he wot not what, yet much desired; and trembling too, was desperately stout. Alī-zamān lost a patron in Muhammad Yusuf, but secured another in Haidar, who, though he lost a province through lack of the quality of persuasion in Alī-zamān, still prized his presence so much as to make him his boon friend and companion.

Conquest of Balam, 1765.

Shortly after the Treaty of Bednūr had been signed and Mādhava Rao crossed the Tungabhadra, Haidar was free for a time to undertake his unexecuted plans. But before he could take up any of these, he had work cut out for him as the result of the last Mahratta invasion. The two woody and mountainous provinces of Balam and

many other officers of Haidar at Chinkurli (*Ibid*, 196). He and others were released by Triambakrao Māma at the end of his campaign (*Ibid*, 229).

383. Sonnet by Stirling (William Alexander, Earl of? 1567-1640)—see *Aurora*, sonnet 68. Stirling was the author of some curious tragedies and an "Elegy on the Death of Prince Henry." He was held in high honour by James VI of Scotland, whom he followed to London. He was for some time Secretary of State for Scotland. He has been ranked as a poet with Drummond of Hawthornden, who was his friend. Drummond was named the "Petrarch of Scotland." He was a born poet. His sonnets and madrigals have some of the grace of Sidney, and he rose at intervals into grave and noble verse as in his sonnet on John the Baptist. He was a devoted Royalist. His first poem was "Tears" on the death of Prince Henry, son of James I. The visit of Ben Johnson to him at Hawthornden is famous in literary history.

Coorg, which lay immediately to the south of Bednūr, had to be secured if he was not to be outwitted by a southern movement in case war broke out in the near or distant future.[384] The province of Balam is represented now by the Bēlūr taluk and the country round about it.[385] It represents the heart of the once mighty Hoysaḷa kingdom, whose capital, Dōrasamudra, now represented by Haḷebīḍ, is 11 miles to the north-east of Bēlūr. It appears to have extended from about Bēlūr in the north to Manjarabad in the south, up to where it met the northern boundary of Coorg. Since Vijayanagar times, it had been in the possession of a family of Pāḷegār chiefs, who had been subverted by Śivappa Nāyaka of Bednūr, about 1645, and made part and parcel of Bednūr for about thirty-seven years. Krishṇappa Nāyaka of the Pāḷegār family asserted his independence of Bednūr about 1682 and he and his descendants held on to their possessions until Haidar turned his attention to them in 1765. Venkaṭādri Nāyaka, a descendant of Krishṇappa, named above, was then the chief. He had attacked the dependencies of Seringapatam during the time Haidar was out of it and busy against the Mahrattas, and had carried off the goods and cattle of the

384. That this was a real fear and had considerable foundation in fact will be admitted by all who can recall the British movement of forces from the Bombay and Madras sides simultaneously against Tipū Sultān during the wars that ended in 1792 and 1799. Haidar had the prescience to note this fact and provide against it as early as 1765, when he undertook the subjugation of these provinces and making them part and parcel of Mysore. From the larger conquest contemplated by him—the whole of the South of India—these annexations would, of course, seem to be perfectly natural.

385. *Mys. Gaz.* (New and Revised Edn), V. 950. "Balam" is the "Bullum" of Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 64, 74, 711; II. 120, 122, 205, 279. As to the origin of the name "Balam", see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 950-951. Major Montgomery identifies Balam with the present Manjarabad. The fort at Manjarabad is an octagonal structure containing a pond, a few powder-magazines and other adjuncts. There is a secret passage leading out of the fort (*Ibid*, 1022). There was a fort here in those days and long after, as shown in Col. Mackenzie's Map of 1808.

peasants resident in them and owning allegiance to Mysore. He had built the tower of the Kēśava temple in 1736 and mounted a cupola on it.[386] Haidar led an expedition against him. Being unable to stand the onslaughts of Haidar, Venkaṭādri abandoned his fort (probably Manjarabad) and fled with his property and family to the safety of the forest, and in confederacy with Chikka-Vīrappa, the Rāja of Coorg,[387] prepared for war. Leaving a strong detachment at Balam (*i.e.*, Manjarabad), he marched on towards Coorg. But at Arkalgūḍ, about 20 miles to the east of Manjarabad,[388] Venkaṭādri made a fresh stand, and a well contested battle was fought. Venkaṭādri fought so fiercely that the forces of Haidar nearly gave way. Immediately Haidar observed this, he, with a few brave men, under the thick cover of the trees, advanced and attacked the rear of the enemy, with the result that their lines were broken and they were scattered. Venkaṭādri himself fled, while his dependents and women were attacked in the place where they had taken refuge by Tipū Sultān, then only about eighteen years of age, and taken captives. On this, Venkaṭādri made peace with Haidar by offering a large sum of money (fifty camel loads, it is said,) and elephant's teeth.[389] But it does not seem that he drove him out of it. Matters were evidently settled in

386. See *E.C.*, *V.* Bl. 64; also *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 911.

387. Kīrmāṇi does not mention the name of the Rāja of Coorg. He was probably Chikka-Vīrappa, son of Appājirāja, who ruled between 1736 and 1766 and was a contemporary of Venkaṭādri Nāyaka of Bēlūr. See Rev. G. Richter, *Manual of Coorg*, 239.

388. For Arkalgūḍ, see *Mys. Gaz.*, V 939-940. It is 17 miles south of Hassan. This must be the place referred to by Kīrmāṇi as the town of "Akrubnar", where he says the action referred to in the text was fought.

389. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 163, 181, 183. Among contemporary writers, Peixoto makes a passing reference to Haidar's attack and conquest of Balam by mentioning it as the country of "Aigur" (see *Memoirs*, l.c.; also *M. A. R.* for 1937, p. 103, noticing this work). He roughly places the event subsequent to the Mahratta campaign of 1764-65.

an amicable spirit, as we see Venkaṭādri Nāyaka was succeeded in due course by his son Krishṇappa Nāyaka, the last of the line to bear that name, in 1772.

Attempt on Coorg, 1765.

Haidar next turned his attention to Chikka-Vīrappa, the Rāja of Coorg, whose country lay contiguously to the south of Balam.[390] The conquest of Balam rendered easy this invasion of Coorg, with which Haidar desired direct communication both from Bednūr on the northern extremity of the Mysore territory and from Seringapatam, the capital. He pretended to be the liege-lord of Coorg, but the Coorg Rājas refused to recognise him as such. He, of course, intended a permanent conquest of the province. As an interjacent territory, its possession was of even greater value to Mysore. The invasion could not have been unknown to the Coorg ruler, as it was the direct result of the aid given by him to Venkaṭādri. The ostensible cause of the war was the claim Haidar asserted over the *Ēḷu-sāvira-sīme* (the seven thousand country), which had been given up by the Mysore Rājas, besides the attempt made by him against the garrisons stationed in all the forts on his frontier with a view to their reduction and the part he

390. This attempt on Coorg is left unnoticed by Wilks, who makes Haidar's invasion of it in November 1773 his first invasion (*o.c.*, I. 712). Neither De La Tour nor Robson has anything to record on the first attempt made by Haidar in 1765. Peixoto, the only contemporary writer who casually refers to the invasion of Coorg under Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, places it subsequent to Mādhava Rao's campaign of 1764-65 (see *Memoirs*, l.c.). Kīrmāṇi (*o.c.*, 178-184), however, gives an account of it but post-dates it by referring it to 1767 (A.H. 1181). Probably the campaign dragged on to 1768, as the final treaty with Coorg was concluded in 1769. From the point of view of both the context and the light thrown by other independent sources, this invasion has to be assigned to 1765-1766. Stewart (*o.c.*, 17) sets it down to 1764, which is impossible in view of the fact that Haidar's hands were full with Mādhava Rao's invasion. This fact is acknowledged in plain terms by Kīrmāṇi (*o.c.*, 179). Rev. G. Richter places the event correctly in 1765, in the reign of Chikka-Vīrappa of Coorg.

had played in Haidar's war against Balam.[391] Haidar left Bednūr immediately the Mahrattas left the country, and marched by land and sea towards Coorg. Having collected some 600 or 700 fishermen, he arranged with their boats for the supply of stores to be despatched by sea, the land route being difficult for transport, evidently on account of the wild, woody nature of the country.[392] He himself advanced with his regular and irregular infantry and artillery and fell on them unexpectedly,[393] while Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, who had accompanied Haidar in this campaign,[394] marched on the north-eastern frontier of Coorg. Many battles were fought and Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān and his forces were put to rout and fled the country. Haidar, however, compromised by offering both "eternal peace" and the Uchchingi district, contiguous to the northern frontier of Coorg, for a payment of 300,000 pagodas. Chikka-Vīrappa acceeded to the proposal. A portion of the amount was paid immediately and hostages given for the remainder. Before Haidar carried out his part of

391. Kīrmāṇi includes the then Rāja of Coorg, a "Zamindar," and makes him a subordinate of the Suba of Sira and of the Nizām of Hyderabad, and states that he had become "insubordinate" and "lifted" up his head to rebellion, plundered and murdered the garrisons of the Nawāb stationed in all the forts in his vicinity and reduced the whole country under his own authority (*o.c.*, 179). There is evident exaggeration here, as there is no independent evidence of his having done all this.

392. Kīrmāṇi calls Coorg a "wild desert," meaning that it was a wild, forest country difficult of approach and without facilities for the transportation of provisions, forage, camp equipage, etc. (*o.c.*, 179-180).

393. In Kīrmāṇi's expressive phrase, "like a sudden calamity" (*o.c.*, 180).

394. Rev. G. Richter, *Manual of Coorg*, 243. Richter's account is based on the *Rājèndra-nāme*, which has been translated into English. Kīrmāṇi says that the Coorg Rāja, cowed down by the humbling of Venkaṭādri, yielded without a struggle and made peace with Haidar and became tributary, and paid a large sum of money, and likewise gave valuable presents of the rarities of the country." This version is not borne out either by the character of the Coorgs or by the actual facts as known from the Coorg side. See Richter, *o. c.*, 243-244.

the engagement, Chikka-Vīrappa died (1766). His successors, Muddarāja and Muddaiya, joint rulers, called on Haidar to fulfil the terms of his engagement with their predecessor. After fruitless negotiations, they recommenced hostilities. Lingarāja, the younger brother of Muddarāja, attacked Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān near the *Ēḷu-sāvira* district and defeated him. Fuzzul-ullāh attempted to retire towards Mangalore by the Bisale-ghāt, but Lingarāja hotly pursued him, outmarched him, and faced him again and completely routed his army. The whole camp, treasure, guns and ammunition fell into the hands of Lingarāja and his victorious troops. The campaign dragged on to 1768, when Haidar once again proposed peace. In place of the Uchchingi country, he ceded the districts of Panje and Bellāre for the sum of Rs. 75,000 already paid to Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān and fixed the boundary between Mysore and Coorg at the river Sarve.[395]

Insurrections in the east and north-east, 1765.

While operations were going on in the north-west and west, in Balam and Coorg, Haidar had had to face various insurrections to the east and north-east, in the territories lately annexed by him. Among these were Sīra, Hoskōṭe, Chikbaḷḷāpur and Doḍbaḷḷāpur, all still under Mahratta influence. The Mysore garrisons in all these places had been unable to quell the insurrections inspired by the local Pāḷegārs, during the year that Haidar was engaged with the Mahrattas. Similar trouble was experienced in the south and south-eastern part of Mysore. Immediately he was able to turn his attention to home affairs, Haidar detached a force under Mīr Alī

395. Rev. G. Richter, *o.c.*, 244. Kīrmāṇi, as might be expected, is all too brief in this part of his narrative. He says that Haidar placed a garrison of his troops in the fort of Mercara, though "he left the country in his (Coorg Rāja's) possession" (*o.c.*, 184). This is evidently an overstatement not confirmed from the Coorg side.

Razā, better known as Mīr Sāhib,[396] to Sīra, where he was enjoined to first re-establish Mysore authority. This accomplished, he was to join hands with the corps at Bangalore, Dēvanhaḷḷi and other places and put down the local insurrections. Haidar, with the caution that always marked his acts in matters of this nature, directed Mīr Sāhib to adopt a defensive plan of operations in winning the objectives aimed at. In a like manner, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān was told off to reduce the incipient attempts at insurrections in the south and south-east and render possible the uninterrupted collection of revenue.[397] This wary and prudent policy helped to put down without material difficulty the local disturbances that had raised their head and enabled Haidar to think of the more important affair of Malabar, whose permanent conquest he had been contemplating for some time.

Invasion of Malabar, 1765-66.

With the conquest of Bednūr and the move against Balam and Coorg, Haidar thought he had prepared the way for the invasion of Malabar, for which he had had secret designs. This invasion was not only a continuation of the policy of the Mysore kings and their generals in the country to their west, but also in keeping with the ambitious policy of extension, embracing the whole of Southern India, which Haidar had planned. For the realization of such a policy, he looked upon the annexation of Malabar as a necessary first measure. Malabar, in those days, was not only contiguous with Mysore to its south but also to its south-west. Though its early history is still wrapped in obscurity, there is enough

Early history of Malabar.

396. Mīr Alī Razā *alias* Mīr Sāhib was a brother-in-law of Haidar. He should be distinguished from Alī Razā Khān, son of Chandā Sāhib, who was helpful to Haidar in his Malabar campaign. See below.

397. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 524. Neither Robson nor Kīrmāṇi has any reference to these events.

evidence to believe that it had an active trade connection with the Mediterranean cities through Arabia, on the other side of the sea, called after it the Arabian Sea. This connection dates back to pre-Islāmic days. The Phœnicians came by way of the Persian Gulf and afterwards by the Red Sea. Possibly the Jews made the same voyage in the reigns of David and Solomon. The Syrians under Seleucus, the Egyptians under the Ptolemies, the Romans under the Emperors, the Arabs after the conquest of Egypt and Persia, the Italians, more especially the Republics of Venice, Florence and Genoa, each in turn appears to have maintained a direct trade. This trade relationship brought into Malabar in due course of time successive waves of immigrants, who for one reason or another sought shelter on this hospitable coast of India. Here lay Musiris, identified with modern Cranganore, situated on the Alwaye river, where foreign ships touched in the centuries before the Christian era and from there carried on a brisk trade with Rome. Pliny (77 A. D.) and the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea* (*c.* 70 A. D.) attest to this fact in vivid terms.[398] The traditions of the Hindus and the Jews

398. *Musiris* identified with Muyiricode, the ancient name of Krishnamakōṭa, just opposite to Cranganore. It is the *Muziris primum emporium Indiae* of Pliny : Musiris, the first emporium of India. According to Pliny, there reigned here, in those days, Kelabothras, identified with Kēra]aputra. Pepper was conveyed, according to him, in boats formed from single logs from "Cottamara", identified with Cadattanāḍ. The *Periplus* describes Muziris as "a city at the height of prosperity, frequented as it is by ships from Awake (Mahārāshṭra country) and Greek ships from Egypt. It is near a river at a distance from Tundis (Cadabundi) of 500 stadia." The Cochin Jewish copper-plate grant of Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman, dated in his 38th year, mentions Muyirikkōṭa as including the village of Aujuvannam, which was granted to them by the king. As Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman came to the throne in 978 A. D., his 38th year would be 1016 A. D. See *E. I.*, III. 66. King Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman referred to in this copper-plate is also mentioned in four lithic inscriptions in the temples of Tirakkadittānam, Travancore State (*T. A. S.*, II. 32-33, 34-38, 40-41, and 45), and in one inscription in the temple at Tirumulikkalam (*Ibid*, II. 45-46). These are dated in the 14th, 15th, 26th and 48th years of his reign.

and Christians, who came to settle here, agree in making Cranganore, in the present Cochin State, the original capital of the Perumāḷs, who claimed sovereignty over the whole of the Chēra (Malayāḷam) country, and the first resort of western shipping. Descendants of fugitive Jews came to settle here about 378 A. D. after the final destruction of Jerusalem by Emperor Titus in 70 A. D. The local ruler granting them a settlement here about 490 A. D., more of their nation came over and lived here. The Christians came even earlier, their first advent going back to the 1st cent. A. D. One of the seven churches founded by St. Thomas, the Apostle, was, it is said, at this place. Whether this was so or not, there is no doubt that it was one of the first settlements of the Syrian Christians, who arrived here in 345 A. D., and flourished at it until they invoked the aid of the Portuguese in 1502 A.D., when their trouble began. Persecution evidently led them to leave it and settle at Cochin about 1509. Roman trade followed in the wake of the Arabian, Arabia being for long, even before the birth of Muhammad (6th cent. A. D.), the emporium from which Europe was principally supplied with Indian commodities by a tedious coasting navigation. In the post-Islāmic era, the Arabian connection with Malabar became even more firm, with the result that Islām got a foothold in Malabar quite early in its history. Those from Arabia already settled in it evidently embraced the new religion, and they and their descendants came to be known as Māpiḷḷas (Moplahs), lit. those who traced their descent through the mother as distinguished from others of that religion, who, being of unmixed blood, traced their descent patri-lineally.

He is also mentioned in five other lithic inscriptions in the temple at Trikākarai, Travancore (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 2, 3, 4 of 1903, and *T.A.S.*, II. 46-48, 49-50). These are dated in the 23rd, 31st, 42nd, and 58th years of Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman's reign.

Among these was one Alī Rāja, who had in the progress of events, obtained possession of the fort of Cannanore with a small district on the coast, subject in a loose manner to the Rāja of Kolastri.[399] It would take too much space here to unfold the circumstances that led to the conversion of this little Muslim chief from an opulent trader into a small territorial lord and merchant monopolist of Cannanore. Suffice it to say that it was this connection with Arabia on the one side and the European nations, who from about the end of the 15th century established themselves on the Malabar coast,

399. *Kolattiri*, also called Chirakal, from its capital, which is abuot 3½ miles south of Cranganore. The first figure that emerges from the mist of tradition, in the early history of Malabar, is Chēramān Perumāl, the last of the Chēra kings. He is said to have renounced the throne voluntarily, subdividing his kingdom and retiring to Mecca to adopt Islām. His date has been much discussed. Tradition assigns him to the 4th cent. A. D. His tomb is said to exist, however, at Sabhai on the Arabian coast, and it is said that the dates on it indicate that he reached it in A.H. 212 (or A.D. 799) and died there in A.H. 216 (or A.D. 803). His departure may, perhaps, be said to date from August 25, 825, the first day of the Kollam era in common use on the Malabar coast to this day. It is possible that his power was practically broken by the growing influence and turbulence of his feudatories and the encroachments of the Western Chālukyas, who rose to prominence about 973 A. D. The disappearance of a common ruler meant the division of Malabar among numerous small chieftains, of whom Kolattiri (or Chirakkal) in the north and the Zāmorin in the south were the most powerful. It was with these last two and with the Cochin Rāja that the early Portuguese adventurers entered into political and trade relations that eventually brought trouble on them.

Alī Rāja: The family of the Alī Rājas, or sea kings, of Cannanore dates from about the 12th and 13th centuries when Cannanore was an important emporium of trade (with Persia and Arabia) on the Malabar coast. The origin of the family is lost in obscurity. Tradition, however, assigns its foundation to a Nair minister of the Kolattiri Rāja, who embraced Islām at about the beginning of the 12th century. Towards the end of that century, the family appears to have obtained the port and town of what is at present known as old Cannanore as a grant from the Kolattiri Rāja. The Alī Rāja became his chief admiral and the head of the Cannanore Māpiḷḷas. His authority gradually increased till by the beginning of the 18th century, he became practically independent of his suzerain and was able to put 25,000 men in the field. He had become so powerful at the time we are writing of—1765-66—that he was scheming with foreign aid to subvert his master and usurp all his territories.

not he other, that gave occasion to incessant revolutions in it. These revolutions arose partly from internal quarrels and partly from the wars of the Dutch, Portuguese and the English, and from invasions by the armies of Bednūr and Mysore. These perpetual feuds and quarrels prepared the way for further foreign interference. Indeed, about 1765, matters had come to such a crisis that it was for Haidar to intervene with ambitious designs of his own.[400]

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400. Vasco da gama reached Malabar in 1498 and his successors quickly established themselves at Cochin, Calicut and Cannanore (1501). In 1656, the Dutch began to compete in the Indian seas with the Portuguese for the trade of the country. They first took Cannanore in 1656, and erected a fort there, which they still held in the year of Haidar Ali's invasion (1765); in 1663, they captured the town and fort of Cochin and Tangasseri from the Portuguese. In 1717, they secured the cession of the island of Chetwai from the Zāmorin of Calicut. The French first settled at Calicut in 1693. In 1726, they obtained a footing at Mahē, and in 1751 acquired Mount Delly and a few outposts in the north, all of which were taken by the English in 1761, with the fall of Pondicherry. The English established themselves at Calicut in 1661, in 1663 at Tellicherry, and in 1684 at Anjengo, Chetwai and other commercial factories. Tellicherry was their chief entrepōt for the pepper trade. So rapid was the extension of their power that, in 1737, the English factories mediated a peace between the princes of Kanara and Kolattiri. They obtained the exclusive privilege of purchasing the valuable products of the country, *viz.*, pepper, cardamoms and sandalwood. For nearly a century (from about 1656 to 1756), the Mahratta pirates under Angria and other chiefs infested the coast and ravaged even inland towns by sailing up the Beypore, Ponnāni and other rivers, so much so that trade was largely interfered with. This, however, appears to have been but a continuation of the old piracy rampant on this coast as early as the first cent. A. D. Pliny feelingly refers to the pirates infesting the neighbourhood of Musiris (modern Cranganore) during his time. This piracy was destroyed by an English expedition sent out in 1756. Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka II of Bednūr (1714-1739) is said to have invaded the country of Kolattiri Rāja in 1736, while his successor Basappa Nāyaka II (1739-1754) is credited with having again sent an army of conquest against it in 1751 and collected large sums of money from him. The Pālghāt Rāja, after its dismemberment by the Rājas of Calicut and Cochin, sought the friendship of Mysore, who stationed a subsidiary force in it to secure it against attacks (see *ante* P. 208). This connection afforded Haidar the opportunity to invade Malabar in defence of the Pālghāt Achchan. In 1758, he sent an army to Pālghāt and descended the ghāts through Coorg in person

Alliance with Alī Rāja of Cannanore.

What exactly was the objective of Alī Rāja of Cannanore in approaching Haidar is not clear. But it is fairly inferable that the conquest of Bednūr, Balam and the settlement with Coorg and their several dependencies had brought Mysore nearer to Cannanore, his own seat of power. This made him aim at a greater degree of power and possibly of independence as well and led him to seek the active aid of Haidar. The ties of religion united to those of mutual self-aggrandisement had made him the more eager to approach Haidar.[401] Alī Rāja was not, at any rate, slow to understand that if he was not to be subjugated by such a powerful neighbour as Haidar, he should seek his protection in time, and with his help, better his position, if he could.[402] Haidar, on his own side, desired to use him more as an instrument for securing a better access to the country which he desired to possess as the means for the reduction of the whole of the country as far as Cape Comorin. There is no doubt whatever that through him he was enabled to obtain a closer knowledge of the state of the northern portion of Malabar and to add a great deal more to the information he had gathered so far as to the position in its southern portion.[403] One fact that emerged as the result of all that he came to know was that the whole country was divided into petty territorial areas presided over by chieftains, more or less independent of each other, with subordinate proprietors of land, generally drawn from the military caste, who were always at war with each other. This knowledge emboldened Haidar to draw the conclusion that the conquest of the country may not be attended with

(see *ante* P. 211). The invasion of 1765 followed and it was ostensibly to aid Alī Rāja and protect his people as against the chiefs of Malabar but really it was in prosecution of Haidar's own aims (see text above).

401. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 526.
402. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 96.
403. Wilks, l. c.

difficulty, especially if he prepared adequately for it and took into confidence one like Alī Rāja. Haidar did not realize at the time how much he had miscalculated the physical difficulties presented by the country, nor had he any adequate idea of the animosities that would be created by his invasion, especially at the instance of a man like Alī Rāja, and the effect it would have on the spirited inhabitants of the country.

Further relations between Haidar and Alī Rāja.

Alī Rāja had first come into contact with Haidar immediately after the conquest of Bednūr. He had sent out a deputation to Haidar and that had been well received by Haidar. He not only loaded Alī's deputies with rich presents but also appointed him his Admiral. To maintain a fleet ready for service, not only to keep the coast clear of Mahratta and other pirates but also to use it in any warfare he might undertake later in this side of the country, he commissioned him to purchase or build vessels as may be found possible, and placed him in funds for the purpose. His brother, Shaikh Alī, was made intendant of the marine and put in charge of the ports and of the maritime trade of the newly conquered country of Bednūr and the coastal ports dependent on it.[404] Alī Rāja, flushed with the means to make himself felt in his own land, soon formed a fleet manned by his Māpiḷḷa subjects, who are skilful navigators, and invaded the Maldive Islands, in the Indian Ocean, under the pretence that some injustice had been done to them. Taking the Sultān of the Maldives a prisoner, he blinded him in the most barbarous manner and led him captive on his ship and presented him to Haidar, with evident glee, at Mangalore. Haidar was so irritated that he at once removed Alī Rāja from the command of the fleet and consoled

404. De La Tour *o.c.*, I. 96-97.

the Sultān by offering him one of his own palatial residences and enough to make him feel as happy as he could in his unfortunate situation.[405] Haidar, however, did not break off from 'Alī Rāja. He encouraged him and made him, indeed, proud of the protection offered to him. Alī Rāja, thus supported, made himself obnoxious to his neighbours, the Nair chieftains, while his subjects, the Māpiḷḷas, took the law into their own hands when their swollen claims were not met by the poor inhabitants, to whom they had lent at usurious rates of interest. Irritated beyond measure, the Nairs took counsel, under the presidency of the Zāmorin of Calicut, their leader, and resolved that on an appointed day there should be a general massacre of the Māpiḷḷas everywhere in the country. The conspiracy was carried into effect and nearly six thousand Māpiḷḷas were cruelly done to death. A great many, however, escaped with their lives by quickly taking to the sea; while a few, forewarned, assembled in sufficient numbers and resisted the attacks made on them. Those who took refuge at Cannanore managed to send deputies to Haidar and implored his aid in their hour of trouble.[406] Haidar, improving on the situation, accepted the call, the more so as it served him as an ostensible cause for his long intended invasion of Malabar.

405. *Ibid*, 98-99. The Maldives are a chain of several hundred tiny coral islands in the Indian Ocean, stretching 550 miles southward from a point 300 miles S.W. of Cape Comorin. Two hundred of these islands are inhabited. Male is the residence of the Sultān. Since 1645, he has been a tributary of the Governor of Ceylon, the Maldives being 400 miles to the S. W. of that island. The natives of the Maldives are akin to the Singhalese and are Muslims in religion; they occupy themselves in gathering cowries, cocoanuts and tortoise shell for exportation. Ibn Batuta visited these islands and lived in them in 1343-44.

406. *Ibid*, 100-102. There is nothing inherently impossible in this story to make it incapable of belief, knowing as we do to-day the etiology of the disturbances that have marred social life in Malabar during the greater part of the century and three quarters that has elapsed since Haidar's invasion of 1765.

Before setting out on his expedition, Haidar made adequate arrangements for the protection of Bednūr, this being the more necessary as he had reason to believe of both treachery and rebellion during his absence from Bednūr. He left a corps of observation, consisting of 3,000 horse, 4,000 regular infantry and 10,000 peons at Basavāpaṭṇa, a stronghold, about 50 miles to the north-east of Bednūr; and with the rest of his disposal force, he made his descent into Kanara, about the close of the year 1765, with the definite object of achieving the conquest of Malabar.[407] Haidar's plan was to attack both by land and sea. He, therefore, ordered his fleet, under the command of one Stanet, an Englishman, who had taken the place of Alī Rāja, to accompany him along the coast, he himself keeping close to it.[408] The first stage of his route lay through the coastal area through which the railway now passes from Mangalore to Cannanore, covering about 80 miles. Having posted a garrison at Basavāpaṭṇa, he passed on to Bednūr, and from there, with an army consisting of 12,000 of his best troops, of which 4,000 were cavalry, while the rest were infantry, and 4 pieces of cannon, he reached Kundāpur.[409] From Kundāpur, he passed southward to Mangalore, where he was joined by his ally and guide, Alī Rāja, by previous arrangement. From there, both pressed forward further south to Nīlēśvar, which may be said to mark the southernmost limit of Kanara. From there, they moved forward to Cannanore, where Haidar encamped with his forces on the river called the Cannanore river, after

Haidar sets out on the campaign.

His plan of operations.

407. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 527.

408. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 103.

409. *Ibid.* Both Wilks and Kīrmāṇi throw no light on the question of the strength of Haidar's forces. De La Tour errs in saying later that the artillery of Haidar consisted of 12 pieces of cannon (*o.c.*, I. 107). He states earlier (*o.c.*, I. 103) that they consisted only of four pieces.

the town near which it runs.[410] Here he found, ready to join him, 12,000 Māpiḷḷas under arms, ill-equipped but animated with a desire for vengeance against their enemies, the Nairs. Situated on a small bay, open to the south, but sheltered on the west by a bluff headland running north and south and surmounted by a fort, Cannanore possessed advantages which Haidar perceived at once. His fleet of ships sailed into the harbour and lay at anchor ready for action. Haidar was helped by the European officers on his staff, particularly the French, who later brought in a contingent of Hussars from Pondicherry.[411] Second in command under him was Alī Razā Khān, the son of Chandā Sāhib, who directed, under Haidar's general authority, the subsequent operations.[412]

His objective.

Before commencing operations, however, Haidar despatched an embassy to Māna-Vikrama-Rāja, the Zāmorin of Calicut, suggesting a peaceful settlement of the matters in dispute.[413] He demanded justice may be rendered to the Māpiḷḷas for the cruelties inflicted on them, and the punishment of the principal offenders, and suggested that he would not advance further with his army, if adequate reparation was done. If this were not done, he said he would be compelled to undertake the troublesome duty of rendering justice to every one.[414] Haidar also made a point of the contribution of Rs. 12 lakhs

410. This river, which is called the Cannanore river by De La Tour (*Ibid*), should be identified with the Vallarpaṭṭaṇam river, on the southern bank of which Cannanore is situated (see Map issued by the Surveyor-General of India, accompanying *Mysore Gaz.*, vol. V). Haidar was encamped on the northern bank of the river and the Nair chiefs prepared at first to prevent him from crossing it.

411. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 106, 107.

412. Wilks, l. c.

413. The deputation is said to have been composed of the most distinguished Brāhmans of the Mysore court (De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 103).

414. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 104.

levied by him in 1757, but not paid by the Zāmorin.[415] Haidar had not relinquished this claim so far and made it one of the ostensible causes of the present war.[416]

The Nairs retaliate.

The Nair chiefs had already taken counsel with one another and had agreed to support each other. When they heard that Haidar was advancing against them in aid of the Māpiḷḷas, they assembled an army, variously estimated from 100,000 to 120,000 men.[417] Māna-Vikrama-Rāja received the deputation, but in view of the consultations he had had with his brother chiefs and the decision arrived at, he said that the chiefs were astonished at the conduct of Haidar, with whom they had never had any connection or dependence so far; and that if his troops did anything more than drink the water of the Cannanore river—that if they even presumed to set their feet in it—they would be forthwith attacked and punished for their temerity. The ambassadors returned to Haidar's camp, while the Nair chiefs collected all their forces and marched out with the firm determination of preventing Haidar from crossing the river.[418]

Their tactics.

The Nair forces, though they were large in numbers and possessed of indomitable courage, and fired by a high spirit of independence and military honour, lacked discipline. Their efforts accordingly lacked sustained action; they were generally marked by uncertainty, caprice and desultoriness. They were ill-equipped too. Except for the broad blade, about the length of a Roman sword, they carried, and which was ever their inseparable companion,

415. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 582.

416. See *Ante*, P. 208; also Logan, *Malabar*, I. 405, where he says :—"The claim to this war subsidy was never relinquished and to recover it was one of Hyder Ali's avowed objects in invading Malabar."

417. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 104, 105.

418. *Ibid*, 105.

and the musket and the bow, they had no other weapon of offence or defence. They were, however, adepts in the use of these few weapons and they used them effectively too. Their concealed fire from the woods could neither be returned with effect, nor could those opposing them be induced to enter the thickets and act individually against them. In every movement through the forests, with which the country abounded, bands of Nairs would rush on the marching columns, and after making dreadful havoc, become invisible in a moment.[419] This kind of guerilla warfare, however, may impede and even delay the advancing enemy but not prevent him from ultimately attaining his aim. What was worse, the Nairs were wholly unaccustomed to cavalry warfare, on which Haidar founded his own expectations of success.[420] Unaccustomed as they were to open warfare, they soon learnt what it was to attempt it on any scale. They determined to oppose Haidar's advance by preventing him from crossing the river at which he had arrived. They stood out in numbers to openly defend the passage of the river. Despite their numbers, Haidar saw his opportunity. He ordered his fleet to enter the river. His vessels sailed up as far as possible. Haidar now drew up his infantry in order of battle in a single line in face of the enemy, with his four pieces of cannon, and waited for the ebb of the water at a higher ford. When it was at its lowest, he entered it in full gallop, at the head of his cavalry, which till then

Haidar's progress against them.

419. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 527-529.

420. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 106. De La Tour says that cavalry "was a body of troops absolutely unknown to the Nayres (Nayars), no foreign army having penetrated as far as the Malabar coast, where no horses had ever been seen, except a few belonging to the European chiefs of the factory and purchased by them more for pleasure than for utility: for this country, intersected by rivulets, and covered with woods, besides being subject to continual rains for seven months in the year, is absolutely improper for the breeding and keeping of horses."

he had kept out of the sight of the Nair forces. Led by fifty of the French Hussars, he combined a charge on the flank of the Nairs, with a heavy discharge of grape in front. The dreadful carnage that followed may be better imagined than described.[421] The rapidity of the current being diminished by the vessels, the cavalry column traversed the river with ease at a place where it was a league in breadth, sometimes swimming and sometimes by wading through. It soon reached the lower reaches of the river,[422] where the Nairs had been attempting to oppose the infantry, who pretended to cross over at this spot. They were frightened at the sudden appearance of the cavalry and fled with the utmost precipitation and disorder, without offering any other defence but that of discharging a few cannon, which, owing to the confusion caused in their ranks, they were unable to point properly. At this moment, Haidar gave orders to pursue the fugitives at full speed, cutting down all they could overtake, without losing time either by taking prisoners or securing plunder. Haidar's direction that no quarter was to be given was kept up so rigorously that nothing was to be seen on the roads, for some four leagues round, but scattered limbs and mutilated bodies. The whole of the country of the Kolattiri Rāja was thrown into a general consternation, which was greatly increased by the cruelty of the Māpiḷḷas, who, following the cavalry, massacred all who had managed to escape, sparing neither women nor children. The army advancing under the guidance of this enraged and barbarous multitude, met with but little resistance.

421. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 529. Wilks, however, is extremely laconic in his description. De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 107-108) gives a longer description.

422. De La Tour calls it the "other river" (*o.c.*, I. 107). He is evidently referring to a bend of the same river in its lower reaches. If we are to believe De La Tour and Wilks, there were two cavalry actions, one at the upper reach and another at the lower. Both these authorities cannot be referring to one and the same action when we remember that De Da Tours's description refers to an action lower down the river.

Almost every place connected with human habitation—villages, fortresses, temples, houses—were found forsaken and deserted for miles to the southward. Indeed, it was not until they reached the environs of Tellicherry and Mahe—about fourteen and eighteen miles from Cannanore—that they found any signs of human life. Here, for the first time, they saw, under the walls of the English and French settlements, people taking refuge from the ravages of the Māpiḷḷas.[423] Despite this general flight of the population, the army had not an easy march.[424] Its progress was impeded at times by the Nair chieftains, who showed the stuff they were made of. Not only they lay in ambush, in woods and hills, and carried a kind of guerilla warfare,[425] but also they actively opposed its advance. Quickly realizing the nature of the warfare that he had to reckon with, Haidar, with a view to secure his communications, erected a series of block-houses—called at the time *Lakkaḍi Kōṭṭa*—and the Nairs, perceiving the object of these erections, impeded his progress by a courageous defence of their own small posts.[426] One of these, which Wilks says was at a place called Tamelpelly,[427] was

423. De La Tour *o.c.*, I. 107-108.

424. *Ibid*, 108; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 529-530.

425. *Ibid*, 109, where he says: "The Nayres continued to conceal themselves in the woods and mountains, from whence they carried on a kind of concealed war with the Mapelets."

426. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 530, f. n. Wilks translates quite appositely *Lakkaḍi Kōṭṭa*, into *block-house*. A *block-house* is a house made of blocks of wood; originally one which *blocked* the way and impeded the advance. Generally speaking, a *block-house* indicates a strong building used for defence, and so called because constructed chiefly of hewn timber. Malabar has unlimited supplies of such timber. In the map accompanying Wilks' *History*, prepared by Col. Colin Mackenzie, there are two *Lakkaḍi Kōṭṭas* marked on it. One, called *Lakady Cotta*, is shown about midway between Heggadadēvan Kotta and Panamarti Kotta; and another, called *New Lakaree Cotta*, is marked between Panamarti Kotta and Tāmrachēri, about 16 miles N. E. of Calicut.

427. *Tamelpelly* would seem to indicate the *New Lakaree Cotta* of Col. Colin Mackenzie's Map of 1808, *Tamelpelly* itself being identified with *Tāmrachēri*, which is about 10 miles to the S.W. of *New Lakaree*

attacked by Haidar in a manner which was intended to prevent the escape of a single man. It consisted of, first, a line of regular infantry, and guns with an abbatis;[428] second, a line of peons; third, of cavalry. This special kind of disposition was made to strike terror into the Nairs by making their destruction certain. But the Nairs, true to their reputation, defended themselves stubbornly, until they were tired of the confinement to which they had been compelled. They then leaped over the abbatis and cutting through the three lines with astounding rapidity, they gained the woods before the invading troops had recovered from their surprise. Such was the character of the warfare in which Haidar and Razā Alī Khān were daily engaged in the area of the five northern chiefs of Malabar, and, indeed, until they reached the confines of Calicut.[429] Though thus impeded to a certain extent, the invading army was in want of nothing. It everywhere found cows, oxen, poultry, rice and other necessary provisions that it could have wished for, for the fugitives had abandoned everything without daring to load themselves with the least article that might abate the speed of their flight.[430]

Seeks to negotiate with the Zāmorin.

Once Haidar reached Tellicherry, 42 miles to the north of Calicut, he tried to negotiate. He sent offers of peace on reasonable terms to Māna-Vikrama Rāja and the other chiefs. The Zāmorin, being fairly advanced in age, prepared to temporize. He remained

Cotta. See note 426 above. Tāmrachūri is a village on the ghāts, in the Kedavur Amsom, where is a palace of the Koṭṭāyam Rāja. The Ghāt is one of Tipū's military roads and leads from Calicut through South Wynad to Mysore, and this was the line selected by Col. Arthur Wellesley later for the operations against Pychy Rāja. It has since been much used for the export of coffee.

428. *Abbatis* (*Abatis*) signifies a collection of felled trees with the smaller branches cut off, forming a fort-like obstruction to assailants.

429. See Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 531.

430. De La Tour, l.c.

quietly in his palace, and sent word that he waited for the conqueror and trusted to his discretion. He had heard, it is said, the favourable terms that the Pāḷegār of Rāyadurg had obtained by early submission[431] and wanted, if possible, to tone down Haidar's demands by a peaceful attitude. The friendly overtures of Haidar, the halt of the advancing army, the strict control that Haidar exercised over his forces,[432] and the quiet demeanour of the Zāmorin, induced the terror-stricken inhabitants to return to their abodes. This they did the more quickly because they saw that the Māpiḷḷas confined their outrages, as the army advanced, only to the persons or the property of the Nairs. Once, however, the Nairs of the Kolattiri Rāja united and made a rush on the troops of Haidar and put to the sword a hundred of them. Haidar was enraged and took vengeance at once. He gave orders that all Nairs who could be captured should be put to death. A horrible massacre followed and they were so frightened that every one who could escape fled for his life, while others hid themselves as best they could. This determined but horrible action quelled all signs of unrest in the Kolattiri region.[433] The people returned soon after to their homes once again. The Kolattiri Rāja escaped with his family to Travancore, the country being made over to Alī Rāja of Cannanore, who began to administer it from then.[434] Alī Rāja agreed to such a heavy tribute that it was almost impossible to raise it and he fell consequently into arrears, despite the heavy taxes he raised from the people.[435] The Kolattiri country being thus settled, Haidar advanced against the Zāmorin's kingdom. Arriving at Tellicherry, he encamped with his

Settlement of the Kolattiri country.

Haidar advances against the Zāmorin's kingdom.

431. Wilks, l.c. 432. Moens, *o.c.*, 153. 433. *Ibid.*
434. *Ibid*, 152. 435. *Ibid*, 153.

forces on the river there, which separates the Zāmorin's country from that of the Kolattiri. Here he met with the first signs of opposition.[436] The Zāmorin, willingly or unwillingly, and the frontier chiefs of the Kolattiri Rāja assembled their forces and pitched their camps on the southern banks of the Tellicherry river. They tried to prevent Haidar from crossing it. Though the odds were against him, Haidar successfully crossed the river with some loss, and marched straight on, fighting his way through the united forces of the Zāmorin and the Kolattiri frontier chiefs. The slaughter was so great that few of the Nair forces escaped, even the small number that tried to run away being pursued by the cavalry and put to the sword.[437]

Invests Calicut.

Haidar marched further south towards Calicut, practically unopposed, except at a fortified hill pagoda, where Māna-Vikrama's nephew had taken refuge. This place was quickly invested. The young man made good his escape and the place surrendered.[438] Reaching the confines of Calicut, Haidar took up his residence in the English factory, where his fleet had arrived before him.[439] From

436. Both Wilks and De La Tour suggest in their narratives that Haidar had an easy walk over the territories of the Zāmorin. If Moens is to be believed, it was not so. While the Zāmorin made Haidar believe he was for peace, evidently he had agreed to or yielded to the frontier chiefs of the Kolattiri country and opposed or was compelled to oppose Haidar on the banks of the Tellicherry river, as mentioned in the text above (Moens, l.c.).

437. Moens, l.c.

438. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 109-110.-Moens states that Haidar marched off southwards (into Malabar) "in the month of February 1766 and made himself master unexpectedly of the kingdom of Collastry". This would suggest that the first part of the campaign began in February 1766 and ended before 20th April 1766, when Haidar arrived at Calicut with his forces (Moens, *o.c.*, 152).

439. *Ibid*, 110. Wilks refers to the "camp" of Haidar, but does not mention where it was located. De La Tour specifically states that Haidar encamped in the English factory house at Calicut, but suggests that Haidar and Māna-Vikrama settled the terms of peace in

here, he sent word to Māna-Vikrama Rāja of his arrival. If a safe conduct was assured to him, Māna-Vikrama agreed to meet Haidar in his camp to adjust the terms of peace. This proposal being acceded to, Māna-Vikrama proceeded to Haidar's camp on 11th April 1766, on a *cowle*, at the head of 2,000 Nair troops. After the customary mutual exchange of presents, the terms of peace were settled.[440] They were as follows: (1) Haidar was to restore to Māna-Vikrama his territories on condition of his paying a small tribute to Mysore; (2) Māna-Vikrama was to pay four lakhs of *Venetian sequins* as a military contribution;[441] (3) as a preliminary condition, the Nair chiefs were to lay down their arms; and (4) the grievances of the Māpiḷḷas were to be amicably adjusted.[442] The Zāmorin took leave of

Proposes terms to the Zāmorin, April 1766.

the Zāmorin's "palace." But Wilks states they met and settled the terms in Haidar's "camp" to which the Zāmorin repaired in accordance with the safe conduct vouchsafed to him.

440. Māna-Vikrama's presents on the occasion consisted, it is said, of two small basins of gold (evidently offered by way of *Nazar*), one filled with precious stones, and the other with pieces of gold, and two small cannons of gold with cartridges of the same metal (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 110-111.) Wilks says Haidar received the Zāmorin with "marks of particular distinction, and presented him with valuable jewels" (Wilks, *l.c.*). There is no mention of these in De La Tour's account. De La Tour says that when Haidar came forth to meet Māna-Vikrama, the latter "threw himself at his feet" and that Haidar "hastened to raise him." Robson says that De La Tour is here "most certainly mistaken." He suggests that as the representative of the Nairs, "the most haughty people on the face of the earth," he would sooner have preferred death to degrading himself before a Muslim, he and his people having "the utmost contempt for that tribe" (Robson, *o.c.*, 35-36, f. n.).

441. *Sequin* is an old Venetian gold coin in value about 9s. 4d. sterling. cf. Arabic *Sikkah*, a stamp or die, from which the Hyderabadi *sicca* or *sikka* is derived.

442. Wilks, l.c.; De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 111. These two writers differ in details. What is stated in the text may be held to represent the substance of what was probably mutually agreed to. There is one point on which Wilks is rather not clear. According to him, Haidar agreed to the "confirmation of the Raja in his *actual possessions* as the tributary of Hyder." This would suggest a prior settlement of the part of the country traversed by Haidar, that is, the region between Nīlēśvar and Calicut, including the Kolattiri (or Chirakal) territory.

Haidar and turned homeward, suspecting nothing. But as he left, Haidar ordered the troops to move forward towards Calicut. And even as he was receiving Māna-Vikrama in his camp and honoring him with presents in a friendly manner, he had given secret injunctions for a column to move on by a circuitous route and seize Calicut.[443] When this column reached the post, the garrison not unreasonably concluded that their king had been taken prisoner, and considering that defence would not avail them, they evacuated the place the same night. This step was taken by Haidar because the Rāja had cunningly contrived to deprive him of the military contribution he had agreed to after the war of 1757.[444] Whether such a step on Haidar's part was right or wrong, it had an unfortunate effect on Māna-Vikrama. He apprehended from this virtual infraction of the agreement they had come to that Haidar meant further circumvention of it. What was worse, at the end of four or five days, Haidar began to press for the payment of the contribution and as was his wont, he applied rigorous methods to extract it. He stopped supplies so effectively that the Rāja, a pious man, who never dined without feeding a large number of people, was unable even to go through the daily routine of his life.[445] This exasperated the Rāja a great deal. He

Haidar's precaution.

The Zāmorin temporizes.

443. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 33) calls it the *Chikka Kille Kallikōṭē*, lit. the small fort of Calicut. It suggests that this step was taken by Haidar as a measure of precaution.

444. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 532. For the military contribtuion of 1757, see *ante* P. 208.

445. Robson narrates in piteous terms the trouble caused to Māna-Vikrama Rāja by Haidar on this occasion. The Rāja sent a Brāhman agent to enquire of Haidar as to his intentions in regard "to his request of the necessary provisions for the accustomed charity; soon after this intercourse, Haidar returned and directed that a sufficient quantity of grain for 500 men should be sent to the king who was forced to rest satisfied; the next day a considerable deduction was made out of

consulted with his ministers regarding the measures to be taken for realizing the amount and paying it to Haidar. Sanguine of collecting the amount, they seem to have at first given their word to soon make up the amount. But they soon found it impossible to collect the amount within the time allowed.[446] At any rate, they failed to realize the amount and evidently pressed hard by the Rāja, they seem to have fallen out with him.[447] Haidar had reached Calicut on the 20th April 1766,[448] and the season was advancing and the breaking of the monsoon was not far off. Haidar, suspecting deception, placed Māna-Vikrama and his ministers under further restraint.[449] Strict guard being placed over their

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this allowance, and the third day the same; on the fourth an entire stop was put to this supply and Hyder having sent some principal Moormen (Muslims) to observe how matters went, they returned, telling him they apprehended some strange event from the gloomy aspect of the king's attendants; that the king himself had already fasted three days, and was then preparing for some particular ceremony. The king, being provoked at this cruel treatment, had assembled all his family, and after performing certain ceremonies with the chief Brahmins, ordered fire to be set to different parts of the building of his palace, which were of wood, and the whole, together with himself and family, were entirely consumed" (Robson, *o.c.*, 36-37). The cutting off of supplies, however, was not the sole reason for the calamitous step the Rāja took, though it proved evidently one of the chief factors which contributed to it. See text above.

446. Wilks, l.c. He writes that the Rāja's ministers "whether from inability or design, they appeared to make but little progress in its collection." There is no evidence whatever for "design" on their part; such "design" they knew would mean not only trouble to the Rāja but also to themselves, as they knew to their cost.

447. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) says: *Rājāge mātukoṭṭidda kaikeḷaginavarella tirugi biddu haṇa sallade hōddarīnda*", which may be thus rendered: "the subordinates, who had agreed and given their word, turned back, and failed to bring the money."

448. Moens, *o.c.*, 153. He mentions the 20th April 1766 as the date of Haidar's arrival at Calicut, that is, after the virtual surrender of the Rāja. The date 11th April 1766 is given by Wilks as the date of the reception of the Rāja in Haidar's camp (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 531). The negotiation &c., took evidently eight days.

449. So states Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 532), but does not explain or even hint at what this further "restraint" consisted in. Moens' narrative suggests that Haidar had kept Māna-Vikrama a prisoner in his own palace and threatened to take his life and prevent the disposal of his corpse with

movements, the ministers were confined in their own houses, while Māna-Vikrama was "kept a prisoner in his own palace" and "mocked and threatened to flog as a common Malabari unless he pointed out his treasures." Haidar "would not see him" and, as we have seen, cut off supplies. The ministers were tortured into producing the cash they had—in his view—secretly hidden. Māna-Vikrama feared that Haidar would "take his life" and "that his corpse would not be burnt according to the 'customs" of his country and religion.[450] He had been apprized of the cruelties and indignities that had been offered to his ministers and feared that his turn was fast approaching.[451] He accordingly determined to anticipate the possibility of a similar disgrace to himself.[452] As misfortune would have it, while Māna-Vikrama was in this difficult state of mind, he received letters from his nephews and from the kings of Cochin and Travancore, in which they bitterly reproached him—with execrations, we are told—as the betrayer of his country and an apostate to his religion, which, they said, he had abandoned to a Muslim. The Brāhman priest, who conveyed these letters to the Rāja, avowed to him, at the same time,

The Zāmorin confined in his own Palace.

the customary Hindu rites. Evidently what was threatened in the case of the king had been already accomplished in the cases of his ministers (Moens, *o.c.*, 133, 153). They were evidently also flogged to death. (*Ibid*, 153).

450. Moens, *o.c.*, 133, 153. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 35-36) also testifies to the fact that they were placed under strict guard.

451. Wilks says that Haidar applied to the ministers "the customary Indian methods of extorting treasure" (l.c.). This is rather somewhat cryptic, but it might be presumed that Haidar inflicted "cruelties" and "indignities" on them, besides confining them in their own houses, flogging them and even, perhaps, threatening them with cruel deaths and a worse disposal of their bodies. At any rate, Moens' narrative shows these were the fears that Māna-Vikrama entertained and preferred self-destruction to the fate, he feared, that would overtake him at Haidar's hands. See Moens, *o.c.*, 133, 153.

452. Wilks, l.c.

it is said, that he had been degraded and excluded from his own caste and that all Brāhmans and Nairs had sworn never to have any communication with him.[453] Māna-Vikrama, in a highly strung state of mind, gave way before these reproaches on the one side and the cruelties and indignities heaped on him and his ministers on the other, and fearing worse may befall him and his family, if he did not make it impossible for Haidar to go any further in his own way, barricaded the doors of the palace[454] in which he was confined, set fire to it in many places, and burnt himself and all his people alive in the general conflagration that ensued. Several of his attendants, who had been accidentally excluded when he closed the doors, afterwards threw themselves into the flames and perished with their master rather than survive him.[455] All attempts at

And burns himself to death.

453. This story is set out at length by De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 1, 111,-112. It is possible they misunderstood both the peaceful tactics and diplomacy of Māna-Vikrama in trying to win over Haidar. They seem to have preferred military fight to overtures for peace. But they did not know Haidar and how he had completely overcome all the opposition that had been offered by them so far.

454. "Palace" is the word used by Robson, *o.c.*, 37; the same word is used by De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 111. Moens, however, describes it as "the room in which he was imprisoned" (*o. c.*, 135), though he, twenty pages later, at p. 153, describes it as "his own palace". Wilks refers to it as "the house in which he was confined" (l. c.). The *Haid-Nām.*, however, speaks of it as "the sanctuary (*guḍi*) in which he had taken refuge" (ff. 35-36). If this was so, it must be presumed, he had taken his final refuge in the sanctuary in his palace, to which access, he should have thought, was impossible to any one.

455. There can be no doubt that this ghastly event occurred as a matter of fact. Wilks states that he inquired and made sure of its actual occurrence. "In the remembrance after a lapse of years of so extraordinary a scene as that which has been related, and even in the confusion of such a moment, a spectator may have misconceived what he said; but I have been assured," writes Wilks, "by more than one eye-witness, that several of the Raja's personal attendants, who were accidentally excluded when he closed the door, afterwards threw themselves intot he flames and perished with their master" (*o. c*, I. 532-533). Wilks quotes, in support of the "credibility" of the story, other "instances of similar desperation on the part of other military classes of the Hindoos." One is the well known case of Ranga Rao of Bobbili

extinguishing the fire proved futile, Haidar's commands

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related by Orme, and the other the more recent occurrence of the capture of Gawilgarh, where the assailants were commanded by General Arthur Wellesly (see Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 532, f. n.; see also Orme, *Indostan*, II. 254-260, for a thrilling account of the tragic circumstances in which Ranga Rao of Bobbili killed himself after heroically defending himself in his fort at Bobbili in January 1757). The incident referred to by Wilks as having occurred at Gawilgarh, a strong fortress between the sources of the Tapti and the Pūrna, about 15 miles north-west of Ellichpur in Berar, is not recorded by W. J. Wilson, in his *History of the Madras Army*, III. 118-124, where a full account of the siege and capture of Gawilgarh is given by him. The fact, however, is that after the battle of Argaum, General Arthur Wellesley proceeded to besiege and storm Gawilgarh (14th December 1803). The Rāja of Berar was hardly ready either to resist or oppose him. But the commander of the fort refused to surrender and died in its defence. Edward Thornton, however, in his *History of the British Empire*, III. 353-354, gives the following account of the incident referred to by Wilks. "The garrison was numerous and well armed. Vast numbers of them were killed...The killedar was a Rajpoot of eminent bravery...He was aided by another Rajpoot, Beni Singh, bold and intrepid as himself; but the bravery of the leaders does not seem to have been shared by those whom they commanded. Little of their spirit was displayed by the garrison. The two Rajpoot commanders appear to have considered the fall of the place as inevitable, and to have resolved not to survive the event. Their bodies were found among a heap of slain; a more fearful evidence of the determined spirit in which they had acted was afforded by the discovery, that, in conformity with the feeling of their country, they had doomed their wives and daughters to become sharers in the fate which they scorned to evade for themselves. But the task had been imperfectly performed. A few of the women only were dead. The rest, some of whom had received several wounds, survived to afford exercise to the humane feelings of the conquerors. It is scarcely necessary to add that General Wellesley directed all attention and respect to be shown them." The discovery of these females is related in the *Journal* of Sir Jasper Nicolls, K. C. B,, quoted in the *Wellington Despatches*. Nicolls was present at both Argaum and Gawilgarh and ended his career as C.-in-C. in India, 1839-1843. Both Bussy, who figured in the Bobbili affair, and Wellesley, in the Gawilgarh issue, were, as Wilks remarks, "as eminently distinguished by their humanity as by the most brilliant military talents"; still they were unable to prevent the occurrence of an event too horrible to contemplate or describe. The taking of such a terrible step should be described as the last attempt of a desperate soul, determined on saving what he considered his honour, which he regarded as inviolate and inviolable under any circumstances. There seems, therefore, no doubt that Māna-Vikrama burnt himself to death with his family and people. Logan records an account of it, said to have been obtained in 1793 from the then Zāmorin by Mr. Jonathan Duncan, President of the first Malabar Commission and later Governor of Bombay (1794-1811). See Logan's

notwithstanding.[456] Though there is reason to believe that Haidar was affected to some extent by the tragic end of the Zāmorin and his people, it did not operate to the advantage of the fallen man's family, his ministers, or his people. If anything, the conduct of the Zāmorin only further exasperated him. He doubled his demand on the Zāmorin's ministers[457] and tortured them without the least intermission. They could not, however, produce

Haidar's exactions from the Zāmorin's ministers.

Malabar, I, 411. For other sources referring to Haidar's campaigns in Malabar, see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 35-36,; *Telli. Fact. Rec.*, *Letters Received* 1765-66, p. 19; *Diaries*, XXIX. 188, 257, 260, 293, &c., Kīrmāṇi, however, gives an entirely different account. He is wholly at variance with the other sources when he says that the Zāmorin, on finding that all the country had been conquered by Haidar, that affairs were going against him, that he was not able to oppose the conqueror any further in open fight, and that he had no means of escaping from him, and, finding himself resourceless, sent ambassadors with presents and provisions for the army and the "tribute money," etc., (the arrears due) and asked for forgiveness for his offence. Haidar, from convenience and policy, called the envoys to his presence, and having severely reproved them, he honoured the Zāmorin with a *Cowl-nāma* (letter of security) and sent for him. After they met, Haidar, it is added by Kīrmāṇi, "gave him his life and property and forgave his offences, but took the country out of his hands, and instead of it gave him a monthly pension, and thus freed himself from all further trouble with him" (Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 185). This story has to be rejected as incredible in the light of the contemporary and other sources, of which the *Haid. Nām.*, is the earliest, being referable to 1784. The story narrated in this work is, moreover, materially corroborated and supported by the other sources cited above. Kīrmāṇi's account being based on other sources referred to but not specifically named by him, we have been unable to trace the particular one from which he derived his version. He also postdates the conquest of Malabar to 1767 (A. H. 1181), which is also not supported by other sources (*o. c.*, 178). On the other hand, Stewart antedates the event and sets it down to 1764 (*o. c.*, 17).

456. Wilks, l. c. There can be no doubt that Haidar issued such a command, whether from merciful motives or from the sole motive of saving as much as he could, of what might otherwise be lost in the fire. De La Tour says that "the tragical end of the Samorin affected Haidar extremely" and he adds that "he was so irritated against the nephews of that prince, that he publicly swore he would never restore their dominions (*o. c.*, I. 114). Wilks, however, takes the opposite view that "even a scene of this nature was not calculated to operate on the impenetrable nerves of Hyder" (*o. c.*, I. 533).

457. *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.

anything like the amount demanded of them, what they did bring in falling far short of the sum stipulated by Haidar.[458]

The settlement of the Zāmorin's country.

Haidar's arrangements for holding the conquered country were made with characteristic zeal, while the contributions levied were being collected by his agents. The Rāja of Kolattiri having fled,[459] his territories were taken over by Haidar. The Rāja of Kolattiri, however, had several "sons",[460] one of whom was seized by Haidar, made a prisoner and "adopted" by him, being converted to the Muslim faith and given the name of Ayāz Khān.[461] The Kolattiri country was handed over to Alī Rāja, who agreed to pay a tribute for it, which he found it impossible to raise. While the taxes he imposed on the people proved heavy, he himself was always in arrears in the payment of his tribute to Mysore.[462] The Zāmorin's territories were annexed to Mysore, Calicut being garrisoned.[463] The small fort there was improved and enlarged,[464] and additional posts were erected in different parts of the country, and, with a

458. Wilks, l. c.

459. Kīrmāṇi says that he was "slain" but no other source confirms this statement. Probably he fled and sought shelter in Travancore (*o.c.*, 185).

460. So says Kīrmāṇi: probably he means "nephews," as the succession was in the female line (l.c.).

461. "Iyas Khān" of Kīrmāṇi (l.c.). Wilks partially confirms this story in his *History* (*o.c.*, I. 741), though he says that he was one of those prisoners "carried off in the first inhuman emigration from Malabar." He describes him "as a young Nair, from Chercul," *i.e.*, Chirakkal, or the Kolattiri kingdom, and adds that he "had been received as a slave of the palace, and to whom, on his forced conversion to Islam, they had given the name of Sheik Ayaz" (*Ibid*). He became Governor of Bednūr on Tipū's coming to power. The English writers called him *Hyat-Saheb* (corruption of *Ayāz Sāheb*). When offered the Governorship of Chitaldrug by Haidar, he declined it, but was, as will be narrated later, persuaded to accept it (see Wilks, *o.c.*, 742-743, for an anecdote in this connection).

462. Moens, *o.c.*, 153.

463. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 533; and De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 113.

464. *Ibid*; Wilks, l.c.

view to eventualities, stored with ammunition and provisions for the use of their ample garrisons. A disposable column of 3,000 regular infantry, aided by Alī Rāja's Māpiḷḷa troops, was stationed at Calicut.[465] The civil government of the place was committed to one Mādaṇṇa, son of one Terakaṇāmbi Śankara-Gauḍa, who had been Governor of Coimbatore, a position in which he had proved himself capable and trustworthy.[466] He was chosen for the post for the reason that he was successfully governing the adjoining country, and being a Hindu, it was expected that he would be welcome to the Nairs, whose manners and customs he understood.[467]

Haidar advances further south-west.

All this took nearly a month from the day Māna-Vikrama put himself to death in such an extraordinary fashion. Haidar then moved further south-west, with the view of reducing the country as far as Travancore, thus completing his design of the conquest of the whole of the Western Coast from Goa onwards.[468] He had the more reason to do this now, as he suspected that the sons of the Nair chiefs of Malabar—including those belonging to the Kolattiri and Zāmorin families—had taken counsel with the kings of Travancore and Cochin, and had collected a large army at Ponnāni, about 36 miles to the south of Calicut.[469] Their forces assembled on the banks of the river of the same name, and were

465. Wilks, l.c.

466. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; De La Tour, *l.c.* De La Tour describes Mādaṇṇa, whose name he does not mention, as the "Raja of Coimbatore", which is not strictly correct; nor is his reference to him as a "Brahman" equally accurate. Mādaṇṇa, according to *Haid. Nām.*, was a non-Brāhman Hindu, being a *Vokkaliga*, his father's name being Śankara-Gauḍa, as stated above.

467. De La Tour, *l.c.* See also and compare, on the subject of Haidar's invasion of Malabar, Peixoto, *Memoirs* (*l.c.*), whose account, though brief, agrees in the main with the other sources drawn upon here.

468. The conquest of Bednūr was the prelude to the conquest of the Portuguese territories; as regards Travancore, see text below.

469. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I 112.

assisted by a few European gunners [470] and Portuguese artisans. These, however, precipitately withdrew, immediately Haidar made his appearance. He pursued them as far as Cochin, some fifty miles further to the southward, where, by the mediation of the Dutch, the king of Cochin made peace with him by agreeing to pay tribute to Mysore.[471] Ponnāni possessed a strong fort and it was garrisoned by Haidar immediately the Nairs retired before him. The example of Cochin was followed by the submission of the rest of the chiefs, including the Rāja of Pālghat,[472] who all agreed to pay tribute and settle the alleged claims of the Māpiḷḷas.[473] On these terms, their territories were restored to them, except that the nephews of the Zāmorin were kept out of possession of Calicut and the territory subordinate to it.[474] From Cochin, after a dreary and difficult march, in which many horses and cattle were lost, Haidar passed through the woods of Annamalais, receiving on the way tribute from the Rājas of Pālghāt and Cochin;[475] and reached Coimbatore, towards the close of April 1766, where he cantoned. Before doing so, he posted Alī Razā-Khān with 3,000

Reduction of Cochin and other chiefs.

Return to Coimbatore.

470. The Europeans referred to were probably Dutchmen.

471. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 112-113; Wilks, l.c.; and Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 186.

472. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 534.

473. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 113.

474. *Ibid.*

475. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 533-534; Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 186; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 36. Wilks says Haidar exacted "tribute" from both these Rājas. The chief of Malabar referred to by Kīrmāṇi may be identified with the Rāja of Pālghāt. He is said to have sent 28 elephants and Rs. 7 lakhs as a present. According to him, Haidar levied contributions also from the inhabitants of Cochin. De La Tour does not mention these conquests. According to *Haid. Nām.*, however, a lack of rupees was exacted from the Chief of Pālghāt, while the Chief of Cochin was made to pay an annual tribute (*khaṇḍaṇe*) of 40,000 *varahas*.

infantry at Mannārkat,[476] a large town and fortress on the frontier, about 18 miles west by south of Coimbatore and midway between Ponnāni and Pālghāt.

Rebellion of Nair chiefs and its suppression.

Mādaṇṇa at Coimbatore, however, did not fulfil expectations. His exactions and his lack of knowledge of the character of the people he had to deal with proved inimical to the success of his administration. Nor would the Nairs easily yield to foreign subjugation as Haidar seems to have thought. Their fiery zeal for independence and the imprudent measures of Mādaṇṇa drove them into open rebellion.[477] The secret help that the king of Travancore rendered them and the nephews of the Zāmorin also evidently inclined them in the same direction.[478] Alī Rāja and his brother Shaik Rāja had added their own quota. If they and Mādaṇṇa had been more temperate in their exactions, the rebellion would perhaps have been less general.[479] Within two or three months of Haidar's arrival at Coimbatore, he received news of a general rebellion of the Nairs throughout the invaded country. The monsoon had broken out and every rivulet had swollen into a river. The weather helping them, the Nairs attacked the block-houses, which the swelling of the rivers had cut off from all reinforcement, either from each other, or from the movable column stationed at Calicut.[480]

476. De La Tour calls this place "Madigheri" and says it was 6 leagues from Coimbatore (*o.c.*, I. 114). If that be so, it should be "Mannarkat" of the Survey Map of India; and "Mungary Cota" of Mackenzie's Map of 1808.

477. Wilks *o.c.*, I. 534.

478. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 115.

479. *Ibid.*

480. Wilks says "three months" (l.c.); Robson says that the rebellion occurred "within two months" after Haidar's departure (*o.c.*, 37). The rebellion was begun by the brother of the late Zāmorin of Calicut, if not led by him. He collected an army of 20,000 men and invested Calicut. From intelligence gained from within, he forced the place, and put the whole garrison to the sword, except about 300 men, who fled to a neighbouring temple for safety (Robson, l.c.).

The Nairs began by massacring a small garrison of about 200 men stationed at Puḍiyangaḍi.[481]. Here they cut off five French soldiers, who were proceeding from Mahe to join Haidar at Coimbatore.[482] Their object was to take Calicut before Haidar or Alī Razā Khān came back to prevent their endeavours. Both Ponnāni and Calicut were soon invested by them.[483] News of this reaching Alī Rāzā at Mannārkat, he made a precipitate march, which duly impressed the Nairs. But seeing that he had no cavalry with him, they succeeded in drawing him into a place, situated at the junction of the two rivers near Puḍiyangaḍi, where he found himself shut up, without being able to pass on either side, by reason of the depth and rapidity of the water. He also saw he had been cut off from returning by the defiles he had passed, which were everywhere rendered difficult to pass by the felling of trees and by the lying in wait of Nairs in ambuscade, ready to fire.[484] Haidar, securing reinforcements from Mysore, after the rains abated a little, marched at the head of 3,000 horse, 10,000 foot and 12 light pieces of cannon,[485] and by forced marches through a mountainous country, under a blazing sun, alternating with rain followed with thunder and lightning, soon reached Manjēri,[486] which he made his head-quarters. From here he sent detachments in various directions. One of these, consisting of 5000 foot and 1000 horse,

481. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 114; De La Tour calls this place Pandicharry, which has to be identified with Pondiagerry of Mackenzie's Map of 1808 and Puḍiyangaḍi of the modern Survey Map.

482. *Ibid*, 115.

483. *Ibid*, 115-116.

484. *Ibid*, 117-118.

485. *Ibid*, 118-119. Wilks, however, says that Haidar moved with only "a light equipment of eight days' provisions" (*o.c.*, I. 535), and he is confirmed by *Haid. Nām.* also (l.c.).

486. Manjēri, called "Munjera" by Wilks (l.c.), lies nearly midway between Periangaḍi and Nilambūr, and just 10 miles north of Malapuram. There is a graphic description of the difficulties encountered by Haidar during this march in De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 119-120.

was under one Asof Khān, who had strict orders to retake Calicut. On his approach, the rebel leader marched out valiantly and gave battle. Worsted in two attacks, and not choosing to be invested, he left the place towards night-fall, retreating with his army. The inhabitants fled to the neighbouring hills, thus facilitating the occupation of the country by Asof Khān. But the rebel leader's retreat was nothing more than a ruse. Three months elapsed and he reappeared on the scene. Haidar's party, lulled into a state of security, fell an easy prey to a sudden attack. Asof Khān's head was cut off and Calicut was retaken with ease.[487] The rebel leader, however, was not kept long in possession of the place. Haidar, hearing of the disaster, detached a force under Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao, one of his Brāhman officers, with orders to retake it. On his advance, the rebel leader attacked him, but being worsted once again, retired to the woods. Śrīnivāsa Rao re-occupied Calicut thereafter and garrisoned it.[488] Hearing of this unexpected arrival of Haidar, the Nair chiefs collected their forces and prepared to offer opposition to him at Puḍiyangaḍi. They had strongly entrenched themselves here, at this place, which, on its left wing, had a fortified village with a ditch and parapet planted with pallisades, well furnished with artillery. Haidar, seeing the resolute opposition offered him by men who preferred death to surrender, determined to attack this camp. He detached his right wing, consisting of 4000 of his best sepoys, and charged them to attack it. Commanded by a Portuguese officer, they attacked the camp by marching to the edge of the ditch, but being badly exposed, the troops were destroyed to a man by the Nairs, who fired with impunity from pentholes or from behind

487. Robson, *o c.*, 37-38.

488 *Ibid*, 38. The "Sevagee Row," a Mahratta Brāhman, referred to by Robson, should by identified with "Śrīnivāsa Rao", *i. e.*, Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao of the text above.

the hedges. Haidar's anger knew no bounds at the improper manœuvre of the Portuguese officer, who soon earned his dismissal at his hands. The French officer, who served in support of the main body of the troops, under the direct command of Haidar, now advanced forward and put himself at the head of the remnant of the sepoys with his reserve corps. Supported by his own men, Haidar and his troops jumped into the ditch, and hastily ascending the entrenchments, tore up the pallisades, and were instantly in the face of the Nair chiefs. They gave no quarter; the Nair forces, taken unawares and all too suddenly, suffered themselves to be butchered without even an opportunity for offering any resistance. The flames of the village on fire, and the direction of the cannon now pointed on the unhappy Nair chiefs, showed that the village had been carried. Haidar now moved with his whole army and attacked the entrenchment, with the result that the Nairs deserted it and fled precipitately in utter disorder. The inhabitants all round deserted their homes and had the anguish to behold, from their hiding, houses in flames, their fruit-trees cut down, their cattle destroyed and their temples burned.[489] Their further march uninterrupted, Haidar's troops slew isolated bodies of Nairs, while the prisoners taken in the first attacks were either beheaded or hanged. As their numbers increased, Haidar conceived the plan of transplanting them to uninhabited areas in Mysore. This cure for rebellion in one province and for defective population in another proved, as might be expected, wholly futile. Unaccustomed to the new climate, and the new conditions of life demanded by it, added to the hunger and the mental anxiety resulting from the sudden transfer from their accustomed environment, not two hundred

489. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 120-125. Wilks omits all mention of this attack (l.c.).

survived of the 15,000 thus transported.[490] These rigorous measures, however, had little effect in restoring confidence in the people. The Māpiḷḷas and Alī Rāja saw that in the ruin of the Nairs their own future was involved. They prevailed on Haidar to return to Coimbatore in the hope that his absence might induce the people to return to their homes. Haidar, however, thought it best to proclaim an amnesty to such of the remaining inhabitants as should immediately submit. Many returned but they bore no love for Haidar or for his troops who had proved so cruel towards them.[491] Before returning to Coimbatore, Haidar took the precaution of providing for the protection of the new conquests he had made. As he had exacted the allegiance of the Rāja of Pālghāt, he directed the erection of a fort at Pālghāt, a position judiciously chosen as an advanced post and depot, securing for all time an easy communication between the new conquests and the old province of Coimbatore, from whose capital it was only thirty miles distant.[492] Haidar appointed Sardār Khān, described as an officer of great courage, as Subādār of the newly occupied country and left with him military force sufficient to guard it and aid him in its administration.[493]

490. Wilks compares these transplantations to the numerous instances that occur in Jewish history, and adversely remarks on "the barbarous nature of the design" underlying such transplantation of the population of one area to another (l.c.). Here is something of a warning to those—European or Indian—who suggest transfer of populations from one area to another, for whatever reasons.

491. Wilks *o.c.*, I. 535-536. De La Tour says that Haidar issued an order which made the Nairs forfeit all their privileges, subjecting them "to salute the Pariahs and others of the lowest castes" and that he also issued another edict by which he established in all their rights and privileges such Nairs "as should embrace the Muhammadan religion" (*o.c.*, I. 126-127). These statements should be taken with reservation, though he says that "many of the nobles took the turban on this occasion" (*o.c.*, I. 127). As a matter of fact, many remained, as he admits later, "dispersed and chose rather to take refuge in the kingdom of Travancore than submit to this last ordinance" (*Ibid*).

492. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 536.

493. Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 186-187. On the topics included in this section, see also *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.), which contains a running summary of the whole affair.

Territorial limits of Mysore in 1766.

In 1766, the last year of the reign of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar II, the territorial limits of Mysore had extended far beyond what they had been in 1704, the last year of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar's reign. Its northern frontier had extended to Bednūr and far beyond it, while the southern frontier had extended to Diṇḍigal in the south and Cochin in the south-west. The tendency to reach down to the sea in the south and south-west and advance northwards to the banks of the Krishṇa had become more pronounced since 1750, with the coming into power of the Daḷavāi brothers. This territorial expansion was the direct outcome of the strenuous work which Haidar Alī continued from the period he came to be at the head of affairs in Mysore, thus fulfilling the policy of his masters and the predecessors, the early rulers of Mysore.